TRUMP

v.

ANDERSON

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 601 U.

S. Part 1 Pages 100–123 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT March 4, 2024 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors. 100 OCTOBER TERM, 2023 Syllabus TRUMP v. ANDERSON et al. certiorari to the supreme court of colorado No. 23–719. Argued February 8, 2024—Decided March 4, 2024 Six Colorado voters (respondents here) filed a petition in Colorado state court against former President Donald J. Trump and Colorado Secretary of State Jena Griswold, contending that Section³ of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former President Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomination of the Republican Party in this year's election, from becoming President again.

Section³ provides: “No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.” According to the respondents, Section³ applies to the former President because after taking the Presidential oath in 2017, he intentionally incited the breaching of the Capitol on January 6, 2021, in order to retain power. The respondents claim that the former President is therefore not a qualifed candidate under Colorado law and may not be placed on the Presidential primary ballot. The state District Court found that former President Trump had “engaged in insurrection” within the meaning of Section³, but nonetheless denied the respondents' petition. It concluded that the Presidency, which Section³ does not mention by name, is not an “office . . . under the United States” and the President is not an “officer of the United States” within the meaning of that provision. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a–284a. A divided Colorado Supreme Court reversed the District Court's operative holding that Section³ did not apply to the former President, and otherwise affirmed. It accordingly ordered Secretary Griswold not to list former President Trump on the Presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. See Anderson v. Griswold, 543 P. 3d 283. Held: Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section³ against federal offceholders and candidates, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in ordering former President Trump excluded from Colorado's 2024 Presidential primary ballot. Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 101 Syllabus (a) Ratifed after the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment “expand[ed] federal power at the expense of state autonomy” and thus “fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 59.

Section³ was designed to help ensure an enduring Union by preventing former Confederates from returning to power. Because Section³ works by imposing on certain individuals a preventive and severe penalty—disqualifcation from holding a wide array of offices—rather than by granting rights to all, it is necessary, as Chief Justice Chase concluded and the Colorado Supreme Court recognized, to “ `ascertain[] what particular individuals are embraced' ” by the provision. 543 P. 3d, at 316 (quoting Griffn's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (No. 5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase, Circuit Justice)). “To accomplish this ascertainment and ensure effective results, proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable.” Id., at 26. The Constitution empowers Congress to prescribe how those determinations should be made. The relevant provision is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which enables Congress, subject to judicial review, to pass “appropriate legislation” to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536. That power is critical when it comes to Section 3. Indeed, shortly after ratifcation, hundreds of men were holding office in violation of Section<sup>3</sup>, prompting Congress to pass Section 5 enforcement legislation. See Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 143–144. (b) States have sovereign power over the qualifcations and elections of their own officers, see Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 570–571. But States lack the constitutional authority to enforce Section<sup>3</sup> with respect to federal offices, especially the Presidency. Because federal officers “ `owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the people,' ” powers over their election and qualifcations must be specifically “delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States.” U.

S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 803–804 (quoting 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §627, p. 435 (3d ed. 1858)).

Not even the respondents contend that the Constitution authorizes the States to somehow remove sitting federal offceholders who may be violating Section 3. And the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which speaks only to enforcement by Congress, does not affirmatively delegate to the States the power to enforce Section³ against candidates for federal office.

Moreover, because its substantive provisions “embody signifcant limitations on state authority,” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456, it would be incongruous to read this particular Amendment as silently granting the States that power. The only other plausi- 102 TRUMP v. ANDERSON Syllabus ble constitutional sources of such a delegation are the Elections and Electors Clauses, which authorize States to conduct and regulate congressional and Presidential elections, respectively. See Art. I, §4, cl. 1; Art. II, §1, cl.

2. But there is little reason to think that these Clauses implicitly authorize the States to enforce Section³ against federal offceholders and candidates. Granting the States that authority would invert the Fourteenth Amendment's rebalancing of federal and state power. The text of Section³ reinforces these conclusions. Its final sentence empowers Congress to “remove” any Section³ “disability” by a twothirds vote of each House. Congress may exercise that amnesty power at any time, and historically, Congress sometimes removed Section³ disabilities postelection to ensure that some of the people's chosen candidates could take office. But if States were free to enforce Section³ by barring candidates from running in the first place, Congress would be forced to exercise its disability removal power before voting begins. It is implausible to suppose that the Constitution affirmatively delegated to the States the authority to impose such a burden on congressional power with respect to candidates for federal office. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436. Nor have the respondents identifed any tradition of state enforcement of Section³ against federal offceholders or candidates in the years following ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, it is Congress that has long given effect to Section³ with respect to would-be or existing federal offceholders. And while Section 5 limits congressional legislation enforcing Section³ by requiring Congress to “tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing” the specifc individual conduct that Section³ prohibits, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 639, state enforcement might be argued to sweep more broadly. It is implausible that the Constitution grants the States freer rein than Congress to decide how Section³ should be enforced with respect to federal offices.

Finally, state enforcement with respect to the Presidency would raise heightened concerns. “[I]n the context of a Presidential election, stateimposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 794–795 (footnote omitted). Conficting state-by-state resolution of the question whether Section³ bars a particular candidate for President could result not just from differing views of the merits, but also from variations in state law governing the proceedings that are necessary to make Section³ disqualifcation determinations. The “patchwork” that would likely result from state enforcement would “sever the direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States” as a whole.

U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 822. Nothing in Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 103 Syllabus the Constitution requires that the Nation endure the chaos that could result. 543 P. 3d 283, reversed.

Jonathan F. Mitchell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Scott E. Gessler, David A. Warrington, Gary M. Lawkowski, and Harmeet Dhillon. Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Andrew J. Ekonomou, Jane Serene Raskin, Walter M. Weber, Cecilia Noland-Heil, Michael W. Melito, and Benjamin P. Sisney filed briefs for respondent Colorado Republican State Central Committee urging reversal. Jason Murray argued the cause for respondent Anderson et al. With him on the brief were Donald Sherman, Nikhel Sus, Jonathan Maier, Martha Tierney, Mario Nicolais, Sean Grimsley, Eric Olson, and Isabel Broer. Shannon Wells Stevenson, Solicitor General of Colorado, argued the cause for respondent Griswold. With her on the brief were Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Natalie Hanlon Leh, Deputy Attorney General, Dayna Zolle Hauser, Michael Kotlarczyk, Michael McMaster, Joseph Michaels, LeeAnn Morrill, and Helen Norton.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Indiana et al. by Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, James A. Barta, Solicitor General, and Melinda R. Holmes, Deputy Attorney General, by Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General of West Virginia, Michael R. Williams, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and David E. Gilbert, Deputy Attorney General, by Rusty D. Crandell, Linley Wilson, and Sam M. Hayes, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Raúl Labrador of Idaho, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Russell Coleman of Kentucky, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, John M. Formella of New Hampshire, Drew H. Wrigley of North Dakota, David A. Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Jason Miyares of Virginia, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for the State of Kansas by Kris W. Kobach, Attorney General, and Anthony J. Powell, Solicitor General; for Chuck Gray, Secretary of 104 TRUMP v. ANDERSON Per Curiam Per Curiam.

A group of Colorado voters contends that Section³ of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former President Donald J. Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomi- State of Wyoming, by Judd E. Stone II, Ari Cuenin, and Gene P. Hamilton; for America's Future et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Robert J. Olson, Patrick McSweeney, J. Mark Brewer, and John I. Harris III; for Christian Family Coalition (CFC) Florida, Inc., by Dennis Grossman; for the Claremont Institute's Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John Yoo; for Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III et al. by Gene C. Schaerr, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Boos, and Daniel H. Jorjani; for Former U.

S. Attorney Robert S. Brewer, Jr. et al. by R. Trent Shores; for the James Madison Center for Free Speech by James Bopp, Jr.; for Judicial Watch, Inc., et al. by T. Russell Nobile, Robert D. Popper, and H. Christopher Coates; for the Kansas Republican Party et al. by Craig L. Uhrich; for the Landmark Legal Foundation by Michael J. O'Neill, Matthew C. Forys, and Richard P. Hutchison; for the Public Interest Legal Foundation et al. by J. Christian Adams and Kaylan Phillips; for the Republican National Committee et al. by Patrick N. Strawbridge, Gilbert C. Dickey, Christopher O. Murray, and Julian R. Ellis, Jr.; for Sen. Ted Cruz et al. by R. Trent McCotter and Gene P. Hamilton; for Sen. Steve Daines et al. by Noel J. Francisco, John M. Gore, E. Stewart Crosland, and Hashim M. Mooppan; for Jack Coben by Larry E. Coben; for William Jones by Stephen Yagman; for Larry Kidd by Larry J. Obhof, Jr., and Mark D. Wagoner, Jr.; for Kurt T. Lash by Christopher E. Mills; for James T. Lindgren by Benjamin M. Flowers; for Pearl O. Madrial by Harold Emmett Lucas; for Terpsehore “Tore” Maras et al. by Warner Mendenhall; for Peter Meijer by Charles R. Spies; for Vivek Ramaswamy by Jonathan Lienhard, Phillip M. Gordon, and Edward Wenger; for Seth Barrett Tillman by Josh Blackman, C. Thomas Ludden, Robert W. Ray, R. Scott Reisch, and Jessica L. Hays; for Devin Watkins et al. by Devin Watkins, pro se; for Gavin M. Wax et al. by Edward Andrew Paltzik and Serge Krimnus; and for 102 Colorado Registered Electors by J. Gregory Troutman.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were filed for Common Cause by Gregory L. Diskant, Jonah M. Knobler, and Kathay Feng; for the Constitutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for Former Colorado Secretary of State Mary Estill Buchanan by Michael A. Caplan; for Former Republican Governors by Jeffrey A. Mandell, Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 105 Per Curiam nation of the Republican Party in this year's election, from becoming President again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with that contention. It ordered the Colorado secre- Douglas M. Poland, and Rachel E. Snyder; for Former Republican Members of Congress by Faith E. Gay; for Retired State Supreme Court Justices by Ronald A. Fein, John C. Bonifaz, Ben T. Clements, Courtney Hostetler, and Charles N. Nauen; for the San Francisco Taxpayers Association et al. by Paul D. Scott; for Floyd Abrams et al. by Steven A. Hirsch; for Carol Anderson et al. by Erica Grossman and John Holland; for Josh Autry, pro se; for Jeremy Bates, pro se; for David P. Cullenberg et al. by Robert A. Stein; for David M. Driesen et al. by David M. Driesen, pro se; for G. Antaeus B. Edelsohn by Joan D.

B. Edelsohn; for Sherrilyn A. Ifll, pro se; for J. Michael Luttig et al. by Richard D. Bernstein and Nancy A. Temple; for Brian J. Martin by Wallace K. Lightsey; for Kermit Roosevelt by Robert S. Peck; for Ilya Somin by Gerson H. Smoger; and for David B. Tatge, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson by Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Heather S. Meingast, Division Chief, and Erik A. Grill, Assistant Attorney General; for the Secretaries of State of Missouri et al. by Barbara A. Smith, Jesus A. Osete, and Robert M. Thompson; for American Historians by Jonathan B. Miller, Joshua A. Rosenthal, and Michael Adame; for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Susan J. Kohlmann, Benjamin D. Alter, Marcy L. Kahn, Stephen L. Kass, and Jerry H. Goldfeder; for the Brennan Center for Justice et al. by Michelle S. Kallen, Wendy R. Weiser, Thomas P. Wolf, Eliza M. Sweren-Becker, Paul M. Smith, Adav Noti, Kevin P. Hancock, Benjamin L. Berwick, and Cameron O. Kistler; for the Capitol Police Offcers Present at the U.

S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, by Damon Hewitt, Jon M. Greenbaum, Marc P. Epstein, William J. Blechman, Elizabeth B. Honkonen, Lauren M. Blas, Lee R. Crain, and Mark J. Cherry; for Children's Rights Legal Scholars et al. by Julia A. Olson, Mathew W. dos Santos, Philip L. Gregory, and Catherine Smith, pro se; for Condemned USA by George T. Pallas; for Experts in Democracy by John Vail; for the League for Sportsmen et al. by Earl N. “Trey” Mayfeld III; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Anuja D. Thatte, Burt M. Rublin, Janai S. Nelson, and Samuel Spital; for Professors and Legal Scholars by Mari Newman; for U.

S. Term Limits by David H. Thompson and Brian W. Barnes; for Akhil Reed Amar et al. by Vikram David Amar, pro se; for Ryan Binkley et al. by Erick G. Kaardal; for David Boyle, pro se; for Orville Vernon Burton et al. by Michael J. Kasper; 106 TRUMP v. ANDERSON Per Curiam tary of state to exclude the former President from the Republican primary ballot in the State and to disregard any write-in votes that Colorado voters might cast for him. Former President Trump challenges that decision on several grounds. Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section³ against federal offceholders and candidates, we reverse.

I

Last September, about six months before the March 5, 2024, Colorado primary election, four Republican and two unaffliated Colorado voters filed a petition against former President Trump and Colorado Secretary of State Jena Griswold in Colorado state court. These voters—whom we refer to as the respondents—contend that after former President Trump's defeat in the 2020 Presidential election, he disrupted the peaceful transfer of power by intentionally organizing and inciting the crowd that breached the Capitol as Congress met to certify the election results on January 6, 2021. One consequence of those actions, the respondents maintain, is that former President Trump is constitutionally ineligible to serve as President again. Their theory turns on Section³ of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section³ provides: “No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the for Edward B. Foley et al. by Michael B. Kimberly; for Mark A. Graber by Nelson Boyle; for Edward J. Larson, by J. Carl Cecere and Edward J. Larson, pro se; for Jordan L. Michelson by Anthony Robert Zelle; for Derek T. Muller by Heather Gebelin Hacker; for David E. Weisberg, pro se; and for Michael T. Worley by Burt M. Rublin. Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 107 Per Curiam Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.” According to the respondents, Section³ applies to the former President because after taking the Presidential oath in 2017, he intentionally incited the breaching of the Capitol on January 6 in order to retain power. They claim that he is therefore not a qualifed candidate, and that as a result, the Colorado secretary of state may not place him on the primary ballot. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§1–1–113(1), 1–4–1101(1), 1–4–1201, 1–4–1203(2)(a), 1–4–1204 (2023).

After a fve-day trial, the state District Court found that former President Trump had “engaged in insurrection” within the meaning of Section³, but nonetheless denied the respondents' petition. The court held that Section³ did not apply because the Presidency, which Section³ does not mention by name, is not an “office . . . under the United States” and the President is not an “officer of the United States” within the meaning of that provision. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a–284a.

In December, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part by a 4 to³ vote. Reversing the District Court's operative holding, the majority concluded that for purposes of Section³, the Presidency is an office under the United States and the President is an officer of the United States. The court otherwise affirmed, holding (1) that the Colorado Election Code permitted the respondents' challenge based on Section³; (2) that Congress need not pass implementing legislation for disqualifcations under Section³ to attach; (3) that the political question doctrine did not preclude judicial review of former President Trump's eligibility; (4) that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence portions of a congressional Report on the events of January 6; (5) that the District Court 108 TRUMP v. ANDERSON Per Curiam did not err in concluding that those events constituted an “insurrection” and that former President Trump “engaged in” that insurrection; and (6) that former President Trump's speech to the crowd that breached the Capitol on January 6 was not protected by the First Amendment. See Anderson v. Griswold, 543 P. 3d 283 (2023).

The Colorado Supreme Court accordingly ordered Secretary Griswold not to “list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot” or “count any write-in votes cast for him.” Id., at 342. Chief Justice Boatright and Justices Samour and Berkenkotter each filed dissenting opinions. Id., at 342, 346, 361. Under the terms of the opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court, its ruling was automatically stayed pending this Court's review. See id., at 342. We granted former President Trump's petition for certiorari, which raised a single question: “Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?” See 601 U. S. ––– (2024).

Concluding that it did, we now reverse.

II

A

Proposed by Congress in 1866 and ratifed by the States in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment “expand[ed] federal power at the expense of state autonomy” and thus “fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 59 (1996); see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880).

Section 1 of the Amendment, for instance, bars the States from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” or “deny[ing] to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” And Section 5 confers on Congress “power to enforce” those prohibitions, along with the other provisions of the Amendment, “by appropriate legislation.” Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 109 Per Curiam Section³ of the Amendment likewise restricts state autonomy, but through different means. It was designed to help ensure an enduring Union by preventing former Confederates from returning to power in the aftermath of the Civil War. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2544 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens, warning that without appropriate constitutional reforms “yelling secessionists and hissing copperheads” would take seats in the House); id., at 2768 (statement of Sen. Howard, lamenting prospect of a “State Legislature . . . made up entirely of disloyal elements” absent a disqualifcation provision).

Section³ aimed to prevent such a resurgence by barring from office “those who, having once taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, afterward went into rebellion against the Government of the United States.” Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., 626 (1869) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).

Section³ works by imposing on certain individuals a preventive and severe penalty—disqualifcation from holding a wide array of offices—rather than by granting rights to all. It is therefore necessary, as Chief Justice Chase concluded and the Colorado Supreme Court itself recognized, to “ `ascertain[] what particular individuals are embraced' ” by the provision. 543 P. 3d, at 316 (quoting Griffn's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (No. 5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase, Circuit Justice)).

Chase went on to explain that “[t]o accomplish this ascertainment and ensure effective results, proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable.” Id., at 26. For its part, the Colorado Supreme Court also concluded that there must be some kind of “determination” that Section³ applies to a particular person “before the disqualifcation holds meaning.” 543 P. 3d, at 316.

The Constitution empowers Congress to prescribe how those determinations should be made. The relevant provision is Section 5, which enables Congress, subject of course to judicial review, to pass “appropriate legislation” to “en- 110 TRUMP v. ANDERSON Per Curiam force” the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536 (1997).

Or as Senator Howard put it at the time the Amendment was framed, Section 5 “casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out in good faith.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2768. Congress's Section 5 power is critical when it comes to Section 3. Indeed, during a debate on enforcement legislation less than a year after ratifcation, Sen. Trumbull noted that “notwithstanding [Section³] . . . hundreds of men [were] holding office” in violation of its terms. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., at 626. The Constitution, Trumbull noted, “provide[d] no means for enforcing” the disqualifcation, necessitating a “bill to give effect to the fundamental law embraced in the Constitution.” Ibid. The enforcement mechanism Trumbull championed was later enacted as part of the Enforcement Act of 1870, “pursuant to the power conferred by §5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 385 (1982); see 16 Stat. 143–144.

B

This case raises the question whether the States, in addition to Congress, may also enforce Section 3.

We conclude that States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office. But States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section³ with respect to federal offices, especially the Presidency. “In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.” Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 854 (2014).

Among those retained powers is the power of a State to “order the processes of its own governance.”

Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 752 (1999).

In particular, the States enjoy sovereign “power to prescribe the qualifcations of their own officers” and “the manner of their election . . . Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 111 Per Curiam free from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.” Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 570–571 (1900).

Although the Fourteenth Amendment restricts state power, nothing in it plainly withdraws from the States this traditional authority. And after ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment, States used this authority to disqualify state officers in accordance with state statutes. See, e. g., Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N. C. 199, 200, 204 (1869) (elected county sheriff); State ex rel. Sandlin v. Watkins, 21 La. 631, 631–633 (1869) (state judge).

Such power over governance, however, does not extend to federal offceholders and candidates. Because federal offcers “ `owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the people,' ” powers over their election and qualifcations must be specifically “delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States.” U.

S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 803–804 (1995) (quoting 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §627, p. 435 (3d ed. 1858)).

But nothing in the Constitution delegates to the States any power to enforce Section³ against federal offceholders and candidates. As an initial matter, not even the respondents contend that the Constitution authorizes States to somehow remove sitting federal offceholders who may be violating Section 3. Such a power would fout the principle that “the Constitution guarantees `the entire independence of the General Government from any control by the respective States.' ” Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800 (2020) (quoting Farmers and Mechanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 521 (1914)).

Indeed, consistent with that principle, States lack even the lesser powers to issue writs of mandamus against federal officials or to grant habeas corpus relief to persons in federal custody. See McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598, 603–605 (1821); Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 405– 410 (1872). 112 TRUMP v. ANDERSON Per Curiam The respondents nonetheless maintain that States may enforce Section³ against candidates for federal office. But the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, does not affirmatively delegate such a power to the States. The terms of the Amendment speak only to enforcement by Congress, which enjoys power to enforce the Amendment through legislation pursuant to Section 5. This can hardly come as a surprise, given that the substantive provisions of the Amendment “embody signifcant limitations on state authority.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976).

Under the Amendment, States cannot abridge privileges or immunities, deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process, deny equal protection, or deny male inhabitants the right to vote (without thereby suffering reduced representation in the House).

See Amdt. 14, §§1, 2. On the other hand, the Fourteenth Amendment grants new power to Congress to enforce the provisions of the Amendment against the States. It would be incongruous to read this particular Amendment as granting the States the power—silently no less—to disqualify a candidate for federal office. The only other plausible constitutional sources of such a delegation are the Elections and Electors Clauses, which authorize States to conduct and regulate congressional and Presidential elections, respectively. See Art. I, §4, cl. 1; Art. II, §1, cl. 2.1 But there is little reason to think that these Clauses implicitly authorize the States to enforce Section³ against federal offceholders and candidates. Granting the States that authority would invert the Fourteenth Amendment's rebalancing of federal and state power. 1 The Elections Clause directs, in relevant part, that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” Art. I, §4, cl.

1.

The Electors Clause similarly provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,” who in turn elect the President. Art. II, §1, cl.

2.

Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 113 Per Curiam The text of Section³ reinforces these conclusions. Its final sentence empowers Congress to “remove” any Section

Nor have the respondents identifed any tradition of state enforcement of Section³ against federal offceholders or candidates in the years following ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment.³ Such a lack of historical precedent is gener- 2 Shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed, for instance, Congress enacted a private bill to remove the Section³ disability of Nelson Tift of Georgia, who had recently been elected to represent the State in Congress. See ch. 393, 15 Stat.

427. Tift took his seat in Congress immediately thereafter. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4499–4500 (1868).

Congress similarly acted postelection to remove the disabilities of persons elected to state and local offices. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 29–30, 120–121 (1868); ch. 5, 15 Stat. 435–436. 3 We are aware of just one example of state enforcement against a would-be federal officer. In 1868, the Governor of Georgia refused to commission John Christy, who had won the most votes in a congressional 114 TRUMP v. ANDERSON Per Curiam ally a “ `telling indication' ” of a “ `severe constitutional problem' ” with the asserted power. United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 677 (2023) (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 505 (2010)).

And it is an especially telling sign here, because as noted, States did disqualify persons from holding state offces following ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment. That pattern of disqualifcation with respect to state, but not federal offices provides “persuasive evidence of a general understanding” that the States lacked enforcement power with respect to the latter.

U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 826.

Instead, it is Congress that has long given effect to Section³ with respect to would-be or existing federal offceholders. Shortly after ratifcation of the Amendment, Congress enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870. That Act authorized federal district attorneys to bring civil actions in federal court to remove anyone holding nonlegislative office—federal or state—in violation of Section³, and made holding or attempting to hold office in violation of Section³ a federal crime. §§14, 15, 16 Stat. 143–144 (repealed, 35 Stat. 1153– 1154, 62 Stat. 992–993).

In the years following ratifcation, the House and Senate exercised their unique powers under Article I to adjudicate challenges contending that certain prospective or sitting Members could not take or retain their seats due to Section 3. See Art. I, §5, cls. 1, 2; 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives §§459–463, pp. 470–486 (1907).

And the Confscation Act of 1862, which predated Section³, effectively provided an additional procedure for enforcing disqualifcation. That law made engaging in insurrection or rebellion, among other acts, a federal election, because—in the Governor's view—Section³ made Christy ineligible to serve. But the Governor's determination was not final; a committee of the House reviewed Christy's qualifcations itself and recommended that he not be seated. The full House never acted on the matter, and Christy was never seated. See 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives §459, pp. 470–472 (1907).

Cite as: 601 U. S. 100 (2024) 115 Per Curiam crime punishable by disqualifcation from holding office under the United States. See §§2, 3, 12 Stat.

590. A successor to those provisions remains on the books today. See 18 U.

S. C. §2383.

Moreover, permitting state enforcement of Section³ against federal offceholders and candidates would raise serious questions about the scope of that power.

Section 5 limits congressional legislation enforcing Section³, because Section 5 is strictly “remedial.” City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 520. To comply with that limitation, Congress “must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing” the specifc conduct the relevant provision prohibits. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 639 (1999).

Section³, unlike other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes conduct of individuals. It bars persons from holding office after taking a qualifying oath and then engaging in insurrection or rebellion—nothing more. Any congressional legislation enforcing Section³ must, like the Enforcement Act of 1870 and §2383, refect “congruence and proportionality” between preventing or remedying that conduct “and the means adopted to that end.” City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 520. Neither we nor the respondents are aware of any other legislation by Congress to enforce Section 3. See Tr. of Oral Arg.