THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSE C. MONTANO, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals the suppression of cocaine found during an unlawful pretextual stop of a vehicle. The court holds that a passenger in an unlawfully stopped car has standing to challenge both the stop and the search, even without a property interest in the vehicle, because the passenger's liberty interest is directly implicated by the seizure.
A passenger has standing to challenge an unlawful stop and resulting search because the stop itself constitutes a seizure of the passenger's person under the Fourth Amendment, implicating the passenger's liberty interest regardless of any expectation of privacy in the vehicle.
[1] A passenger in a vehicle has standing to challenge an unlawful stop of that vehicle and any subsequent search conducted as a result of that stop.
[2] A passenger's liberty interest in proceeding on their way in a vehicle is improperly interfered with by an unlawful stop, granting them standing to assert the impropriety…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well-settled that since the passenger's liberty interest in proceeding on his way in the vehicle was improperly interfered with by the lawless act of stopping the car, he has the requisite interest to assert the impropriety both of that stop and of the search which was based upon it.”
Establishes the core holding that a passenger's liberty interest, not property interest, is the basis for standing to challenge an unlawful stop.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice stopped a vehicle in which Montano was a passenger. The prosecution stipulated that the stop was unlawful and pretextual. During the search of …
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The defendant-appellee Montano was a passenger in a car which, the prosecution stipulated below, was unlawfully, pretextually stopped by the police. See Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988). In the ensuing search of the vehicle, the police discovered cocaine which Montano successfully moved to suppress. The state argued below and reiterates here only the contention that, although the stop and search were both constitutionally unjustified, Mon-tano, as a mere passenger, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car which would give him “standing” to assert the claim. We reject this position.
It is well-settled that since the passenger’s liberty interest in proceeding on his way in the vehicle was improperly interfered with by the lawless act of stopping the car, he has the requisite interest to assert the impropriety both of that stop and of the search which was based upon it. 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.18 (2d ed. 1987), and cases cited at n. 200 (“If either the stopping of the car or the passenger’s removal from it are unreasonable in a Fourth Amendment sense, then surely the passenger has standing to object to those constitutional violations and to have suppressed any evidence found in the car which is their fruit.”). Compare Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 150-151, 99 S.Ct. 421, 434, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 406 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[Petitioners do not challenge the constitutionality of the police action in stopping the automobile in which they were riding_”). As the first district recently said:
The State’s contention that [a passenger] has no standing to object to the stop or resulting search is incorrect. The United States and Florida Constitutions forbid unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Fla. Const, art. I, § 12. The Florida supreme court held in State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla.1986), that ‘[unquestionably, stopping an automobile and detaining its occupant constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.’ 483 So. 2d at 435. Regardless of any expectation of privacy, Adams clearly has standing to object to the stop of the vehicle in which he was riding since that stop resulted in his seizure. State v. Scott, 481 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); State v. Beja, 451 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190, 192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); see also State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d 461, 462 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Since it is conceded that the search was the product of an unlawful stop, this rule requires affirmance of the order of suppression below.
Affirmed.
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Monroe v. State, 543 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…with directions to discharge the defendant. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . Defendant has standing to object to the stop of the vehicle in which he was riding because that stop resulted in his seizure. State v. Montano, 527 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).…
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Welch v. State, 741 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…lted in his seizure. Hernandez; Silverman v. State, 610 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Velez v. State, 554 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), rev. denied, 563 So. 2d 635 (Fla.1990); Wulff v. State, 533 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); State v. Montano, 527 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); State v. Beja, 451 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), cause dismissed, 469 So. 2d 750 (Fla.1985). Further, if a stop is permissible, as for a traffic infraction,6 the stop must la…1 / 2
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State v. Lilias Ivory Lagree, 595 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…cle I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution. Lagree clearly has standing to object to the stopping of the vehicle in which he was riding since that stop resulted in his seizure. Wulffv. State, 533 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); State v. Montano, 527 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1988); and Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Thus, Lagree does have “standing” to assert the stop of Ms. Thompson’s vehicle, in which he was riding, was unlawful or pretextual. Additionally, assuming that the traffic…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978)
- Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. R.A., 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986)
- Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- State v. Beja, 451 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- State v. Scott, 481 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)