IRBY

v.

THE MEDICAL STAFF AT COLUMBIA CORRECTION INSTITUTION

Plaintiff Arrius T. Irby, a former inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC),¹ initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on June 16, 2023, by filing a pro se Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The assigned judge transferred the action to the Middle District of Florida on June 27, 2023. Doc. 4. In the Complaint, Irby names as Defendants: (1) the “Medical Staff at Columbia Correctional Institution [Columbia CI],” and (2) supervisor F.C. Hughes. Complaint at 1. Irby alleges that he sustained a “hernia injury,” for which medical saw him on February 27, 2023. Id. at 2. According to Irby,

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.² See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F. 3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F. 2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327, or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims ‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F. 3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.³ Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F. 3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F. 3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F. 3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F. 3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F. 3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F. 2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F. 3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F. 3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Irby’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United

States, 148 F. 3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F. 3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of

Escambia, 132 F. 3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F. 3d at 709).

Liberally read, Irby’s Complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendants. First, the Medical Staff at Columbia CI is not a legal entity capable of being sued or a person for purposes of § 1983 litigation. See Murphy v. Turpin, 159 F. App’x 945, 949 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005)4 (“[T]he medical unit cannot be sued under § 1983, because it is not a person.”); Hines v. Wexford Health Source, Inc., No. 15-CIV-22472, 2015 WL 13821270, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2015)5 (“[A] state prison’s medical department is not a person or an entity subject to suit because it does not have a legal existence.”), report and recommendation adopted by, No. 15-22472-CIV, 2015 WL 13821215 (S.D. Fla. Oct.⁶, 2015). In addition, it appears Irby sues Hughes based on her supervisory position. Complaint at 1. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[i]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under

1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F. 3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish individual liability for supervisory conduct, a plaintiff must show “that the supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F. 3d 1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2014). Causation “may be established and supervisory liability imposed where the supervisor’s improper custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Id. (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff can also show that the absence of a policy led to a violation of constitutional rights.” Piazza, 923 F. 3d at 957. “Either way, though, to prove that a policy or its absence caused a constitutional harm, a plaintiff must point to multiple incidents, or multiple reports of prior misconduct by a particular employee.” Id. (citation omitted). And allegations of a single incident of unconstitutional conduct cannot state a claim for supervisory liability, even when the conduct involves several subordinates. Id. at 957-58.

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F. 4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022).

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminating any pending motions, and closing the case. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 14th day of August, 2028.

United States District Judge

Jax-9 8/7 c: Arrius T. Irby, #133074