STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
KEVIN B. HANCOCK, RESPONDENT
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Florida sought certiorari review of a circuit court decision that reversed a county court's denial of a motion to dismiss a driving-with-suspended-license charge. The issue was whether the statutory requirement to file a traffic citation within five days of issuance is jurisdictional. The appellate court held it is not, and therefore the defendant waived his right to challenge the late filing by not raising it at arraignment.
The five-day filing requirement for traffic citations is not jurisdictional but merely a procedural matter of statutory origin not essential to constitutional due process. Accordingly, failure to raise the objection prior to or at arraignment constitutes a waiver, and the defendant's post-arraignment motion to dismiss was properly denied.
[1] A motion to dismiss based on a procedural defect in filing a traffic citation is waived if not raised by or at arraignment, unless the objection is based on fundamental g…
[2] A statutory requirement for filing a traffic citation within five days of issuance is not jurisdictional and does not divest the court of jurisdiction to hear the case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Not all procedural requirements are jurisdictional in the sense that they are indispensable to the acquisition of jurisdiction by the court. Instead, they may be procedural matters of statutory origin that are not essential to the constitutional requirement of due process, as we believe is true in this case.”
Establishes the court's distinction between jurisdictional requirements and non-jurisdictional procedural requirements, central to the holding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn November 14, 1986, Hancock was issued a traffic citation for driving with a suspended license. The officer did not file the citation with the Orang…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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DANIEL, Judge.
On November 14, 1986, respondent Hancock was charged by a uniform traffic citation with driving while his license was suspended. The officer issuing the citation to Hancock did not file the citation with the Orange County Court Clerk until seventeen days after it was issued, contrary to section 316.650(3), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides that the citation shall be filed with the clerk of the court within five days after issuance. After his arraignment, Hancock filed a motion to dismiss the charge, based on the officer’s failure to timely comply with the filing requirement. The county court denied the motion to dismiss since it was filed after the arraignment and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.190(c) provides that every ground for a motion to dismiss which is not raised by or at arraignment is waived, unless the objection is based on fundamental grounds.
The circuit court reversed, holding that the five day requirement in section 316.650(3) was jurisdictional and fundamental and therefore the motion to dismiss was not untimely and should have been granted.
The state seeks review by certiorari of the circuit court opinion.
Hancock claims that the filing requirement in this case is similar to that set forth in section 932.61(4), Florida Statutes (1987), which involves the transfer of actions from municipal courts to county courts for jury trial and provides that the clerk of the municipal court has three days from the receipt of a transfer order in which to transmit the court record to the clerk of the county court. Formal charges for incarcerated defendants must be filed within three days of the transfer and failure to file charges, by the terms of the statute, requires release. § 932.65, Fla.Stat. (1987).
In interpreting this section, the Florida Supreme Court, in State v. Cook, 264 So. 2d 417 (Fla.1972), held that the time for taking each step in the transfer procedure is mandatory and jurisdictional, as the time for taking one step is, in each instance, dependent upon the time each previous step was taken, and, accordingly, the failure to transmit a record within three days required dismissal of the charges.
The filing provision for traffic citations, however, is distinguishable from section 932.65 because there is no provision in the traffic statute that the filing of the citation within five days of issuance is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the prosecution of the defendant, nor are there any further steps in the violator’s prosecution which are dependent upon the filing of the citation. In fact, the statute provides that failure to timely file the citations is official misconduct subject to disciplinary proceedings, which indicates a legislative intent that a violation of the section is not to be considered jurisdictional.
Furthermore, as noted by the state, any prejudice resulting from the delay in filing a traffic citation falls on the state’s shoulders, since speedy trial commences when the citation is issued, regardless of when it is filed with the clerk. See Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551 (Fla.1975); Rodriguez v. State, 453 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Not all procedural requirements are jurisdictional in the sense that they are indispensable to the acquisition of jurisdiction by the court. Instead, they may be procedural matters of statutory origin that are not essential to the constitutional requirement of due process, as we believe is true in this case. Since the provision requiring filing of the traffic citation within five days is not jurisdictional in nature and therefore the failure of the defendant to raise the issue prior to, or at arraignment, resulted in the waiver of any objection, the county court correctly denied Hancock’s motion to dismiss, and the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in reversing the county court’s order.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the circuit court opinion is hereby quashed.
WRIT ISSUED.
SHARP, C. J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Krist Nikollaj, 780 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ears that it accepted respondent’s argument that the Department lacked jurisdiction to uphold the license suspension because it was not clear from the citation whether respondent received the proper notice. As this court stated in State v. Hancock, 529 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), not all statutory procedural requirements are jurisdictional in the sense that they are indispensable to the acquisition of jurisdiction. Once respondent requested a formal review of his license suspension, the Department had ju…
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State v. Coughlin, 871 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…taken into custody when the summons was issued. The county court’s order simply stated that the motion for discharge was granted. The circuit [*936] court affirmed, citing Rodriguez v. State, 453 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), and State v. Hancock, 529 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). We conclude that this case is controlled by this court’s decision in Fothergill v. State, 754 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), wherein we said: Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a) starts the running of “speedy trial” ..…
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State v. Anderson, 781 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ed results in — if I were to force him to trial on Monday, the end of speedy trial period — a fundamental denial of due process. Accordingly, because of the series of errors, I don’t believe this case can further be prosecuted. In State v. Hancock, 529 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), we held that it was not fatal to the prosecution that the citation was not timely filed as required by section 316.650(3). We gave three reasons: (1) in Hancock, the motion was filed after arraignment; (2) no “further steps in t…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nadene Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1975)
- Rodriguez v. State, 453 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- State v. Cook, 264 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1972)