STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
PAULINE THELMA COOK ET AL., RESPONDENTS

Fla. | 1972-07-05
No. 41863
ERVIN, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur., ROBERTS, C. J., agrees with judgment.
264 So. 2d 417 Florida Supreme Court (1972) Negative Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a District Court of Appeal decision dismissing charges against respondents for failure to comply with statutory time requirements in transferring municipal ordinance violation charges to circuit court for jury trial. The Court held that the time periods prescribed in the transfer statute are mandatory and jurisdictional, affirmed the dismissal, but clarified that jeopardy has not attached so proper authorities may refile charges.


Holding

The time periods prescribed in the transfer statutes are mandatory and jurisdictional because each step's timing depends on the previous step. Jeopardy has not attached, so dismissals do not bar proper authorities from filing an independent information based on the same facts in circuit court.


Headnotes

[1] Statutes governing the transfer of a municipal charge to a state court for a jury trial must be construed in pari materia.

[2] Time periods prescribed for steps in the transfer of a municipal charge to a state court for a jury trial are mandatory and jurisdictional.

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Key Quotes

“The time for taking each step in the transfer procedure is mandatory and jurisdictional, as the time for taking one step is, in each instance, dependent upon the time a previous step was taken.”

Establishes that statutory time periods for municipal charge transfers are mandatory and jurisdictional requirements

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Facts & Procedural History

Respondents were charged with violations of municipal ordinances and sought trial by jury. The magistrate and county authorities failed to comply with…

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Opinion of the Court
ADKINS, Justice.

ADKINS, Justice.

By petition for certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District (State v. Cook, 254 So.2d 560), which allegedly conflicts with a prior decision of this Court (Schneider v. Gustafson Industries, Inc., 139 So.2d 423), and a prior decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District (State v. Joseph, 253 So.2d 275), on the same point of law. Fla.Const., art. V, § 4, F.S.A.

The statute under consideration, Fla.Stat. § 932.61, F.S.A., describes the method by which charges may be filed in the State court when a person charged with violation of a municipal ordinance seeks a trial by jury. Schneider v. Gustafson Industries, Inc., supra, says a statute prescribing the time for the filing of a transcript in workmen compensation cases is directory. A statute prescribing the time for filing workmen compensation claims would not be so construed. State v. Joseph, supra, deals with the procedures for transmitting papers by a magistrate upon finding probable cause. The time periods prescribed in Fla.Stat. §§ 932.61-932.65, F.S.A., relate to the filing of charges in the State court. All of these statutes relating to a transfer of a municipal charge to a court providing trial by jury should be construed together and read in pari ma-teria. The time for taking each step in the transfer procedure is mandatory and jurisdictional, as the time for taking one step is, in each instance, dependent upon the time a previous step was taken. There is no conflict.

We do, however, approve the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in the case sub judice and point out the following language:

“We, as did Judge Bruton, take no position as to what the county solicitor or *418any other proper official may do in the future, but only hold as did the circuit court that the statute under which the magistrate acted provides for the orderly transmittal of a cause for a trial by jury and the limitations, are set forth in the statute for that purpose.” (State v. Cook, 254 So.2d 560, 561)

Jeopardy has not attached, so the dismissals of the cases will not bar the proper authorities from filing in the State court an independent information based on the same facts which gave rise to the municipal violation in the first instance. See State v. Ressler, 257 So.2d 620 (Fla.App.4th, 1971).

The writ of certiorari previously issued is discharged.

It is so ordered.

ERVIN, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.

ROBERTS, C. J., agrees with judgment.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Hancock, 529 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
    …ncarcerated defendants must be filed within three days of the transfer and failure to file charges, by the terms of the statute, requires release. § 932.65, Fla.Stat. (1987). In interpreting this section, the Florida Supreme Court, in State v. Cook, 264 So. 2d 417 (Fla.1972), held that the time for taking each step in the transfer procedure is mandatory and jurisdictional, as the time for taking one step is, in each instance, dependent upon the time each previous step was taken, and, accordingly, the failure…
  • …F.S.A.” The circuit court judge followed the law as set forth in Schneider v. Gustafson Industries, Inc., Fla.1962, 139 So. 2d 423; also in State v. Joseph, Fla.App.1971, 253 So. 2d 275. Appellant contends that the case of State v. Cook, Fla.1972, 264 So. 2d 417, reverses the law set forth in the two cases above cited. The Schneider case holds that a Rule of the Industrial Commission requiring that an appellant “shall have . . . the transcript . . . filed . . . within forty-five days . . after filing an ap…
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