E. M. COONEY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF LAURA LYNN COONEY, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
JACKSONVILLE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, PRESTIGE PONTIAC, INC., AND MCLAIN ROSE, INC., A CORPORATION, APPELLEES; JERRY MORRIS WALKER, APPELLANT, V. JACKSONVILLE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, ET AL., APPELLEES; VIKI J. SANDERS, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BOBBY JAMES SANDERS, APPELLANT, V. JACKSONVILLE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Appellants brought wrongful death and negligence actions against Prestige Pontiac after a car sold by Prestige Pontiac was involved in an accident. The court affirmed summary judgment for Prestige Pontiac, holding that the seller's liability for the purchaser's negligent operation depends on beneficial ownership and use, not on technical compliance with title transfer requirements, and that Prestige Pontiac was not the beneficial owner.
Prestige Pontiac is not liable because seller's liability for purchaser's negligent operation is based on beneficial ownership and use of the car, not on technical compliance with title transfer requirements. Even if the transaction did not comply with technical requirements of the title statute, Prestige Pontiac was not the beneficial owner and therefore had no liability.
[1] A seller of a vehicle is not liable for the purchaser's negligent operation of the vehicle when the seller is not the beneficial owner.
[2] A statute governing the issuance of a certificate of title for a motor vehicle pertains to marketable title and does not govern a seller's liability for a purchaser's neg…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“such liability is properly based on the beneficial ownership and use of the car”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for seller's liability, which depends on beneficial ownership rather than title transfer compliance
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePrestige Pontiac sold a car to John McDaniel, who took delivery, had sole possession, and made the payments. Title was listed in McDaniel's and his st…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellants seek review of a summary final judgment for appellee Prestige Pontiac on the issue of liability in consolidated actions for wrongful death and negligence. We find that the undisputed material facts establish that Prestige Pontiac is not liable in these actions, and that the summary judgment was properly entered.
Prestige Pontiac sold a car to John McDaniel, who took delivery, had sole possession and made the payments. Title to the car was listed in McDaniel’s and his stepfather’s names. About nine months after this sale, McDaniel was involved in an accident. Prestige Pontiac and other defendants were then sued by several plaintiffs. The evidence suggests that the signature of McDaniels’ stepfather on the Power of Attorney, which was used to apply for title, may have been forged. And it was indicated that both signatures on the Power of Attorney were notarized by Prestige Pontiac’s employee, although neither McDaniel nor his stepfather were present during notarization.
Section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes, addresses the transfer of title for mobile homes and motor vehicles, and provides that “no court shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person ... unless evidenced by a certificate of title duly issued to that person.” The statute further provides that no person shall acquire marketable title until issued a certificate of title. Appellants contend that in the circumstances of this case the certificate of title was not duly issued, and that title thus never passed to McDaniel.
However, section 319.22(1) deals only with marketable title, and does not govern the seller’s liability for the purchaser’s negligent operation of the vehicle. See Platt v. Dre-ka, 79 So. 2d 670 (Fla.1955); see also, section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes. Rather, such liability is properly based on the beneficial ownership and use of the car. Register v. Redding, 126 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961); Cox Motor Co. v. Faber, 113 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959).
Even if the transaction in the present case did not comply with the technical requirements of chapter 319, so as to preclude the passing of marketable title, Prestige Pontiac still was not the beneficial owner of the car. See generally, Cox Motor Co., supra. A summary judgment may be entered when there is no disputed issue as to the material facts. See Evens v. Eastern Air Lines Inc., 468 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Since the undisputed facts establish that Prestige Pontiac is not liable in these actions, summary judgment was appropriate.
The order appealed is affirmed.
ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
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Sterling v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 600 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…nt operation of a vehicle, the holding of mere naked title as security for payment is insufficient to establish ownership of a vehicle. Similarly, in McAfee v. Killingsworth, 98 So. 2d 738 (Fla.1957), Cooney v. Jacksonville Transportation Authority, 530 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA1988), and Register v. Redding, 126 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), the courts held that for purposes of imposing liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, the holding of legal title as security is insufficient to establish ow…
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hartzog, 917 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…cident. Exclusive possession and control, taken at the time of the agreement, is a key factor in determining beneficial ownership of a vehicle, regardless of whether legal title remains in the seller’s name. See Cooney v. Jacksonville Transp. Auth., 530 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); McCall v. Garland, 371 So. 2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); see also Register, 126 So. 2d at 291-92. The mere fact that the seller retains title until after the full purchase price is paid is not enough to prove that the…
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Carrasquero v. Ethan's Auto Express, Inc., 949 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…ier County Motors, Inc., 193 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); see Palm Beach Auto Brokers, Inc. v. DeCarlo, 620 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Ferran Eng’g Group, Inc. v. Reid, 600 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Cooney v. Jacksonville Transp. Auth., 530 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Cox Motor Co. v. Faber, 113 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). Affirmed. . We have long commended this practice as efficiently avoiding the necessity of a new trial regardless of the appellate result. See Leon v. Fox, 791 So.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Register v. Harris W. Redding, 126 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Pearce v. Pearce, 113 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- COX Motor Co. v. Faber, 113 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Regine Evens v. E. AIR Lines, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Platt v. Dreka, 79 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1955)