STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
MARVA CRONK, JAY P. LEWIS, PAMELA LEWIS AND ZAHN BUILDERS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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State Farm sought declaratory relief regarding its duty to defend an insured against a lawsuit by tenants alleging constructive eviction and negligence from formaldehyde gas exposure. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the appellate court reversed, holding that questions regarding policy coverage interpretation and duty to defend are appropriate subjects for declaratory relief.
The court held that declaratory relief is appropriate because State Farm's complaint raised questions requiring interpretation of policy language regarding coverage for the alleged injuries and determination of the duty to defend, both of which are proper subjects for declaratory judgment. The fact that some factual determinations are necessary does not render the action inappropriate for declaratory relief when policy interpretation is also required.
[1] A declaratory judgment action is appropriate to determine whether an insurance policy's provisions afford coverage for alleged injuries, as this requires interpretation o…
[2] A declaratory judgment action is appropriate to determine an insurer's duty to defend an insured, which can be ascertained from the face of the underlying complaint.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In all of those cases, an insured or insurer sought a declaratory decree concerning insurance coverage, based entirely upon a factual determination, without raising any question about the meaning of the policy language or the extent and nature of the coverage provided.”
Distinguishes prior cases that held declaratory relief inappropriate when based solely on factual determinations without policy interpretation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceState Farm's insured, Marva Cronk, was sued by her tenants Jay P. and Pamela Lewis for constructive eviction and personal injuries allegedly caused by…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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COOK, JACK H., Associate Judge.
Appellant, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, appeals the dismissal of its complaint for declaratory relief. We conclude that the action is appropriate for declaratory relief and thus reverse.
In its complaint, State Farm alleged that its insured, Appellee Marva Cronk, had been sued by her tenants, Jay P. Lewis and Pamela Lewis, for constructive eviction from their apartment and personal injuries caused by Mrs. Cronk’s negligence, in allowing unsafe levels of formaldehyde gas to be discharged from the apartment’s air conditioning system. The Lewises also joined Appellee Zahn Builders in the suit as the builder of the apartment.
In its complaint, State Farm asks the court to answer three basic questions by declaratory decree. First, whether the provisions of the insurance policy afforded coverage for the type of injuries allegedly suffered by Mr. and Mrs. Lewis. Second, whether the injuries to the Lewises occurred before the effective' date of the policy. Third, whether State Farm had a duty to defend the action brought by the Lewis- es. The trial court granted the appellees’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice without stating its reasons.
On appeal, Mrs. Cronk and Zahn Builders urge that the dismissal was proper because State Farm did not seek to have the court resolve an ambiguity in the insurance policy, but, rather, sought to have the court make factual determinations in order to determine coverage. To support this position, Cronk and Zahn Builders rely on Bergh v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co., 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla.1968), Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman, 62 So. 2d 338 (Fla.1952), and Smith v. Milwaukee Insurance Co., 197 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert, dismissed, 204 So. 2d 332 (Fla.1967).
In all of those cases, an insured or insurer sought a declaratory decree concerning insurance coverage, based entirely upon a factual determination, without raising any question about the meaning of the policy language or the extent and nature of the coverage provided. In Bergh, Justice Er-vin analyzed the holdings in Zimmerman and similar cases as follows:
Our study of the above-mentioned cases reveals that the basic issue involved in those cases is analogous to the one posed by the instant situation, to wit: a determination in a declaratory judgment proceeding as to whether the insurer is liable to the insured in view of alleged breaches of policy provisions — said determinations involving, in each cas ⅛, factual questions and issues not contract interpretations or construction.
Bergh, 216 So. 2d at 440.
In this case, if State Farm had sought only a declaration of coverage based on whether Mr. and Mrs. Lewis had been injured before the effective date of the policy, the cases relied upon by Mrs. Cronk and Zahn Builders might well control. The only question then presented would be factual, i.e., the date of the injury, and there would be no question of policy interpretation or policy construction. However, State Farm also asked the circuit court to determine whether the policy provisions afforded coverage for the injuries alleged by the Lewises and whether it had a duty to defend Mrs. Cronk under the policy. The question of whether the policy provisions afford coverage clearly requires the court to interpret the policy language and thus is appropriate for declaratory relief. The question of whether State Farm had a duty to defend Mrs. Cronk can be determined from the face of the Lewis complaint and has consistently been held to also be appropriate for declaratory relief. See Baron Oil Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 470 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 453 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Since the complaint stated a cause of action for declaratory relief, the order of the circuit court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
GLICKSTEIN and DELL, JJ., concur.
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State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins, 788 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…Travelers Insurance, this court in All Phase used the term “interpretive issues” to connote an explanation of the legal effects and consequences of applying the policy exclusion to the facts of the case. See also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cronk, 530 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (finding that declaratory relief was proper because the case required the court to “interpret the policy language”). The fifth district carried this court’s discomfort with Columbia Casualty a step further in Allstate Insur…
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The Travelers Ins. Co. v. Emery, 579 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…); Tavares v. Allstate Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Perez v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 270 So. 2d 377, 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1964). . State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Cronk, 530 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (allegation of question of coverage .and insurer's duty to defend clearly requires the court to interpret the policy language and thus is appropriate for declaratory relief). See also Baron Oil Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co…
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Dixie Ins. Co. v. Gaffney, 582 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…the third party not yet established did not defeat the insured’s declaratory judgment action against its liability carrier wherein the insured sought a declaration on a policy coverage question. See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Cronk, 530 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (allegation of question of coverage and insurer’s duty to defend calls upon the court to interpret policy language and thus is appropriate for declaratory relief); The Travelers Insurance Company v. Emery, 579 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1s…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Baron OIL Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Columbia Cas. Co. v. Zimmerman, 62 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1952)
- White v. BAY Dredging & Constr. Co., 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1968)
- Smith v. Milwaukee Ins. Co. OF Milwaukee, 197 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Tarlow v. Heimholtz, 204 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1967)
- Wheatland Hills Corp. v. Morton, 204 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1967)