THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOEL E. RILEY, APPELLEE
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The court held that the defendant's youth and lack of a prior felony record, standing alone or combined, are not sustainable reasons for a downward departure from sentencing guidelines.
[1] Youthfulness alone is an insufficient basis for a downward departure from sentencing guidelines absent additional factors demonstrating lack of ordinary intelligence or m…
[2] Lack of a prior felony record, standing alone, is not a valid reason for downward departure from sentencing guidelines.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with a guidelines sentence range of twelve to seventeen years. Th…
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals from a downward departure from sentencing guidelines.
Appellee was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, robbery and burglary of a conveyance. His guidelines sentence scoresheet computed out to twelve to seventeen years. The trial court departed downward, however, imposing concurrent sentences of seven years for each offense. The trial court cited two reasons for the departure: the defendant’s youth (three days short of twenty-one at the time of the offenses) and his lack of a prior felony record. Neither reason is sustainable.
Assuming age twenty-one to qualify as “youthfulness” which may, under certain circumstances, justify a downward departure from sentencing guidelines, such youthfulness of itself is an invalid reason for downward departure absent additional factors such as lack of ordinary intelligence or marked emotional immaturity. Cf. State v. Myers, 515 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Concerning the second reason, i.e., defendant’s lack of a prior felony record, appellee concedes that lack of a criminal record of itself is not a valid reason for downward departure. See Sanders v. State, 510 So. 2d 296 (Fla.1987). But he urges that when considering such reason in the light of the first reason (coupled further with the fact that the trial court had stated at sentencing that “the incident appears to be an aberration in the life of this young man”, thus implying, it is suggested, a significant degree of emotional immaturity) the two reasons together mutually and reciprocally support each other as valid reasons. We disagree. Clearly, no matter how you cut it, the second reason is simply and impermissibly an oblique reliance on the absence of a prior criminal record, already factored into the guidelines score-sheet. It adds nothing to the first reason, nor does the first add to the second.
The sentences appealed from are therefore vacated and set aside and the cause remanded for appropriate sentences within the guidelines.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. Ashley, 549 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…iated for departure is valid. The defendant’s age is not a valid reason for departure unless additional factors, such as emotional immaturity or lack of intelligence, are present. State v. Bryant, 546 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); State v. Riley, 530 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); but see State v. Davis, 538 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). There is no evidence that Ashley possesses less intelligence or emotional maturity than any other twenty-nine year old individual. The trial court’s second reason, the q…
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State v. Whiddon, 554 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…l)(I) permits the state to appeal an illegal sentence. . See State v. Ashley, 549 So. 2d 226, 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); State v. Bryant, 546 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); State v. Davis, 537 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); State v. Riley, 530 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); State v. Collins, 482 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).…
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State v. Bryant, 546 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…ate v. Daughtry, 505 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dism., 511 So. 2d 999 (Fla.1987). The defendant’s youthfulness is not a proper basis for departure unless additional factors, such as marked emotional immaturity, are also present. State v. Riley, 530 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Bryant’s age at the time of the prior offense is irrelevant, particularly given the fact he had been incarcerated for over six years when the present charges were brought. Similarly, while Bryant may have had a drug problem at so…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sanders v. State, 510 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1987)
- State v. Myers, 515 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)