SHAW

v.

STRANGE

As an initial matter, “a document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Accordingly, the Court construes Mr. Shaw’s filing (Doc. 15) as a motion to remand and accepts pages two to four of that filing as his amended pleading (“Amended Complaint”). As Defendants concede, Mr. Shaw may amend his pleading as a matter of course because he sought to do so only three days after Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. (Docs. 12, 15); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Thus, the Clerk will be directed to file the Amended Complaint (Doc. 15 at 2–4) as a separate docket entry, and the Court will otherwise construe it as the operative pleading. For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) is due to be denied as moot, as is their opposition to remand on this basis (Doc. 16). The Amended Complaint references only state law claims (Doc. 15 at 2–4), but that is not to say this divests the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F. 3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002). Still, in situations like this where all claims over which a district court had original jurisdiction are no longer pending, federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). And in declining to exercise that jurisdiction, district courts may remand such matters to state court. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). In fact, “if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, [district courts are] strongly encourage[d]” to remand the state claims. See L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator- Frye, Inc., 735 F. 2d 414, 428 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Taking into account “concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like,” the Court can discern no reason to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Shaw’s remaining state law claims. Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F. 3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).¹ The factors of comity and judicial economy favor remand. See Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F. 3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Florida state courts are best suited to resolve Florida law issues. And while convenience may just barely tip in Defendants’ favor, this case is still in its infancy, negating any prejudice or undue burden Defendants may suffer. As such, the factors of fairness and convenience also edge towards remand.

PLD ChabelbraLe

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE