ANDERSON
v.
WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN - USP I
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The court denied the petitioner's motions to strike and for production of documents, and confirmed its prior judgment denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner filed several motions after the deadline for a reply brief and after judgment was entered denying his habeas corpus petition. The petit…
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This case is before the Court on Petitioner Melvin Anderson’s Motion to Strike Respondent’s Supplemental Response (Doc. 64), Motion for Production of Documents (Doc. 65), and reply brief (Doc. 66), all of which the Court received after the August 28, 2020, deadline had passed for Petitioner to file a reply brief, and after the Court entered judgment denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (See Doc. 60, Order to Show Cause; Doc. 62, Order Denying Petition; Doc. 63, Judgment). Given the untimeliness of the filings, the motions are due to be denied and the Court’s judgment is unchanged. Petitioner’s motions also lack merit. In his reply brief and Motion to Strike, he objects that the Warden’s supplemental response (Doc. 61) is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and therefore that the Court should strike it and enter judgment for Petitioner.1 However, The Eleventh Circuit “recogniz[es] that a default judgment is not contemplated in habeas corpus
cases.” Aziz v. Leferve, 830 F. 2d 184, 187 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). Thus, in Goodman v. Keohane, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a habeas petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to default judgment where the respondent failed to return a timely answer to the petition. 663 F. 2d 1044, 1047
n.4 (11th Cir. 1981). Additionally, other courts have held that § 2243 does not displace a district court’s authority to grant a respondent additional time to answer a habeas petition. See, e.g., Hudson v. Helman, 948 F. Supp. 810, 811 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Troglin v. Clanon, 378 F. Supp. 273, 278-81 & n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Other courts have likewise held that they retain discretion under Section 2243 to order a supplemental response on the merits of a petition. See, e.g., Erwin v. Elo, 130 F. Supp. 2d 887, 890–91 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Thus, Petitioner’s argument that the Court should strike the Warden’s supplemental response
under § 2243 and enter judgment in his favor lacks merit.2
1. Petitioner Melvin Anderson’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 64) and Motion for Production of Documents (Doc. 65) are DENIED. 2. The Court has considered Petitioner’s belated reply brief but concludes that it does not alter the Court’s previously-entered judgment.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this 2nd day of November, 2020. Cirncthug 9. Corrig an
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
United States District Judge
lc 19
Copies: Counsel of record Pro se petitioner
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Ruiz v. Cady, 660 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1981)…identiary hearing and unless and until the averments of the petition have been proved by competent evidence.” Allen v. Perini, 424 F. 2d 134, 138 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 147, 27 L.Ed.2d 143 (1970). Contra, Troglin v. Clanon, 378 F.Supp. 273, 280 (N.D.Cal.1974); Witt v. State ex rel. Eyman, 343 F.Supp. 392, 394 (D.Ariz.1972). These district courts disagreed with Allen v. Perini but denied default as a matter of discretion. Allen relied upon the language of the habeas statute in holding…
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Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985)…lace suggests we resolve this question in favor of the state, the opinion fails to address the precise issue before us. It is unclear whether the court addressed the propriety of an extension beyond 3 days or beyond 20 days. E.g., Troglin v. Clanon, 378 F.Supp. 273, 276 & n. 12 (N.D.Cal.1974). Moreover, the court’s decision antedates the 1971 amendment to Rule 81(a)(2) and its advisory committee note. Wallace, therefore, does not entirely refute Clutchette’s argument. Whatever the shortcomings of Wallace, how…
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Anderson v. Warden, FCC Coleman - USP I, 948 F. Supp. 810 (M.D. Fla. 2020)…dditionally, other courts have held that § 2243 does not displace a district court’s authority to grant a respondent additional time to answer a habeas petition. See, e.g., Hudson v. Helman, 948 F. Supp. 810, 811 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Troglin v. Clanon, 378 F. Supp. 273, 278-81 & n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Other courts have likewise held that they retain discretion under Section 2243 to order a supplemental response on the merits of a petition. See, e.g., Erwin v. Elo, 130 F. Supp. 2d 887, 890–91 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Thu…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Goodman v. Keohane, 663 F.2d 1044 (11th Cir. 1981)
- Thrameah Aziz v. E.S. Leferve and Robert Abrams, 830 F.2d 184 (11th Cir. 1987)
- Anderson v. Warden, FCC Coleman - USP I, 948 F. Supp. 810 (M.D. Fla. 2020)