HENRY NORTON, APPELLANT,
v.
GWENDOLYN GIBSON, APPELLEE
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In this paternity action, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment against the defendant because the plaintiff failed to serve her summary judgment motion at least 20 days before the hearing as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c). The court found that strict compliance with the 20-day service requirement is mandatory and that failure to comply is reversible error.
It is reversible error to grant summary judgment pursuant to a motion that has not been served in accordance with the mandatory 20-day time requirement of Rule 1.510(c). The trial court's prior announcement of intent to hear motions does not excuse compliance with the rule's service requirements.
[1] A summary judgment motion must be served at least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
[2] Granting summary judgment on a motion that has not been timely served in accordance with procedural rules constitutes reversible error.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well established that it is reversible error to grant summary judgment pursuant to a motion which has not been served in accordance with the 20-day time requirement of Rule 1.510(c).”
Establishes the binding legal rule that the 20-day service requirement is mandatory and non-compliance results in reversible error
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn April 12, 1988, the plaintiff filed and served a motion for summary judgment. The defendant was hand-served on April 13, 1988 with notice that the …
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NIMMONS Judge.
Appellant, the defendant below, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of appellee/plaintiff in this paternity action. We reverse for failure of the plaintiff to serve her summary judgment motion at least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing as required by Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510(c).
On April 12, 1988, plaintiff filed and served her motion for summary judgment. On April 13, 1988, the defendant was served by hand with a notice of hearing indicating that the motion for summary judgment would be heard at a hearing before the court scheduled for the following day, April 14. At an earlier hearing on April 4, the Court, according to the recitations in the order granting summary judgment, advised the attorneys that he would hear all outstanding motions on April 14, including plaintiff’s summary judgment motion although the latter had not yet been filed or served. At the hearing on April 14, defendant’s counsel objected to the court’s consideration of the summary judgment motion inasmuch as the motion had not been timely served in accordance with the provisions of Rule 1.510(c).1 Nevertheless, the court proceeded to hear the summary judgment motion as well as other pending motions and, the following day, entered summary judgment against the defendant. The defendant’s subsequent motion for rehearing was denied.
It is well established that it is reversible error to grant summary judgment pursuant to a motion which has not been served in accordance with the 20-day time requirement of Rule 1.510(c). Brock v. G.D. Searle & Co., 530 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Lazar v. Allen, 347 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977); Cleveland Trust Company v. Foster, 93 So. 2d 112 (Fla.1957). This was not an instance of a summary judgment being entered at or pursuant to a pretrial conference. Compare Savage-Hawk v. Premier Outdoor Products, Inc., 474 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985).
Accordingly, the summary judgment is REVERSED.
SMITH, C.J., and MILLS, J., concur. . Rule 1.510(c) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Motion and Procedings Thereon. The motion shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued and shall be served at least twenty days before the time fixed for the hearing.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Carbonell v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 675 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…requires service “twenty days before the time fixed for the hearing.” No error has been shown because service occurred exactly twenty days prior to the hearing date, thereby giving Carbonell the required opportunity to prepare. See Norton v. Gibson, 532 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Fernandez v. Moreno, 176 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). Finally, Carbonell contends there was not enough evidence in the record for the trial court to enter summary judgment on the issue of whether BellSouth possessed knowledge…
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Wizikowski v. Hillsborough Cnty., 651 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…for a hearing on the County’s motion. Thus, it was error for the trial court to hear and determine the County’s motion without giving Wizikowski the required twenty day notice. See Lazar v. Allen, 347 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Norton v. Gibson, 532 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Fouts v. Bowling, 596 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 606 So. 2d 1164 (Fla.1992). The County argues a trial court may enter summary judgment in favor of a party opposing a summary judgment even when no cross-motion for su…
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E & I, Inc. v. Excavators, Inc., 697 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…d that it is reversible error to grant a summary judgment pursuant to a motion which has not been served within the 20-day notice required by rule 1.510(c). See Wizikowski v. Hillsborough County, 651 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Norton v. Gibson, 532 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Brock v. G.D. Searle & Co., 530 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Parker v. Lower Florida Keys Hosp. Dist., 432 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In each of these cases, however, there was an objection. In Vandyk v. Sowthside Gun, I…
Authorities Cited
- The Cleveland Tr. Co. v. Athene S. Foster and Jack Wentz, 93 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1957)
- Lazar v. Allen, 347 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Brock v. G.D. Searle & Co., 530 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Savage-Hawk v. Premier Outdoor Prods., Inc., 474 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)