RENE CARBONELL, APPELLANT,
v.
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Carbonell sued BellSouth for negligence after allegedly tripping over a fallen cable in a parking lot. The trial court granted summary judgment for BellSouth, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding BellSouth's knowledge of the cable. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting Carbonell's procedural and substantive arguments.
Summary judgment for BellSouth was proper because Carbonell failed to present evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material fact regarding BellSouth's knowledge of the fallen cable. The trial court also properly denied the continuance motion and verified that Carbonell received adequate notice of the summary judgment hearing.
[1] A party seeking a continuance bears the burden of showing, by affidavit, the existence and availability of other evidence, its relevance, the efforts taken to produce it,…
[2] Service of notice of a hearing exactly twenty days prior to the hearing date satisfies the requirement of service "twenty days before the time fixed for the hearing."
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“once BellSouth met its initial burden of showing the absence of material disputed issues, the burden shifted to Carbonell to prove otherwise either through facts or justifiable inferences from facts presented to the trial court”
Establishes the burden-shifting framework for summary judgment, placing the burden on Carbonell to refute BellSouth's evidence of lack of notice
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA messenger wire cable, used only to support BellSouth's main cable, fell in a parking lot. The cable's fall did not interrupt service or notify BellS…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Notice And Hearing Requirements cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Rene Carbonell (“Carbonell”), appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of appellee, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (“BellSouth”). We affirm.
Carbonell sued BellSouth for negligence, alleging that BellSouth knew or should have known of the danger created by its cable which fell in a parking lot and allegedly caused’ Carbonell to trip. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Bell-South based upon the undisputed testimony of BellSouth’s employee.
The employee testified at his deposition that the cable was a messenger wire used only to support the main cable and that its fall did not interrupt service or in any other way notify BellSouth of a problem. The employee further stated that BellSouth was not notified of the fallen cable prior to Carbo-nell’s fall.
On appeal, Carbonell argues first that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance of the scheduled hearing on the motion for summary judgment. A party seeking a continuance bears the burden of showing, by affidavit, the existence and availability of other evidence, its relevance, the efforts taken to produce it, and that any failure to do so is not the result of the movant’s inexcusable delay. DeMesme v. Stephenson, 498 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(f). Carbonell offered no such support and, therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Carbonell’s motion for continuance. See Rosen v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc., 265 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
Second, Carbonell contends he did not receive the twenty-day notice of hearing required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c). This, however, is not the ease. Carbonell was served on July 27, 1995 with notice of the August 16, 1995 hearing. Rule 1.510(c) requires service “twenty days before the time fixed for the hearing.” No error has been shown because service occurred exactly twenty days prior to the hearing date, thereby giving Carbonell the required opportunity to prepare. See Norton v. Gibson, 532 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Fernandez v. Moreno, 176 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
Finally, Carbonell contends there was not enough evidence in the record for the trial court to enter summary judgment on the issue of whether BellSouth possessed knowledge of the fallen cable. This argument is erroneous because once BellSouth met its initial burden of showing the absence of material disputed issues, the burden shifted to Carbonell to prove otherwise either through facts or justifiable inferences from facts presented to the trial court. See Stepp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 656 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 663 So. 2d 632 (Fla.1995). Here, Carbonell failed to refute or challenge BellSouth’s evidence and no reversible error was shown. Accordingly, the entry of final judgment in favor of BellSouth is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
-
Justa Patricia Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…aw Firm of Cauthen & Odham, P.A., 781 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The opposing party, Delgado, may meet her burden “through facts or justifiable inferences from facts presented to the trial court.” Carbonell v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 675 So. 2d 705, [*1089] 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); accord Williams v. Garden City Claims, Inc. of NY, 796 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). The Substantive Law Governing Delgado’s Claim Since our standard of review is de novo, the survival of Laundromax’s summary…
-
Harriette Wilson-Greene v. The City OF Miami, 208 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…ition. Although it is true that a non-moving party to a summary judgment motion may set forth a genuine issue of material fact through “justifiable inferences from facts presented to the trial court,” Carbonell v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 675 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), the stacking of inferences is not permitted. See Cohen v. Arvin, 878 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The rule on the impermissible stacking of inferences provides: [I]n a civil case, a fact may be established by circumstant…
-
Nicholas Plaza v. Fisher Dev., Inc., 971 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…s initial burden of showing the absence of material disputed issues, the burden shifted to Plaza to prove otherwise either through facts or justifiable inferences from facts presented to the trial court. See Carbonell v. Bell-South Telecomms., Inc., 675 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (citing Stepp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 656 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)). Plaza failed to do this. As to the negligence count, the majority properly affirms on the basis that the undisputed material facts were that…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Darius DeMESME v. Sam E. Stephenson, Jr., M.D., 498 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Michaeline K. Rosen v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc., 265 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Fernandez v. Moreno, 176 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Stepp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 656 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Norton v. Gibson, 532 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)