MICHAEL J. THOMAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael J. Thomas appeals the denial of his motion to suppress incriminating statements and cocaine residue found during a police pat-down. The appellate court reversed, holding that while the initial stop was proper, the subsequent frisk violated Florida law because the officer lacked probable cause to believe Thomas was armed.
The court held that while the initial stop was proper based on the totality of circumstances, the subsequent frisk was illegal because the officer had no probable cause to believe Thomas was armed. Consequently, the incriminating statements and cocaine residue must be suppressed as fruits of the illegal search.
[1] A police officer may detain an individual based on a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, considering the totality of the individual's behavior, the time, a…
[2] A founded suspicion justifying an investigatory stop may arise from an individual's actions in a known drug area late at night, including crouching over a lighter and att…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although we think the stop was proper, the right to search does not automatically follow once the right to detain is established.”
Establishes the critical distinction that a lawful stop does not automatically justify a frisk or pat-down search.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAt 1:30 a.m. on April 10, 1987, an officer observed Thomas crouched with others over a Bic lighter flame in a known drug area. When the officer appear…
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SCHEB, Judge.
The defendant, Michael J. Thomas, appeals the denial of his motion to suppress self-incriminating statements and a vial with cocaine residue found as a result of a police pat-down. After reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion, Thomas pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine and possession of paraphernalia charges. We reverse.
At 1:30 a.m. on April 10,1987, the arresting officer observed Thomas crouched down in a crowd over the flame of a Bic lighter in a known drug area. Upon seeing the officer, the crowd dispersed. As Thomas walked quickly away from the scene, he stuffed something in his pants. The officer told Thomas to stop and put his hands on a car. He then patted Thomas down and pulled out a glass pipe or vial from the groin area of Thomas’s pants. Thomas admitted he had used the pipe to smoke rock cocaine.
The officer stopped Thomas under the Florida Stop and Frisk Law, section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1985). Thomas argues that the stop was improper because the only things which gave rise to the officer’s suspicions were Thomas’s being in a high crime area and his attempt to conceal something in his pants.
We disagree and think the stop was proper. Many factors, such as the time, place, and actions of the individuals, determine the propriety of a temporary detention. State v. Spur-ling, 385 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
We think the totality of Thomas’s behavior observed by the officer at a known drug-transaction area late at night was sufficient to justify the officer’s founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. We distinguish the instant case from R.B. v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), in which the stop was improper where the defendant was detained merely because upon seeing a squad car, he quickly placed his hand in his jacket pocket and started walking faster. See G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (no founded suspicion where officer observed car occupant in a high crime area make a quick movement).
In the instant case, the facts substantiate the officer’s founded suspicion: Thomas was observed crouching with others over a Bic lighter late at night in a known drug area, and upon seeing the officer, he quickly exited the area, stuffing something into his pants. While Thomas is correct in arguing that lighters can be used to ignite materials other than drugs, the surrounding circumstances point to a nefarious, rather than an innocent, use of the lighter. Although we think the stop was proper, the right to search does not automatically follow once the right to detain is established. Sanders v. State, 385 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
A frisk or pat-down incident to an investigatory stop may be conducted only where the officer has probable cause to believe that the person detained is armed with a dangerous weapon. § 901.151, Fla.Stat. Here, the officer testified that he had no reason to believe Thomas was armed. This candid testimony by the officer invalidates the search. See, e.g., Baldwin v. State, 418 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Thomas’s motion to suppress self-incriminating statements and the vial with cocaine residue as fruits of an illegal search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
CAMPBELL, C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Jones v. State, 570 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…well established that an officer may only frisk or pat down an individual incident to an investigatory stop when he has probable cause to believe that the individual is armed with a dangerous weapon. § 901.151(5), Fla.Stat. (1989); Thomas v. State, 533 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Where the officer testifies that he had no reason to believe that the person was armed, the search is invalidated. Id., 533 So. 2d at 862. In the present case, Officer Ellison testified that he did not have reason to believe that…
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Hill v. State, 561 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…to believe the person detained is armed with a dangerous weapon. § 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1985). In this case, the police officer did not testify that he had any reason to believe appellant was armed, therefore, the frisk was improper. Thomas v. State, 533 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Furthermore, the officers had no authority to continue to detain appellant after the “consensual encounter” and the frisk. To justify a temporary detention of a person, there must be a founded suspicion in the mind of the o…
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Cummo v. State, 581 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…efendant from swallowing that which was in his mouth fell well within the range of knowledge and experience of the officer in handling such matters.” The right to search an individual pursuant to a valid detention is not automatic. Thomas v. State, 533 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). A police officer may conduct a search incident to a valid stop only if he has probable cause to believe the person detained is armed with a dangerous weapon. See Michigan v. State, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wong SUN v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1963)
- G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- In the Interest of R.B. v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Yates v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- State v. Spurling, 385 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Baldwin v. State, 418 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Sanders v. State, 385 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)