BETTY KRYSTEL, APPELLANT,

v.

ALEC KRYSTEL, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1988-12-13

No. 87-1051

Before HUBBART and BASKIN and JORGENSON, JJ.

534 So. 2d 914 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1988) Positive Treatment

Cited by 15 cases

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Holding

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment of marriage dissolution, finding no reversible error in the denial of alimony, attorney's fees, costs, or the division of marital assets.

Facts & Procedural History

The wife appealed a final judgment of marriage dissolution. Both parties were retired and living off investments. The wife alleged the husband had sec…

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Topics

Equitable Distribution Of Marital Assets Costs Alimony Abuse Of Discretion (Standard Of Review)

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Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the wife Betty Krys-tel from a final judgment of marriage dissolution. We conclude that none of the wife’s points on appeal present reversible error, and, accordingly, affirm.

First, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of alimony, attorney’s fees and costs. Both parties to the marriage were retired at the time of the final hearing and were living off their investments. The trial court equitably divided the assets of the marriage so that neither party walked out of this marriage in a superior financial position. The trial court was also well within its discretion in rejecting the wife’s claim that the husband had secret cash stashes as such allegations were unproved; moreover, we are not persuaded by the wife’s forcible argument to the contrary on appeal. See Scotchel v. Scotchel, 524 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Woodard v. Woodard, 477 So. 2d 631, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.1986); Magarowicz v. Magarowicz, 429 So. 2d 376, 377-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Colman v. Colman, 314 So. 2d 156, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201-02 (Fla.1980); Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla.1976); cf. Seitz v. Seitz, 471 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).

Second, we find no abuse of discretion in the division of marital assets. As previously stated, the division was perfectly equitable. See Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1985); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1204.

AFFIRMED.

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Citator

Cited By

Jack J. Greenberg, M.D. v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. OF Greater Miami, Inc., 629 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)

…o. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla.1985); Sloan v. Sax, 505 So. 2d 526, 527-28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). The general rule is that an action for tortious interference will not lie where a party tortiously interferes ■with a contract terminable at will. Perez v. Rivero, 534 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). This is so because when a contract is terminable at will there is only an expectancy that the relationship will continue. In such a situation, a competitor has a privilege of interference in order to acquire the business for…
Horizons Rehab., Inc. v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 810 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)

…ommit to therapy contracts it was not required to undertake. Under Florida law, a party is privileged to act, and his actions are non-actionable, if the actions are taken to safeguard or promote the party’s own financial interests. Perez v. Rivero, 534 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Knight Enterprises, Inc. v. Green, 509 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Genet Company v. Annheuser-Busch, Inc., 498 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Such conduct is pr…
Harllee v. Prof'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 619 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)

…ship. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton, 463 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla.1985). The tort law does not, however, create a general immunity from competition. Instead, “it is only direct and unjustified interference that is actionable.” Perez v. Rivero, 534 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (citation omitted). A former employee is free to compete against a former employer (absent a noncompetition agreement to the contrary).2 Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). It is also settled…

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Authorities Cited

Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1985)
Seitz v. Seitz, 471 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
Woodard v. Woodard, 477 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
Colman v. Colman, 314 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
State v. Yuchinski, 524 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
Magarowicz v. Magarowicz, 429 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)

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BETTY KRYSTEL, APPELLANT, v. ALEC KRYSTEL, APPELLEE