HENRY L. COLMAN, HUSBAND, APPELLANT,
v.
PEGGY W. COLMAN, WIFE, AND FRANKIE SNIDER, THIRD-PARTY RESPONDENT, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The award of lump sum alimony and attorney's fees was error because the wife, having received a substantial special equity in property, demonstrated no need for either.
[1] A trial court may award a special equity in property to a spouse when the property was acquired with funds traceable to prior sales of jointly owned assets.
[2] A party seeking alimony must demonstrate a need for financial support.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a fifty-one-year marriage dissolution, the husband appealed the final judgment awarding the wife a special equity in property, lump sum alim…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Need For Alimony cases and more on FLexlaw
OWEN, Chief Judge.
Henry Colman, whose marriage to Peggy Colman lasted fifty-one years before being dissolved, appeals from the final judgment, assigning error to those portions which awarded the wife (1) a special equity in certain real and personal property held in the name of the husband only, or in his name jointly with a third person, (2) lump sum alimony consisting of the marital home and contents, and (3) attorney’s fees and costs.
Appellant has failed to demonstrate error as to the award to Peggy Colman of a special equity in the real and personal property, all of which is more specifically described in the final judgment. There is in the record substantial competent evidence upon which the trial court could find and determine that all such real and personal property was bought from the proceeds of prior real estate sales all of which were traceable to an original acquisition of property in the parties’ joint names.
The award of lump sum alimony and the award of attorney’s fees was error. The record shows without serious dispute that neither of the parties, because of their respective ages, had any real earning capacity. However, by virtue of the special equity awarded to the wife her total assets substantially equaled (if not exceeded) those of the husband. The amount involved was quite substantial and under the circumstances the wife simply showed no need for, and therefore was not entitled to alimony, lump sum or otherwise. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1972); Raley v. Raley, 50 So. 2d 870 (Fla.1951); Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (2nd DCA Fla.1973). By the same token she did not demonstrate her need for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Section 61.16, F.S.; Belcher v. Belcher, supra; Darcy v. Darcy, 285 So. 2d 59 (4th DCA Fla.1973); Mertz v. Mertz, supra.
The final judgment is modified by vacating the award to the appellee, Peggy Col-man, of the house and contents as lump sum alimony, and the award to the wife of attorney’s fees and costs. In all other respects, the final judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed as modified.
CROSS and DOWNEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
The Valparaiso Bank & Tr. Co. C. T. A. of the Est. of Coleman L. Kelly v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…ve substantially equal ability to pay. That general rule ordinarily applies whether the parties’ parity in financial ability results from the dissolution litigation or pre-existed it. Ross v. Ross, 341 So. 2d 833 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Colman v. Colman, 314 So. 2d 156 (Fla.4th DCA 1975); Reinhart v. Reinhart, 291 So. 2d 103 (Fla.1st DCA 1974). To be distinguished are cases sustaining fee money awards when the spouses have unequal ability to pay, though each has independent means. E. g., Kleinschmidt v. Kleinschmi…
-
Scattergood v. Scattergood, 363 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…tently that when a party has been shown to have the ability to pay for the services of his or her attorney, it is improper to require the other party to pay for those services, even though he or she may have the ability.” See also Colman v. Colman, 314 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). Unquestionably the wife here had the same financial ability to obtain legal representation as did the husband. Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed as to the award of a…
-
Krystel v. Alec Krystel, 534 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…hel v. Scotchel, 524 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Woodard v. Woodard, 477 So. 2d 631, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.1986); Magarowicz v. Magarowicz, 429 So. 2d 376, 377-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Colman v. Colman, 314 So. 2d 156, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201-02 (Fla.1980); Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla.1976); cf. Seitz v. Seitz, 471 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Second, we find no abuse of discretion in the divisi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Annabelle G. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972)
- Hernandez v. Hernandez, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Darcy v. Darcy, 285 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)