CARL MOSES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carl Moses' conviction for burglary was reversed because the trial court abused its discretion by preventing defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors about potential bias against the defendant due to his felony record during voir dire.
The trial court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of voir dire. A meaningful voir dire must permit questioning designed to determine whether jurors would be biased against the defendant because of his status as a convicted felon, as this questioning is essential to effectuating the defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by unduly limiting voir dire questioning designed to uncover potential juror bias.
[2] The purpose of voir dire is to identify prospective jurors who cannot impartially evaluate evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The purpose of voir dire is to remove prospective jurors who will not be able to impartially evaluate the evidence.”
Establishes the foundational purpose of voir dire examination that the court relied upon to reverse the conviction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring voir dire in Moses' burglary trial, defense counsel informed prospective jurors that the defendant had a felony record and attempted to questio…
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GUNTHER, Judge.
We reverse Carl Moses’ conviction for burglary because the trial court abused its discretion in limiting defense counsel’s questioning of the prospective jurors.
During voir dire defense counsel informed the prospective jurors that the defendant had a felony record. Counsel then attempted to question the prospective jurors as to whether their knowledge that the defendant was a convicted felon would interfere with their ability to reach a fair decision in the case. However, defense counsel did not inquire as to whether the jurors would convict the defendant. When the state objected to this line of questioning, the trial court sustained the objection.
The purpose of voir dire is to remove prospective jurors who will not be able to impartially evaluate the evidence. See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413, 15 S.Ct. 951, 953, 39 L.Ed. 1033 (1895). Defendant asserts that jurors may have an unyielding bias against a convicted felon which would interfere with their ability to impartially evaluate the evidence and fairly decide the case. Thus, defendant argues that the trial court erred in preventing him from exploring whether any of the prospective jurors harbored such a bias.
In Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322 (Fla.1986), the Florida Supreme Court adopted the dissent in Lavado v. State, 469 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), which stated:
[i]t is apodictic that a meaningful voir dire is critical to effectuating an accused’s constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair and impartial jury, [citations omitted]
What is a meaningful voir dire which will satisfy the constitutional imperative of a fair and impartial jury depends on the issues in the case to be tried. The scope of voir dire therefore “should be so varied and elaborated as the circumstances surrounding the juror under examination in relation to the case on trial would seem to require....”
469 So. 2d at 919 (quoting from Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 375, 8 So. 837, 838 (1891)).
Initially, we note that Lavado is distinguishable from the instant case since the questioning in Lavado related to a legal defense, while the questioning in this case related to the defendant’s status as a convicted felon. However, despite this distinction, it appears that in both cases the questioning was designed to determine whether the jurors harbored a bias which would prevent them from impartially evaluating the evidence and fairly deciding the case. In our view, Lavado stands for the proposition that a defendant must be permitted to conduct a “meaningful” voir dire, and what constitutes a meaningful voir dire varies with each case. Thus, we conclude that in this case a meaningful voir dire would have included questioning the jurors as to whether they would be biased against the defendant because he was a convicted felon.
Furthermore, in United States v. Tegzes, 715 F. 2d 505, 507 (11th Cir.1983), the court explained that:
[wjhile knowledge that criminal conduct sometimes leads to tragic results may create a bias towards crime, bias or prejudice towards crime does not disqualify one to sit as a juror in a criminal case so long as those feelings do not lead to a predisposition toward the prosecution or accused. (Footnote omitted) (Emphasis added). In the instant case, the trial court prevented defense counsel from questioning the jurors as to whether they harbored an unyielding bias against the defendant because he was a convicted felon. Therefore, defendant was precluded from determining if any of the jurors were predisposed against him.
Relying upon the authority of Lavado and Tegzes, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of voir dire. Accordingly, this cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LETTS and DELL, JJ., concur.
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Campbell-Eley v. State, 718 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…court erred by preventing counsel from asking any questions on damages where counsel sought to explore whether the jurors possessed strong preconceived feelings toward personal injury lawsuits and the award of non-economic damages); Moses v. State, 535 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (holding that the trial court erred by preventing the defense from questioning the jurors as to whether they harbored an unyielding bias against the defendant because he was a convicted felon); see generally Vaczek v. State, 477…
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Watson v. State, 693 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…d ability to accept the court’s instructions concerning the presumption of innocence, the state’s burden of proof in respect to each element of the offense, and the defendant’s right not to testify. Jones, 378 So. 2d at 798. See also Moses v. State, 535 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322 (Fla.1986)(counsel must be allowed to question jurors about his defense). Furthermore, it is not for us to say what type of questions counsel should deem important, as long as they are not improp…
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Ingrassia v. State, 902 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…; see also Chandler v. State, 744 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Walker v. State, 724 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); and Lowe v. State, 718 So. 2d 920, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The similar concern exists in this case. See, e.g., Moses v. State, 535 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (recognizing that the rationale of Lavado is not limited to legal defenses). The defendant was charged with sex offenses involving a child, charges disfavored by society. He made a statement to police affirming the child’s versio…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1895)
- Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370 (Fla. 1891)
- Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1986)
- United States v. Tegzes, 715 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1983)
- Williams v. State, 469 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Lavado v. State, 469 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)