LAY

v.

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ECF No. (the “Motion”), filed in conjunction with the Complaint, ECF No. (the “Complaint”).

Plaintiff Luis Lay (“Plaintiff” or “Lay”) has not paid the required filing fee and, thus, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are applicable. The Court has carefully reviewed the Complaint, the Motion, the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that follow, the Complaint is dismissed, and the Motion is denied as moot. Fundamental to our conception and system of justice is that the courthouse doors will not be closed to persons based on their inability to pay a filing fee. Congress has provided that a court “may authorize the commencement . . . or prosecution of any suit, action or proceeding . . . or appeal therein, without the prepayment of fees . . . therefore, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F. 3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (interpreting statute to apply to all persons seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)).

Permission to proceed in forma pauperis is committed to the sound discretion of the court. Camp v. Oliver, 798 F. 2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Thomas v. Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, 574 F. App’x 916, 916 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A district court has wide discretion in ruling on an application for leave to proceed IFP.”).

However, “proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right.” Camp, 798 F. 2d at 437. In addition to the required showing that the litigant, because of poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, Martinez, 364 F. 3d at 1307, upon a motion to proceed in forma pauperis the Court is required to examine whether “the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

If the Court determines that the complaint satisfies any of the three enumerated circumstances under Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss the complaint. A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).

Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Importantly, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and [are] liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F. 3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). “But the leniency accorded pro se litigants does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Matthews, Wilson & Matthews, Inc. v. Capital City Bank, 614 F. App’x 969, 969 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F. 3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F. 3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)).

Even under the relaxed pleading standard afforded to pro se litigants, see Abele v. Tolbert, 130 F. App’x 342, 343 (11th Cir. 2005), the Complaint fails here.

First, there is no adequate basis alleged upon which the Court may properly exercise jurisdiction in this case.¹ A “district court may act sua sponte to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.” Herskowitz v. Reid, 187 F. App’x 911, 912-13 (11th Cir. 2006) (footnote call numbers and citations omitted). This is because federal courts are “‘empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the

Constitution,’ and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F. 3d at 409 (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F. 3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, “once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter

Here, Lay asserts that the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction is “Myself still on control; monitory [sic]; robery [sic]; torture; by more of one agency’s federal and state on one big setup creating by them against myself.” Id. at 3.

This statement, however, does not sufficiently establish that jurisdiction exists in this case. It is axiomatic that the Court cannot consider Plaintiff’s claims without proper jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 84 (U.S. 1998) (“In a long and venerable line of cases, this Court has held that, without proper jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all, but can only note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss the suit.”) (citations omitted).

Second, the Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim. The Court cannot discern any actual claims asserted by Lay. Although Lay names the Military Sealift Command, U.S. Department of Defense, Miami Police Department, and Miami and Hialeah Section 8 Department as defendants, there are no allegations with respect to any of the defendants in the Complaint. Lay simply alleges in his Statement of Claim that On board of ship flag as U.S. Navy was torurate [sic] with illegal injection that final destroy my never [sic] system erraise [sic] memorys [sic] and add to my body some tracking devices that kill vision; alteray [sic] moscule [sic]; etc. from 1990 up to today’s day all full seve [sic] and nation [sic] way inside my body.

ECF No. at 4. In addition, Lay attaches several pages of allegations regarding his military service, see ECF No. [1-1] at 14-16, in which it appears that Lay is seeking payment of salary he claims to be owed. He also attaches several documents to the Complaint, including correspondence from the U.S. Department of Labor, a partial printout of a docket sheet for a case before Judge Cooke, a boarding pass, a letter to the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, a receipt from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, his voter registration, and correspondence from the Social Security Administration. See ECF No. [1-1].

However, there is no explanation of how these documents relate to the Complaint. Even though the Court liberally Case No. 22-cv-22548-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes construes pro se pleadings, the Court is not free to construct causes of action. Here, the Court is unable to ascertain any claims for relief from the Complaint. Therefore, as the Court is unable to ascertain any plausible claim for relief—and it does not have the authority to consider claims without jurisdiction—the instant action must be dismissed. Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Complaint, ECF No. , is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Plaintiffs Motion, ECF No. , is DENIED AS MOOT.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on August 11, 2022.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to: Luis Lay, pro se 2520 SW 22nd Street Suite #2-197 Miami, FL 33145-3438