BOBBY J. SOLES, APPELLANT,
v.
SUSAN S. SOLES, APPELLEE
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In this child support appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed a temporary child support order and quashed a subsequent clarification order, finding the June order ambiguous as to whether support was awarded for one or both children and determining the lower court lacked jurisdiction to modify the order after appeal was filed.
The lower court lacked jurisdiction to enter the August order as it exceeded the scope of concurrent jurisdiction and directly addressed the substance of the appealed matter. The June order is inadequate and ambiguous because it does not specify whether support is awarded for one or both children and references a vague 'moral obligation' as the basis for the award.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify or clarify an order that is the subject of a pending appeal.
[2] An order awarding child support is inadequate when it fails to specify whether the award is for one or more children, creating ambiguity as to the basis of the award.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the August order, and that the June order is ambiguous as to the basis of the award”
Statement of the court's primary holdings regarding jurisdiction and order clarity
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee petitioned for separate maintenance and sought temporary child support for two children: one minor child and one 18-year-old attending high s…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of a June 1988 order by which he is required to pay temporary child support. Subsequent to the filing of this appeal the lower court entered an August 1988 order purporting to clarify and modify the June order. We find that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the August order, and that the June order is ambiguous as to the basis of the award. We therefore quash the August order, and reverse the June order. This action commenced when appellee petitioned for separate maintenance and sought temporary child support. The parties had two children, one who was still a minor and another who had attained the age of 18 and was attending high school. Appellee requested support both for the minor child and for the older one until he graduates. After a hearing the court entered its June 1988 order recognizing that there may not be a legal obligation to support the older child, but suggesting that the parties have a moral obligation in this regard. Appellant was directed to pay weekly child support of $100, until further order. Appellant filed a notice of appeal, and the lower court thereafter entered its August 1988 order which it deemed to be both a clarification and modification, and which addressed the predicate for the child support which had been previously awarded. This August order exceeded the scope of the lower court’s concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.600 and 9.130(f), as it directly addressed the substance of the matter appealed. Since the lower court lacked jurisdiction to amend the appealed order, the subsequent August order must be quashed. See generally, Floyd v. Floyd, 500 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
As to the merits of the June order, the parties are in agreement that support may not be mandated after a child s eighteenth birthday absent a finding of dependency, even if the child is still attending high school. Compare Gelman v. Gelman, 512 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), with Evans v. Evans, 456 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); also see Carter v. Carter, 511 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). In the present case the court did not find dependency as to the older child. The support award does not specify whether it is for one or both of the children, - and the reference to the parties’ “moral obligation” creates some ambiguity as to the basis of the award. While the amount awarded is not necessarily improper, we find the order to be inadequate insofar as we are unable to determine whether support is being awarded for one or both of the children.
The August 1988 order is quashed. The June 1988 order is reversed, and the cause remanded.
MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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Begens v. Begens, 617 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…notified us that the trial court has now entered an order vacating the non-final order on appeal. While that action is consistent with our opinion, because the parties failed to seek a relinquishment of jurisdiction from this court, Soles v. Soles, 536 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), we choose to issue this opinion to avoid any jurisdictional challenge to the subsequently entered order.…
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Bradenton Grp., Inc. v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 701 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…ject matter of the appeal. See, e.g., Thursby v. Stewart, 103 Fla. 990, 1011-12, 138 So. 742, 751 (1931); Johnson v. Circuit Court, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, 686 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 697 So. 2d 511 (Fla.1997); Soles v. Soles, 536 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Waltham A. Condominium Ass’n v. Village Management, Inc., 330 So. 2d 227, 233 (Fla.4th DCA 1976). The lower court is prohibited only from altering the order or acting in any manner with respect to its appealed order as migh…
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Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Scylla Props., 946 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…005) (Committee Notes, 1977 Amendment) (“Subdivision (f) makes clear that unless a stay is granted under Rule 9.310, the lower tribunal is only divested of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of the case.”). See also, e.g., Soles v. Soles, 536 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The present case well illustrates the wisdom of prohibiting the lower tribunal’s entry of final judgment4 while a reviewing court decides an appeal from a non-final order. In No. 1D05-2163, we are today vacating the order…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Adolphus Daniel Evans v. Rhoda Rea Evans, 456 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Reuben Ligan v. Zayre Corp., 511 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Gelman v. Roslyn Uditsy Gelman, 512 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Floyd v. Floyd, 500 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)