ADOLPHUS DANIEL EVANS, APPELLANT,
v.
RHODA REA EVANS, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1984-09-26
No. AV-53
SMITH, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
456 So. 2d 956 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1984) Negative Treatment
Cited by 22 cases

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Synopsis

A father appeals an order requiring him to support his minor child until age 19 or high school graduation, whichever occurs first, even though the child will turn 18 during his senior year. The court affirms, holding that a parent may be required to provide support beyond age 18 when the child is economically dependent and pursuing education.


Holding

A parent may be required to provide support for a dependent person beyond age 18 when there is evidence of the child's economic dependency and the parent's ability to contribute. Legal dependency may be predicated on economic incapacity to support oneself while pursuing education, apart from physical or mental infirmity.


Headnotes

[1] A court may require parental support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18, notwithstanding the general removal of nonage disabilities at that age.

[2] Economic dependency, in the context of pursuing an education, may serve as a basis for requiring parental support beyond a child's eighteenth birthday.

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Key Quotes

“shall not prohibit any court ... from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18”

Establishes statutory authority for courts to order post-majority child support for dependent persons

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant's seventeen-year-old child would reach his eighteenth birthday during his senior year of high school. The trial court expressly found that t…

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Opinion of the Court
WENTWORTH, Judge.

WENTWORTH, Judge.

Appellant seeks review of an order by which he is required to contribute to the support of his minor child until the child “reaches the age of 19 or graduates from high school, whichever occurs first.” The trial court expressly found that appellant’s seventeen year old offspring, who would reach his eighteenth birthday during his senior year of high school, “cannot fully support himself and properly attend to his high school studies _” Appellant contends that he may not be required to provide support beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday. We affirm the order appealed.

In removing the general disabilities of nonage for persons of eighteen years, § 743.07, Fla.Stat., expressly provides that it “shall not prohibit any court ... from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 .... ” In Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla.1975), the Florida Supreme Court indicated that such dependency should not be restricted to physical or mental incapacity, and may encompass the economic dependency of an offspring pursuing an education beyond the age of 18. Accord, Ulbrich v. Ulbrich, 317 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).

In the present case there is evidentiary support for the trial court’s findings regarding the child’s continuing need for support, and appellant’s ability to contribute thereto, so as to establish the child’s economic dependency pursu ant to Finn as a predicate for the continuing support awarded.1

Keenan v. Keenan, 440 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), en banc, reached a result contrary to that which we herein adopt, and dismissed as mere dicta the relevant principles espoused in Finn. However, we find the rationale in Finn to be more persuasive than that in Keenan, which fails to give sufficient regard to the actual and legal impact of a dissolution upon the familial relationship and attendant obligations. As Finn observes:

... a person over 18 ... may indeed be dependent on the help of others to obtain what education and training is needed to be competitive in the economic system in which he must make his way. He and society have a right to expect his parents to meet that need to the reasonable extent of their abilities....

While Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1984), also characterizes such language in Finn as dicta which refers to a “societal ideal” and which creates neither a legal duty nor a “new” cause of action, the narrow holding in Grapin did not encompass the issue addressed in the present case. In Grapin the court ruled only that a parent has no legal duty to provide post-majority support during an offspring’s college education, “absent either a finding of legal dependence or a binding contractual agreement....” However, Grapin did not directly address the issue of whether legal dependency, in the circumstances here presented, may be predicated on a finding of economic incapacity, apart from any mental or physical infirmity.

We conclude that legal dependency may be so predicated, and that in the present case the trial court did not err in finding that appellant’s child, while pursuing a high school education, remains “a dependant person” within the ambit of § 743.07(2) so as to permit an award of continuing parental support beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday.

We hereby certify that the decision in the present case is in direct conflict with Keenan v. Keenan, supra, and we affirm the order appealed.

SMITH, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . The present case is thus unlike Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), wherein the trial court made no express finding of need or dependency.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Soles v. Soles, 536 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
    …re in agreement that support may not be mandated after a child s eighteenth birthday absent a finding of dependency, even if the child is still attending high school. Compare Gelman v. Gelman, 512 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), with Evans v. Evans, 456 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); also see Carter v. Carter, 511 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). In the present case the court did not find dependency as to the older child. The support award does not specify whether it is for one or both of the children, - and…
  • Gelman v. Roslyn Uditsy Gelman, 512 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
    …in its discretion. Second, this court has held that where the evidence indicates a child’s continuing need for support and the paying spouse’s ability to contribute, the court may award continuing child support beyond the age of 18. Evans v. Evans, 456 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). However, where the court has made no finding that a child over the age of 18 is dependent, it is improper to require continuing child support payments. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Since the evidence in the…
  • Thomas F.B. Plant v. Plant, 504 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …the age of eighteen prior to completing high school, and remand the cause for the trial court to determine whether Wade was a dependent person entitled to support within the meaning of section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes (1983).2 See Evans v. Evans, 456 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); cf. Stultz v. Stultz, 504 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Keenan v. Keenan, 440 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (en banc). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. . We consider paragraph D of the Order as referring to al…

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