BRYANT
v.
MASCARA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A judge must not recuse without a proper basis, and the allegations presented do not meet the standard for questioning impartiality.
Plaintiff moved to disqualify the presiding judge, alleging the judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned. The judge reviewed the allegation…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Judicial Impartiality cases and more on FLexlaw
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Disqualification [DE 290]. The Motion has been fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied. Plaintiff moves for the undersigned to disqualify herself from this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.
Section 455 imposes a duty on a judge who presides over a case to recuse when his or her “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In considering this question, the undersigned is not required to accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true. Phillips v. Joint Legislative Com., 637 F. 2d 1014, 1019 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. State of Alabama, 571 F. Supp. 958, 958 n.6 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (“If a party could bind a judge by his factual allegations in [a motion to disqualify under Section 455], free from the formal requirements and more demanding standard of proof of Section 144, the result would be virtual open season for recusal.”); see United States v. Sibla, 624 F. 2d 864, 868 (5th Cir. 1980).
Upon review of Plaintiff’s allegations,1 the Court notes that many of Plaintiff’s allegations are false. While there is no question in the undersigned’s mind that the undersigned is completely impartial, the undersigned must also consider whether “an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the facts would entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal.” United States v. Oluwafemi, 883 F. Supp. 890, 890 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing DeLuca v. Long Island
Lighting Co., Inc., 862 F. 2d 427, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1988)); see Hepperle v. Johnston, 590 F. 2d 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The standard for determining whether a judge should disqualify himself under Section 455 is whether a reasonable person knowing all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”).
The determination of this issue is committed to the undersigned’s sound discretion. Oluwafemi, 883 F. Supp. at 890. Here, an informed, reasonable observer would know that the undersigned did not (contrary to the allegations) campaign on behalf of her spouse in a race for judicial office.2 This is so because when considering what a reasonable observer would think, a judge “must ignore rumors, innuendos, and erroneous information. . . . To do so otherwise would allow a . . . misinformed
[person] to control the choice of judge.” United States v. Greenough, 782 F. 2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re United States, 666 F. 2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1983)). Moreover, an informed, reasonable observer would know that the undersigned has presided over many cases in this District for the past six years with complete impartiality and that, unsurprisingly, the undersigned has ruled many times in favor of parties similar to the Plaintiff, just as the undersigned
-—— fo Tol Heer leap.
ROBIN L. ROSENBERG CU
Copies furnished to Counsel of Record UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bryant v. Mascara, 571 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Fla. 2020)…ht reasonably be questioned.” In considering this question, the undersigned is not required to accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true. Phillips v. Joint Legislative Com., 637 F. 2d 1014, 1019 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. State of Alabama, 571 F. Supp. 958, 958 n.6 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (“If a party could bind a judge by his factual allegations in [a motion to disqualify under Section 455], free from the formal requirements and more demanding standard of proof of Section 144, the result would be virtual op…1 / 2
-
In re Bradford Mason, 916 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1990)…If anyone is to drop out in order to keep the litigation on even keel, that person is attorney Laudig. Oddly, no case discusses the question whether political contributions to a party create an appearance of impropriety. (United States v. Alabama, 571 F.Supp. 958 and 574 F.Supp. 762 (N.D.Ala.1983), holds that contributions to a partner of one of the lawyers do not create a problem.) Contributions raise less doubt than sponsorship, and in light of cases such as Providence Journal and In re United States, spon…
Authorities Cited
- In re United States, 666 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1981)
- United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1986)
- Hepperle v. Johnston, 590 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1979)
- Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001)
- DeLUCA v. Long Island Lighting Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1988)
- Bryant v. Mascara, 571 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Fla. 2020)