ANDREW H. BOROS, P.A., APPELLANT,
v.
ARNOLD P. CARTER, M.D., P.A., APPELLEE
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Attorney Andrew Boros appeals a judgment requiring him to pay an expert witness fee owed by his client. The court affirmed, holding that although an attorney typically acts as agent for a disclosed principal, Boros's own representations to the expert created a personal obligation to pay the bill.
Although an attorney generally serves as agent for his client and would not be personally liable for the client's debts absent express agreement, the trial court's finding that Boros personally agreed to pay Dr. Carter's bill was supported by competent substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
[1] An attorney acting as an agent for a disclosed principal is generally not personally liable for the principal's debts absent an express agreement to the contrary.
[2] A trial court's finding of an express agreement to pay a debt, based on conflicting testimony, will be affirmed if supported by competent substantial evidence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Generally, an attorney serves as agent for his client; the attorney's acts are the acts of the principal, the client.”
Establishes the baseline rule that attorneys act as agents for their clients
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAttorney Boros referred his client Irwin Weintraub to psychiatrist Dr. Carter for treatment and called Dr. Carter as an expert witness at Weintraub's …
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BASKIN, Judge.
Andrew Boros, an attorney, appeals a final judgment awarding damages to psychiatrist, Dr. Arnold P. Carter, an expert witness in a personal injury action brought by Boros on behalf of his client, Irwin Weintraub. Boros had referred his client to Dr. Carter for treatment and called Dr. Carter to testify as an expert witness at trial. When Dr. Carter sent Boros a bill for testifying as an expert at Weintraub’s trial, Boros refused to pay. Dr. Carter filed an action alleging breach of contract, account stated, open account, and quantum meruit. Following a non-jury trial, the court ruled in favor of Dr. Carter.1 Boros appeals, maintaining that Dr. Carter knew that Boros was acting merely as an agent for Weintraub, who is solely responsible for payment of the fee. We affirm.
The evidence concerning Boros’s representations regarding payment was disputed at trial. Dr. Carter testified that when he asked Boros about payment, Boros told him not to worry, that he would “take care of” Dr. Carter after Weintraub’s personal injury trial, and stated that he would pay when he received the bill. Dr. Carter’s office manager corroborated portions of the doctor’s testimony. Boros testified that he • never agreed to pay Dr. Carter from his own funds.
Generally, an attorney serves as agent for his client; the attorney’s acts are the acts of the principal, the client.2 Beasley v. Girten, 61 So. 2d 179 (Fla.1952); Epperson v. Rupp, 157 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). Absent an express agreement, an agent acting for a disclosed principal is not personally liable for the debts of the principal. Blount v. Tomlinson, 57 Fla. 35, 48 So. 751 (1909); International Bulk Shipping, Inc. v. Manatee County Port Auth., 472 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Although the evidence discloses that Boros was acting on behalf of a disclosed principal and, thus, would not have been responsible for the fee, other testimony, albeit disputed, clearly supports the trial court’s conclusion that Boros agreed to pay Dr. Carter’s bill. Where the evidence is conflicting, it is the duty of the trial court to evaluate the weight and credibility of the testimony. Marsh v. Marsh, 419 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1982); Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 349 So. 2d 1187 (Fla.1977); Bloch Equip. Co. v. National Medical Indus., Inc., 539 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The trial court resolved the conflict by ruling in favor of Dr. Carter; it is not the function of this court to reweigh the evidence. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla.1976). Finding that competent substantial evidence supports the decision of the trial court, we affirm the judgment.
Appellant’s remaining points lack merit.
AFFIRMED.
. The court did not set forth, orally or in writing, findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the judgment.
. We note, however, that there may be circumstances where the attorney is the principal. In that case, the attorney must expressly disclaim responsibility to avoid liability.
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Ray Cruise & Epic Mortg. & Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Graham, 622 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…llee’s attorney. This argument is without merit. An attorney acts as the client’s representative, and representations made to the attorney are representations made to that attorney’s client. Cf. Andrew H. Boros, P.A. v. Arnold P. Carter, M.D., P.A., 537 So. 2d 1134, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“Generally, an attorney serves as agent for his client; the attorney’s acts are the acts of the principal, the client.”); Kates v. Millheiser, 569 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (same); see also Joseph v. Norman LaPorte Rea…
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Richard Bertram, Inc. v. Sterling Bank & Tr., 820 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…s acts are the acts of the principal, the client, and absent an express agreement, an agent working on behalf of a disclosed principal is not personally liable for the debts of the principal. See Andrew H. Boros, P.A. v. Arnold P. Carter, M.D., P.A, 537 So. 2d 1134, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). There was no express agreement in this case that the attorney would be personally hable. Although the brokers argue that Wald made a statement that he would promise to pay a commission to them if they found a buyer, he had…
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Kates v. Peter J. Millheiser, M.D., 569 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…riam Reversed”, without a written opinion, the County Court decision. The attorney now petitions for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Circuit Court. As stated by this court in Andrew H. Boros, P.A., v. Arnold P. Carter, M.D., P.A., 537 So. 2d 1134, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citations and footnotes omitted): “Generally, an attorney serves as an agent for his client; the attorney’s acts are the acts of the principal, the client. Absent an express agreement, an agent acting for a disclosed princi…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
- Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. & William A. Cagle, 349 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1977)
- Marsh v. Laurel J. Ising Marsh, 419 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1982)
- Beasley v. Girten, 61 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1952)
- Blount v. Tomlinson, 57 Fla. 35 (Fla. 1909)
- Epperson v. Rupp, 157 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Bloch Equip. Co., Inc. v. Nat'l Med. Indus., Inc., 539 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Int'l Bulk Shipping, Inc. v. Manatee Cnty. Port Auth., 472 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)