CANDY J. TOWNSEND, APPELLANT,
v.
ROGER G. TOWNSEND, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The former wife appeals a divorce judgment provision terminating permanent alimony if she cohabits with another person. The appellate court reverses, finding the cohabitation condition impermissibly broad and unsupported by evidence of an established relationship at the time of judgment.
The cohabitation condition is reversed and stricken from the judgment as inappropriate under the facts presented. While a future modification petition based on actual cohabitation under appropriate circumstances might be authorized, such a nonspecific provision impermissibly restricts the former wife's living arrangements and should not preempt such a future determination.
[1] A provision terminating permanent alimony upon cohabitation is inappropriate when the record lacks evidence of a long-standing relationship, financial support, or intent…
[2] A final judgment of dissolution should not contain nonspecific language that broadly prohibits a recipient of permanent alimony from living with any other person, regardl…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon its face, the final judgment would prohibit the former wife from living with her best female friend, her brother, or even her own mother.”
Demonstrates the facial overbreadth of the cohabitation condition and why it is inappropriate as written.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married April 20, 1969, and separated in June 1986. Their only child is an adult. At the time of the final judgment, the wife had spe…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Cohabitation cases and more on FLexlaw
ALTENBERND, Judge.
The former wife appeals a provision within a final judgment of dissolution which terminates permanent alimony if she “cohabits with another person.” We reverse and order the trial court to strike that condition upon remand.
The parties were married on April 20, 1969, and resided together until June, 1986. The only child of the marriage is now a legal adult. Pursuant to the final judgment, the former marital home is to be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties.
While the record in this case contains some evidence that the wife “had been spending some overnight time” with a male individual in the marital home, the record does not contain any evidence that the relationship at the time of the final judgment was long-standing. The record contains no evidence of any financial support by the “male individual.” There is no evidence that the wife intended the relationship to become permanent.
The restriction placed upon permanent alimony by the lower court in this case is inappropriate under the facts of this case. Upon its face, the final judgment would prohibit the former wife from living with her best female friend, her brother, or even her own mother. We have previously disapproved a similar provision terminating permanent alimony upon the wife’s cohabitation with a male. Condren v. Condren, 475 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). See also Tyler v. Tyler, 427 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Because the record does not contain evidence that the former wife had entered into any relationship of cohabitation prior to the final judgment of dissolution, it is possible that such a future development, under appropriate facts and circumstances, may authorize a petition to modify the final judgment. See Lowry v. Lowry, 512 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Sheffield v. Sheffield, 310 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. den., 328 So. 2d 844 (Fla.1976). That is an issue for another time. It should not have been preempted by nonspecific language within the final judgment. We note that this case does not involve restrictions placed upon a party with custody of a minor child.
Reversed with instructions to the trial court to strike “or cohabits with” from the final judgment upon remand.
LEHAN, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 622 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…ondren v. Condren, 475 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Tyler v. Tyler, 427 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); and Dominik v. Dominik, 390 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). See also Buscemi v. Buscemi, 610 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Townsend v. Townsend, 538 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In conclusion, I am struck by the irony of the trial court’s comment that “Mrs. Kennedy may want to appeal my ruling” because the trial court felt that it may have been shortchanging her. Little did Mrs. Kennedy realize that she…
-
Candy J. Townsend v. Townsend, 585 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…rip that the Townsends have made to this court. In the first appeal, we held that the final judgment of dissolution could not contain language which terminated the wife’s permanent alimony upon cohabitation with another person. Townsend v. Townsend, 538 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Thereafter, the former husband filed a supplemental motion to modify the final judgment. The motion requested that permanent alimony [*469] be substantially reduced or terminated because his former wife was permanently residing w…
Authorities Cited
- Booker T. Birdsong v. State, 310 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Condren v. Condren, 475 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Tyler v. Tyler, 427 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Lowry v. Lowry, 512 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)