A.C., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for trespassing on public school property under Florida Statute 228.091(2). The juvenile appealed arguing the statute was unconstitutionally vague for failing to specify a time limit on school officials' orders to leave and for failing to define "legitimate business on the campus." The court upheld the statute as facially valid.
The statute is facially constitutional and not unconstitutionally vague. The lack of a specified time limit on a school official's authority to bar persons from campus is constitutionally permissible, though orders may become "stale" depending on circumstances. The phrase "legitimate business on the campus" has sufficient definiteness when read in context, conveying an ordinary meaning understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence.
[1] A court may only address the facial validity of a statute when constitutional arguments are not raised in the trial court, as the appellate court is precluded from addres…
[2] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague for failing to specify a limitations period for a school official's order to leave campus, as school officials are entitled to b…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is a fundamental error to convict a person of violating a criminal statute which is unconstitutional on its face”
Establishes that facial constitutional challenges to statutes may be reviewed even when not raised below as fundamental error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA.C., a juvenile, was found to have entered or remained on a public school campus after being directed to leave by a school official, without having l…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the juvenile A.C. who was adjudicated delinquent below for trespassing on public school property in violation of Section 228.091(2), Florida Stat utes (1987).
The sole point raised on appeal is that the aforesaid statute is unconstitutionally vague because (a) it fails to specify a limitations period for the school official’s order to a trespasser to leave a public school campus and (b) fails to define the meaning of “legitimate business on the campus.”1 In the body of his brief, the juvenile A.C. also attacks the constitutionality of the above statute as applied to the facts of this. case. Because the juvenile did not raise any of these constitutional arguments in the trial court, we are only authorized to address the facial validity of the subject statute because it is a fundamental error to convict a person of violating a criminal statute which is unconstitutional on its face; we are precluded, however, from addressing whether the statute was unconstitutionally applied under the facts of this case because this issue was never raised below. Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla.1982).
We have no trouble in sustaining the facial validity of Section 228.091(2), Florida Statutes (1987), against a constitutional attack of vagueness.
First, the fact that the statute sets no time limit on a school official’s authority to otherwise lawfully order a person off a public school campus is of no moment, as, clearly, a public school official is entitled to bar indefinitely non-authorized persons from being on the campus. See Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840 (Fla.1979).
This is not to say, however, that such an order might not become “stale” at some point in time depending on the circumstances of the case, as clearly the statute does not authorize a permanent banishment from a school campus no matter how many years elapse after the subject order, and undoubtedly the typical order to leave campus issued by a school official is never so intended. We do not now address that difficult issue because (a) the sufficiency of the evidence to convict has not been raised as a point on appeal, and (b) the constitutionality of the statute as applied is not properly before us.
Second, we think the statutory phrase “legitimate business on the campus,” is sufficiently definite for constitutional purposes to describe, albeit in general terms, the type of activity which a person must lack in order to expose oneself to possible criminal liability under the statute. This phrase, when read in context, has an ordinary meaning which is reasonably understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence, to wit: that one entering or remaining on a school campus must lack any purpose for being there which is connected with the operation of the school. Compare State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1977); State v. Lindsay, 284 So. 2d 377 (Fla.1973); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla.1972); State v. E.N., 455 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), quashed on other grounds, 484 So. 2d 1210 (Fla.1986).
The final order of delinquency under review is therefore, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
. Section 228.091(2) reads in pertinent part: "Any person who:
[d]oes not have legitimate business on the campus ...
and who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility of such school after the chief administrative officer of such school, or any employee thereof designated by him to maintain order on such campus or facility, has directed such person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the same, is guilty of the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a public school facility and is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree-”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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E.W. v. State, 873 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…by a student who has been suspended or expelled. The “legitimate business” which would entitle one to enter or remain upon school property refers to any purpose for being there which is connected with the operation of the school. See A.C. v. State, 538 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). See also J.H. v. State, 625 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In the instant case, appellant, as an enrolled student at Second Chance School, clearly had legitimate business on school property, and therefore could not be foun…
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In the Interest of J.H. v. State, 625 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…991). In so doing, we reject appellant’s argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague on the ground that the phrase “legitimate business on the campus,” which appears in subsection (1)(a)2. of the statute, is not defined. See A.C. v. State, 538 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), which rejected a similar argument as to subsection (2) of the same statute. We recognize that there is language in K.L.J. v. State, 581 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), which suggests that the phrase “legitimate business” is unc…
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In the Interest of J.C.S. v. State, 613 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…g of guilt on the ground he had a legitimate reason to be on school grounds. ‘Legitimate business on campus’ has been restated by the third district as “any purpose for being there which is connected with the operation of the school.” A.C. v. State, 538 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Section 228.091(1) also provides that a person is not trespassing if he has “any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property....” State answers there was sufficient circumstantial evi…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1982)
- Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. The State of Fla. ex rel. Rom W. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1972)
- State v. DYE, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977)
- Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1979)
- State v. Lindsay, 284 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. E.N., 455 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- E.N. v. State, 484 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1986)