IN THE INTEREST OF J.H., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida's trespass statute for school grounds is not unconstitutionally vague because 'legitimate business' is clarified by reference to authorization, license, or invitation to enter school property.
The phrase 'legitimate business on the campus' in Fla. Stat. § 228.091(1) is not unconstitutionally vague because it is clarified by the surrounding language referencing authorization, license, or invitation.
[1] The phrase 'legitimate business on the campus' in a school trespass statute is not unconstitutionally vague where clarified by reference to authorization, license, or inv…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.H., a minor, was adjudicated delinquent for trespass on public school grounds in violation of Section 228.091(1), Florida Statutes.…
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ERVIN, Judge.
We affirm appellant J.H.’s delinquency adjudication for trespass on public school grounds, in violation of Section 228.091(1), Florida Statutes (1991). In so doing, we reject appellant’s argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague on the ground that the phrase “legitimate business on the campus,” which appears in subsection (1)(a)2. of the statute, is not defined. See A.C. v. State, 538 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), which rejected a similar argument as to subsection (2) of the same statute.
We recognize that there is language in K.L.J. v. State, 581 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), which suggests that the phrase “legitimate business” is unconstitutionally vague; however, we find K.L.J. distinguishable for two reasons. First, K.L.J. does not involve an interpretation of section 228.091(1), but rather considers a Jacksonville curfew ordinance, and curfew ordinances are highly suspect, because they infringe on basic constitutional rights. K.L.J., 581 So. 2d at 921. Second, unlike the Jacksonville ordinance, the phrase “legitimate business on the campus” used in section 228.091(1) is clarified by the words which follow it, namely, “or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property.” Cf. T.T. v. State, 506 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
AFFIRMED.
JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.
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E.W. v. State, 873 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…e business” which would entitle one to enter or remain upon school property refers to any purpose for being there which is connected with the operation of the school. See A.C. v. State, 538 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). See also J.H. v. State, 625 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In the instant case, appellant, as an enrolled student at Second Chance School, clearly had legitimate business on school property, and therefore could not be found guilty of trespass. Viewing the evidence in the light most fav…
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McKINNEY v. State, 722 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…DCA 1992), or told his attorney that he had a history of substance abuse that, together with record evidence of his intoxication at the time of the offense, should have alerted his counsel to the possibility of such a defense. See Jenkins v. State, 625 So. 2d 883, 884-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Reed v. State, 611 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McCoy v. State, 598 So. 2d 169, 170-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); [*935] Price v. State, 487 So. 2d 34, 34-35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Appellant’s allegations meet the requirem…
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Szymanowski v. State, 771 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…ccept a plea and waived his [*12] right to raise affirmative defenses. We disagree and reverse and remand on this issue. See Smith v. State, 719 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Bartley v. State, 689 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Jenkins v. State, 625 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); and Paulk v. State, 723 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The other issues raised on appeal are without merit and we affirm the summary denial of appellant’s 3.850 motion on those issues. As for the second ineffective assistance…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- A.C. v. State, 538 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- K.L.J. v. State, 581 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- In the Interest of T.T. v. State, 506 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)