STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
KIM KRUGER, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's order discharging a defendant on speedy trial grounds. The court held that the state is entitled to an additional fifteen-day grace period under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 3.191(i) after the ninety-day window under rule 3.191(d)(3) expires, and therefore the discharge order was improper.
The state is entitled to the additional fifteen-day grace period provided by rule 3.191(i) after the ninety-day window period under rule 3.191(d)(3) expires. Rule 3.191(i) applies to provide the state with this additional grace period before discharge is mandated.
[1] A defendant who has taken continuances may not seek discharge under the standard 180-day speedy trial rule.
[2] When a motion for discharge under the 180-day speedy trial rule is denied due to the defendant's continuances, the court must schedule trial within 90 days of the denial…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 3.191(i) applies and provides the state with an additional fifteen-day grace period.”
Establishes the core holding that rule 3.191(i) provides an additional grace period beyond the ninety-day window.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was charged with a felony. The trial court initially correctly denied the defendant's first motion for discharge under the 180-day speed…
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion for discharge. The motion was granted pursuant to rule 3.191(d)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for discharge on speedy trial grounds.
The trial court correctly denied defendant’s initial motion for discharge filed pursuant to the 180-day speedy trial rule, because the defendant had taken continuances. This denial triggered the provisions of rule 3.191(d)(3) which states in part:
(d)(3). Delay and Continuances: Effect on Motion. ... If the court finds that discharge is not appropriate for reasons under (d)(3)(ii), (iii), or (iv), the pending motion for discharge shall be denied provided however, trial shall be scheduled and commenced within 90 days of a written or recorded order of denial.
This provision provides for a ninety day speedy trial window period. Defendant moved for an immediate discharge after this ninety-day period expired. The trial court granted this motion.
The state contends on appeal, as it did at trial, that after the rule 3.191(d)(3) ninety-day window period has expired, it is entitled to the additional fifteen-day grace period provided by rule 3.191(i), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We agree.
Rule 3.191(i)(3) and (4) provides: (i) Remedy For Failure To Try Defendant Within the Specified Time.
(3) In the case of a defendant charged with a felony, the defendant may, at any time after the expiration of the prescribed time period, file a motion for discharge.
(4) No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a motion for discharge, the court shall hold a hearing on the motion, and unless the court finds that one of the reasons set forth in section (d)(3) exists, shall order that the defendant be brought to trial within 10 days. If the defendant is not brought to trial within the 10 day period through no fault of the defendant, the defendant shall be forever discharged from the crime.
We conclude the motion for discharge was improperly granted at the expiration of the ninety-day time period. Rule 3.191(i) applies and provides the state with an additional fifteen-day grace period. Therefore, the order of discharge is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LETTS, GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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State v. Kruger, 615 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…Kruger’s third attorney to file another motion for discharge. On April 28, 1988, the trial court granted Kruger’s counsel’s motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds in Case Nos. 87-5722, 87-6462 and 87-6428. This court reversed. Kruger v. State, 539 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). On June 22, 1989, Kruger pled guilty to the charges in his remaining cases. In March of 1990, Kruger’s fourth appointed counsel filed two post-conviction relief motions in Case Nos. 87-6653 and 87-5722 pursuant to rule 3.850, F…
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Kruger v. State, 566 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…sistance of counsel. GLICKSTEIN, POLEN and GARRETT, JJ., concur. . The trial court denied appellant’s first motion for discharge, but granted his second motion. The State appealed and this court reversed the order of discharge. State v. Kruger, 539 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). On remand, appellant entered a guilty plea. He acknowledges that the guilty plea precludes a direct appeal of his conviction.…
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State v. Rohm, 596 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…ANSTEAD, Judge. We agree with the state that the trial court erred in granting the appellee’s motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule. State v. Kruger, 539 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Pursuant to the state’s motion, the trial court extended the speedy trial time until July 15, 1991. The trial did not actually commence until July 22, 1991, at which time the appellee sought and was granted a discharge. The sta…
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