STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GLEN GARRY ROHM, APPELLEE
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The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule when the state was entitled to an additional period to bring the defendant to trial.
The speedy trial time was extended, but the trial commenced seven days after the extended deadline. The defendant was discharged, and the state appeal…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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ANSTEAD, Judge.
We agree with the state that the trial court erred in granting the appellee’s motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule. State v. Kruger, 539 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
Pursuant to the state’s motion, the trial court extended the speedy trial time until July 15, 1991. The trial did not actually commence until July 22, 1991, at which time the appellee sought and was granted a discharge. The state contended then, and now asserts on appeal, that it was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(3) and (4) which provide:
Remedy for Failure To Try Defendant Within the Specified Time.
(3) In the case of a defendant charged with a felony, the defendant may, at any time after the expiration of the prescribed time period, file a motion for discharge. (4) No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a motion for discharge, the court shall hold a hearing on the motion, and unless the court finds that one of the reasons set forth in section (d)(3) exists, shall order that the defendant be brought to trial within 10 days. If the defendant is not brought to trial within the 10 day period through no fault of the defendant, the defendant shall be forever discharged from the crime.
We held in Kruger, that under these provisions the state was entitled to 15 days from the date of the defendant’s motion for discharge to bring the defendant to trial, even though the speedy trial time had expired. The fact that the speedy trial time had been previously extended for exceptional circumstances did not affect the operation of these provisions.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions for further proceedings in accord herewith.
HERSEY and GARRETT, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Rohm, 645 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1994)…an earlier appeal, the district court reversed Rohm’s speedy trial discharge because the trial court failed to give the state the 15-day window period to bring Rohm to [*969] trial as prescribed in Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p). State v. Rohm, 596 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). On remand the trial court granted Rohm’s motion for discharge when the state failed to bring Rohm to trial within 15 days. The trial court held the state was only entitled to the 15-day window period it had earlier been denied,…
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State v. Rohm, 629 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…ing the defendant to trial, or instead the 90-day appellate mandate period?3 Under the facts of this case, we hold that the 15-day window period applies and affirm the court’s discharge after remand. In the first appeal in this case, State v. Rohm, 596 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), we reversed the speedy trial discharge because the court failed to give the state the 15-day window period in which to bring the defendant to trial. Our reversal was based on State v. Kruger, 539 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989),…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Kruger, 539 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)