MORTIMER MEYER, RODNEY R. YOUNG, JR., GEORGE JACK, DORIS S. BROWN, ELEANOR BRUCE MILTON SIMON AND SAMUEL MILLER, APPELLANTS,
v.
PHILIP J. SCUTIERI, JR., JOAN ADUBATO, FRANK ADUBATO, JOAN WARGER, ALBERT PEREZ, PAN AMERICAN BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE AND SUNRISE POINT, INC., APPELLEES
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Condominium unit owners appealed a trial court's attorney's fee order that assessed fees jointly and severally against all members of a condominium class. The court held that attorney's fees cannot be assessed against non-parties to a lawsuit and reversed, directing that fees be assessed as a pro rata share under the Florida Condominium Statute.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to assess attorney's fees jointly and severally against every member of the class because attorney's fees may only be awarded against the losing party to the lawsuit, and individual class members who were not parties cannot be subject to such awards.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter an attorney's fee award against non-parties to a lawsuit.
[2] An attorney's fee award may only be entered against the losing party to a lawsuit.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an attorney's fee award may only be entered, where appropriate, against the losing party to the lawsuit and cannot be entered, as here, against non-parties”
Establishes the core holding that fees cannot be assessed against non-parties to litigation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSunrise Point Condominium Association, Inc. brought a class action suit against the appellees but ultimately lost at trial. The trial court entered an…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by Mortimer Meyer and certain other condominium unit owners at Sunrise Point Condominium from an adverse trial court order which denied their motion to vacate, in part, an attorney’s fees order insofar as it awarded attorney’s fees not only against Sunrise Point Condominium Association, Inc., the losing plaintiff in a suit brought below against the appellees herein, but also against “each of the members of the class it represents, jointly and severally_” Appellants sought to vacate the quoted portion of the attorney’s fee order under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540.
We reverse the order appealed from upon a holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction in this unsuccessful class action suit to enter an attorney’s fee award against every member of the subject class, jointly and severally. This is so because (a) the final judgment was entered splely against Sunrise Point Condominium Association, Inc., which was sole plaintiff in the last operative complaint in this case, and (b) an attorney’s fee award may only be entered, where appropriate, against the losing party to the lawsuit and cannot be entered, as here, against non-parties. See Johnson v. Schneegold, 419 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Dade County v. Grossman, 354 So. 2d 131, 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
The order under review is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions (1) to grant the appellants’ motion to vacate, and (2) to allow the plaintiff Sunrise Point Condominium Association, Inc. to assess each class member a pro rata share of the subject attorney’s fee award in accordance with the Florida Con‘dominium Statute. §§ 718.115(2), 718.-119(1), Fla.Stat. (1987).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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Pyszka v. Mullin, 602 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…minor. The District Court disagreed, holding that there was no authority for the award of costs against persons who were not “actually parties to that action.” See also Puig v. [*960] Saga Corp., 543 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Meyer v. Scutieri, 539 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Dade County v. Grossman, 354 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The husband submits that the award of attorneys’ fees against him in this action is improper because he had no ability to prevent his employer from pursuing an action t…
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Amber Glades, Inc. v. Leisure Assocs. Ltd. P'ship & P & S Fla. Leisure Corp., 893 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ss Actions Act § 16, 12 U.L.A. 119 (1976). The Third District has reversed an order awarding fees against the members of a condominium association, although it is not clear that the case was similar to the situation before us. See Meyer v. Scutieri, 539 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In light of the limited assets of a mobile homeowners’ association and the nature of the class, it is arguable, as a matter of public policy, that fees and costs should be awardable against the mobile homeowners in an unsuccessf…
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Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
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- Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co. & C A F Indus., Inc. v. Biddle, 419 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Dade Cnty. v. Honorable Rhea P. Grossman, 354 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)