PAUL J. CURRY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Curry appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found during a consent search of his bag at an Amtrak station. The court affirmed the suppression denial, holding that the officer's warrantless opening of sealed packages within the bag was justified based on the officer's specialized experience recognizing the packages as typical of cocaine kilos, combined with other factors beyond mere observation of opaque containers.
The court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, holding that the officer's opening of the sealed packages was justified because the officer possessed specialized experience and expertise recognizing the packages as typical of cocaine kilos, combined with other 'additional factors' beyond mere observation of opaque containers, such that the search did not exceed the reasonable scope of the given consent.
[1] A police officer's consent to search does not grant authority to open sealed containers unless the consent expressly permits it or the search is otherwise justified.
[2] The mere observation of an opaque container commonly used to transport contraband does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the police are relying upon consent to conduct a warrantless search, they have no more authority than that reasonably conferred by the terms of the consent. If that consent does not convey permission to break open a locked or sealed container, it is unreasonable for the police to do so unless the search can be justified on some other basis.”
Establishes the governing legal standard for the scope of consent searches under State v. Wells
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA police officer conducted a consensual search of Curry's bag in the waiting area of an Amtrak Station. Upon unzipping the bag, the officer discovered…
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LETTS, Judge.
For the umpteenth time, we consider problems relative to a consent search, on this occasion in the waiting area of an Amtrak Station. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. We affirm.
Pursuant to an informed consent to search, a police officer unzipped the defendant’s bag and discovered therein two opaque silver-wrapped duct-taped packages. Based on his experience, he recognized that opaque containers such as these usually contain contraband and he poked a hole in one of the packages from which a white powder issued forth. Needless to say, it was cocaine.
Based on State v. Avery, 531 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), and under the facts sub judice, we would expect to affirm the trial court. However, the defendant has raised a new variation on the theory of consent searches, that is, the extent of them.
Specifically, the defendant cites two cases authored by Justice Barkett. First of all, in Caplan v. State, 531 So. 2d 88, 92 (Fla.1988), the opinion remarked:
Even if we assume this officer had special expertise to recognize illegal narcotics, this case more closely resembles the line of authority holding that the mere observance of an opaque container commonly used to transport contraband does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search.
Next, only two months ago, the supreme court in State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla.1988) said: When the police are relying upon consent to conduct a warrantless search, they have no more authority than that reasonably conferred by the terms of the consent. If that consent does not convey permission to break open a locked or sealed container, it is unreasonable for the police to do so unless the search can be justified on some other basis.
We would be frank to admit that we agree with the three dissenters in Wells that the majority in that case appears to have overruled United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). However, we do not believe that either Wells or Caplan calls for a reversal in the case sub judice.
The result reached here is in accord with a case out of the Third District, Palmer v. State, 467 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), pet. for rev. dism., 459 So. 2d 1041 (Fla.1984), which in turn appropriately cites a Florida Supreme Court case, P.L.R. v. State, 455 So. 2d 363 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220, 105 S.Ct. 1206, 84 L.Ed.2d 349 (1985). Justice Barkett explains P.L.R. in Caplan by saying “additional factors,” besides observation of opaque containers, are needed. In footnote 2, Justice Barkett gives examples of these additional factors: 1) a container that is commonly used to hold narcotics, 2) the container is at a known narcotics transaction site, and 3) the container is determined to be narcotics-related based on the observations of police officers with sufficient experience and expertise in such matters. In the case before us now, the officer had nine years’ experience in law enforcement and knew that the duct-taped packages and the feel of them were typical of kilos of cocaine. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
GUNTHER, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in conclusion only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Gonzales v. State, 547 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…package as being of a type used for drug transactions, thus there is no basis for concluding that they obtained probable cause to believe that narcotics were present. One other recent case from this District discusses this issue. In Curry v. State, 540 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) this court affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. There the police officer had poked a hole in a duct-taped package (as the police did in the instant case) after the defendant gave informed consent to search the bag contain…
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Rodriguez v. State, 557 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…awstring bag in which another plastic bag was located; and (3) it was within his law enforcement experience that narcotics were often packaged this way. Under similar circumstances, the courts have found probable cause to search. In Curry v. State, 540 So. 2d 165, 166 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 548 So. 2d 662 (Fla.1989), the court ruled there was probable cause to search packages discovered pursuant to a consent search of a bag, when such packages were opaque and duct-taped and it was the police officer’…
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Errol Powell v. State, 551 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…PER CURIAM. We affirm on the authority of Curry v. State, 540 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). LETTS, WALDEN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (U.S. 1982)
- State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989)
- P.L.R. v. State, 455 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1984)
- Palmer v. State, 467 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Clark A. Caplan v. State, 531 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Avery, 531 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Bellman v. United States, 469 U.S. 1220 (U.S. 1985)
- P. L. R. v. Florida, 469 U.S. 1220 (U.S. 1985)