DEBRA A. EILER, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
CAMP DRESSER & MCKEE, INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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Debra Eiler appealed the dismissal of her negligence complaint against three defendants who claimed workers' compensation immunity. The court held that workers' compensation immunity is an affirmative defense that cannot be raised on a motion to dismiss unless the complaint itself alleges facts establishing that defense.
The trial court erred in granting the motions to dismiss. The exclusivity provision of section 440.11 of the Workers' Compensation Act is an affirmative defense that cannot be raised by motion to dismiss unless the allegations in prior pleadings demonstrate the existence of such a defense.
[1] A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint to state a cause of action.
[2] A court may not consider facts outside the four corners of the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is equally well settled that the exclusivity provision set forth in section 440.11 of the Workers' Compensation Act is an affirmative defense which cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss unless the allegations of a prior pleading in the case demonstrate the existence of such a defense.”
Establishes the primary legal principle that workers' compensation immunity is an affirmative defense inappropriate for motion to dismiss
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn November 1987, Debra Eiler, as guardian for her ex-husband Richard Eiler, filed a negligence complaint against several defendants including Paul N.…
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DANIEL, Judge.
This is a consolidated appeal taken by appellant-plaintiff below, Debra A. Eiler, from the orders of the trial court which dismissed with prejudice all counts of her complaint against appellees-defendants below, Paul N. Howard Company, Affholder, Incorporated and Kem-Affholder, Incorporated. We hold that the trial court erred in dismissing these portions of Eiler’s complaint and, therefore, reverse.
In November of 1987, Debra Eiler, as guardian for her ex-husband Richard Eiler, instituted this action for damages by filing a complaint against several defendants including the Paul N. Howard Company, Aff-holder, Incorporated and Kem-Affholder, Incorporated. In her complaint Eiler averred that the defendants were liable for personal injuries sustained by her ex-husband as a result of an accident which occurred while he was at work. In response to Eiler’s complaint, appellee Paul N. Howard Company filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and shortly thereafter appel-lees Kern-Affholder, Incorporated and Aff-holder, Incorporated filed a separate motion to dismiss. Appellees all claimed that the complaint should be dismissed as to them because appellees were entitled to immunity from suit pursuant to section 440.11 of the Workers' Compensation Act. Following a hearing, the trial court granted appellees’ motions to dismiss.
On appeal Eiler contends that it was error for the trial court to dismiss her complaint based upon the finding that the Workers’ Compensation Act provides appel-lees with immunity from suit, asserting that the defense of workers’ compensation immunity is an affirmative defense which cannot be raised on a motion to dismiss. It is settled law that the function of a motion to dismiss a complaint is to raise a question of law as to the sufficiency of the facts alleged to state a cause of action and that a court may not properly go beyond the four comers of the complaint in testing the legal sufficiency of the allegations set forth therein. Reed v. Sampson, 349 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). It is equally well settled that the exclusivity provision set forth in section 440.11 of the Workers’ Compensation Act is an affirmative defense which cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss unless the allegations of a prior pleading in the case demonstrate the existence of such a defense. Moncha v. Burger King Corporation, 450 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). See also Walker v. ITD Industries, Inc., 437 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Here, Eiler’s complaint alleges a cause of action against appellees in negligence. The complaint does not contain any allegations concerning the Workers’ Compensation Act. Thus, in granting appellees’ motions to dismiss, the trial court relied upon the existence of an affirmative defense which was established by facts which were outside the scope of the allegations contained in Eiler’s complaint. This was error. The orders dismissing Eiler's complaint against appellees must, therefore, be reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.
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Hastings v. Demming, 682 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…of such an order, the court directed the Florida Bar Appellate Court Rules Committee to submit a proposed amendment to the rule in accord with its opinion. To date, no such amendment has been adopted. . See also Eiler v. Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., 542 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (it is well settled that the exclusivity provision of section 440.11 is an affirmative defense which cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss unless the allegations of a prior pleading demonstrate the existence of such defens…
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Gen. Cinema Beverages OF Miami, Inc. v. Mortimer, 689 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…n affirmative defense appearing on the face of the complaint may be raised by a motion to dismiss the complaint. Moucha v. Burger King Corp., 450 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (citations omitted); see also Eiler v. Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., 542 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).3 In the unusual circumstances of the present case, the legal issue raised by the employer clearly appears on the face of the employee’s complaint. That is so because the employee has brought suit against the employer based…
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P.P. Fish and Irene Fish v. Post OF Amvets # 85, 560 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…as to the sufficiency of the facts alleged to state a cause of action. The court may not properly go beyond the four corners of the complaint in testing the legal sufficiency of the allegations set forth therein. Eiler v. Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., 542 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Where a complaint is dismissed based on extraneous evidence leading the judge to believe that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, the judge has reversibly erred. DeWitt v. Zimmerman, 366 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Reed v. Sampson, 349 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Carroso v. State, 437 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Walker v. I.T.D. Indus., Inc., 437 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- R.S. Johnson and Margie Mae Johnson v. McWHITE, 450 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Tula Moucha v. Burger King Corp., 450 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)