HENRY E. WOODS APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1989-04-27
No. 88-1234
DAUKSCH and DANIEL, JJ., concur.
542 So. 2d 443 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1989) Negative Treatment
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

Henry Woods pleaded nolo contendere to grand theft and received a five-year probationary sentence despite requesting incarceration instead. The appellate court affirmed, holding that while a defendant must be fully informed of sentencing alternatives including potential upward departures, a defendant does not have an absolute right to elect incarceration over probation.


Holding

A defendant does not have an absolute right to elect incarceration over probation. While the trial court must fully apprise a defendant of sentencing alternatives and any potential upward departure before allowing rejection of probation, the trial court retains the ultimate discretion to impose the sentence it deems appropriate.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant does not have an absolute right to elect incarceration over probation when the court has the discretion to impose either.

[2] A trial court may depart upward one guidelines cell if a defendant refuses to cooperate with or accept probation or community control, provided the defendant is informed…

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Key Quotes

“if a defendant refused to cooperate or accept probation or community control when that was the recommended sentence (any nonstate prison sanction), then the court could depart upward one cell, provided that the defendant was advised of possible alternatives, and "was clearly given an election between the recommended guideline sentence of any nonstate prison sanction and a sentence one cell block upward."”

Establishes the standard for when a court may impose an upward departure upon a defendant's rejection of probation—the defendant must be fully informed of alternatives.

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Facts & Procedural History

Woods entered a nolo contendere plea to grand theft with the state dropping a burglary count and recommending withholding of adjudication with a two-y…

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Opinion of the Court
COBB, Judge.

COBB, Judge.

The appellant, Henry Eugene Woods, entered a plea of nolo contendere to a grand theft charge. In return for the plea, the state dropped a burglary count and recommended withholding of adjudication and a two-year probationary term. At the time of the plea, the trial court explained to Woods that he could receive a prison sentence up to five years.

The guidelines sentencing cell was any nonstate prison sanction. Woods requested that he be sentenced to time served and not be given a term of probation, so that he would be free to leave Florida without any legal encumbrances. The trial court, however, imposed a probationary term of five years.

On appeal, Woods contends that since he represented to the court that he was not a viable candidate for probation, it was error for the trial court to force probation on him, even if this meant an incarcerative term of up to 30 months “within the next higher guidelines cell.” According to Woods, a defendant has the right to reject probation and it was error for the trial court not to allow him to do so. Woods relies upon two cases in support of his position: Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) and Holley v. State, 483 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).

In Holley we held that if a defendant refused to cooperate or accept probation or community control when that was the recommended sentence (any nonstate prison sanction), then the court could depart upward one cell, provided that the defendant was advised of possible alternatives, and “was clearly given an election between the recommended guideline sentence of any nonstate prison sanction and a sentence one cell block upward.” Holley at 855; Williams at 1022.

Those cases are somewhat different from the problem presented by Woods. Our concern in the prior case was that the defendant be fully apprised by the trial court of the possibility of a one-cell departure upward (12-30 months incarceration) pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701.d.l4, prior to being allowed to reject probation and receive a sentence of incarceration harsher than he had anticipated. We did not hold in either case that an informed defendant has the absolute right to elect incarceration over probation, or vice versa.

In the instant case we are not dealing with a youthful offender who was “overwhelmed” by his inability to make monetary payments required by the court and “reacted improvidently with lack of advice as to the possible alternatives.” Holley at 855. Holley was protesting his uninformed loss of probation; here, Woods was fully informed and is demanding extended incarceration in lieu of probation. The trial court, not the defendant, is the one with that ultimate option.

AFFIRMED.

DAUKSCH and DANIEL, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Morganti v. State, 573 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1991)
    …earden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). We also reject Morganti’s claim that the trial judge was prohibited from imposing a term of probation over his objection. See Woods v. State, 542 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Smith v. State, 513 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Dearth v. State, 390 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). We note that these two additional claims are now moot since the sentencing judge vacated the $10,000 fine and terminated M…
  • Johnson v. State, 557 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
    …for this defendant to comply with the terms of probation. This is evident by the fact that defendants are now asserting the right to be sentenced to the next higher cell to avoid probation. The right to so choose denied defendants by Woods v. State, 542 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) and Evans v. State, 544 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) has, in effect, now been granted by the Franklin decision. .Admittedly, the court also discussed the effect of the legislatures’ “one cell bump up" authorization in violati…
  • Jones v. State, 873 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
    …TORPY, J., concurring specially. I concur based upon Woods v. State, 542 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). See also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.702(d)(19).…

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