T-JETT ENTERPRISES, INC. AND THOMAS D. WILLIAMS, APPELLANTS,
v.
ERNEST AND STEWART, INC., APPELLEE
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The court reversed summary judgment for a real estate broker's fee because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding when the commission was due, as the contract language specifying payment "at closing" was crossed out and initialed by the parties with the broker's knowledge.
Summary judgment for a broker's commission is improper when the contract's payment terms are ambiguous due to crossed-out language and uncontradicted evidence suggests an alternative payment arrangement was agreed upon.
[1] When a real estate sales contract's payment terms are modified by the parties through crossed-out language initialed by all parties with the broker's knowledge, and uncon…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The record presents genuine issues of material fact as to how and when the broker's commission was to be paid since in the sales contract the words that the commission was due "at the closing" were crossed out, and the change was initialed by the buyer and seller in the presence and with the knowledge of the broker's agent.”
Court's explanation of why summary judgment was improper
T-Jett Enterprises and Thomas D. Williams entered into a real estate transaction with Ernest and Stewart, Inc. as broker. The sales contract originall…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse the final summary judgment and judgment of garnishment entered for the broker in this contract dispute for a real estate broker’s fee.
The record presents genuine issues of material fact as to how and when the broker’s commission was to be paid since in the sales contract the words that the commission was due “at the closing” were crossed out, and the change was initialed by the buyer and seller in the presence and with the knowledge of the broker’s agent. See Kirsh v. Mannen, 393 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Gentile v. Abadessa, 267 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). The agent herself then signed the contract on the same page as the changes. Furthermore, there were unrebutted and uncontradicted sworn statements by the seller that the broker’s agent agreed to accept monthly payments of the commission. The summary final judgment is therefore reversed.
Based on the above, the final judgment of garnishment must also be reversed. We point out, moreover, that the appellee’s failure to comply with the requirements of section 77.055, Florida Statutes (1987), and properly notify the seller of the garnishment proceedings, would be sufficient basis alone for reversing the garnishment order. Having reversed the final summary judgment, it is unnecessary to address the appellant’s other point on appeal.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Gigliotti Contracting N., Inc. v. Traffic Control Prods. OF N. Fla., Inc., 788 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…da Statutes (1997). Garnishment statutes are strictly construed. See Williams v. Espirito Santo Bank of Florida, 656 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Paz v. Hernandez, 654 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); T-Jett Enters., Inc. v. Ernest & Stewart, Inc., 543 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Failure to strictly adhere to the garnishment procedures is at the root of Gigliotti’s problems. Gigliotti tried to enter the garnishment case as an intervenor, claiming standing only as an assignee of SCI, the judgment debtor, i…
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Ahmad Izadi v. MacHado (GUS) Ford, Inc., 550 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…ecide what the ultimate construction of the offer may be, or whether the court or the jury should make this determination. Compare Sosa v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 435 So. 2d 821 (Fla.1983) with T-Jett Enters., Inc. v. Ernest & Stewart, Inc., 543 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) and Kirsh v. Mannen, 393 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). . It goes almost without saying that the plaintiffs ability eventually to recover on the theories suggested in this opinion depends on the showing that he was, in fact, led o…
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Cruise Control, Inc. v. Tyler, 577 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…rse the final judgment of garnishment because the appellee as garnishor failed to provide the defendant, appellant Webber, with the notice required by section 77.055, Florida Statutes (1989). See T-Jett Enterprises, Inc. v. Ernest and Stewart, Inc., 543 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). SCHEB, A.C.J., and FRANK and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kirsh v. Mannen, 393 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Holmes v. State, 267 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Gentile v. Abadessa, 267 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)