MORRIS KIRSH, AS TRUSTEE INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANTS AND JUDGMENT CREDITORS, APPELLANT,
v.
HARRIET V. MANNEN, ESTATE OF OSCAR J. MANNEN, HAROLD RICHMAN, DOROTHY HIRSCHORN, EDWIN BORGOS, MARCUS FRIED, ROBERT H. PAQUETTE, RICHARD M. MANNEN, APPELLEES
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The court reviewed a trial court's decision to set aside a sheriff's sale of an alcoholic beverage license, considering the rights of the judgment creditor, the lessors, and the buyer.
The trial court erred in setting aside the sheriff's sale of the alcoholic beverage license, as the buyer was subject to caveat emptor regarding the lessors' reversionary interest.
[1] Summary judgment is improper when conflicting legal inferences, particularly concerning the intent of the parties, can be drawn from an ambiguous document or the effect o…
[2] When a deed names a grantee with the addition of 'trustee' and does not specify beneficiaries or trust purposes, it generally conveys a fee simple estate with full power…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA judgment creditor levied on a debtor's alcoholic beverage license, which was part of a lease agreement with the lessors who retained a reversionary …
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
The trial judge entered summary judgment to the effect that certain interests in real property titled in the name of Oscar J. Mannen, as trustee, were, contrary to Section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1979)1 not owned by Mr. Mannen at the time of his death and were therefore not assets of his estate, subject to the claims of his creditors. This was so, the court held, because (a) Mannen held the title in trust for various investors who held beneficial ownership, rather than, as the appellant-creditor claimed, merely security interests in the realty; and (b) 62.35% of that beneficial interest had been owned by Mannen and his wife, by the entireties, rather than by Man-nen individually.
We reverse the summary judgment below because the appellees did not, as to either ground, conclusively establish as a matter of law their entitlement to the relief granted. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966).
In so ruling, we apply the doctrine that when conflicting legal inferences, particularly concerning the intent of the parties, may be drawn from an ambiguous legal document, or as to the effect even of undisputed facts, the issue is not properly subject to summary adjudication, and may be resolved only after trial. Carroll v. Moxley, 241 So. 2d 681 (Fla.1970); Macina v. Magurno, 100 So. 2d 369 (Fla.1958); MacKenzie v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 369 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1979); Bankers Ins. Service Corp. v. Southeastern Home Mortgage Co., 363 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Lauer v. Wilson, 355 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); B & J Van Beber Equipment Rental, Inc. v. Pedersen, 348 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Mathews Corp. v. Tutten Enterprises, Inc., 343 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Sullivan v. Bloom, 342 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Stone v. Lingerfeldt, 330 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Carter v. Dade County, 213 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), cert. denied, 219 So. 2d 700 (Fla.1968); Mead v. Mead, 193 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 552 (Fla.1967); Benson v. Atwood, 177 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965); Owens v. MacKenzie, 103 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958).
Reversed.
. 689.07: ‘Trustee’ or ‘as trustee’ added to name of grantee, transferee, assignee or mortgagee transfers interest or creates lien as if additional word or words not used.—
(1) Every deed or conveyance of real estate heretofore or hereafter made or executed, in which the words ‘trustee’ or ‘as trustee’ are added to the name of the grantee, and in which no beneficiaries are named nor the nature and purposes of the trust, if any, are set forth, shall grant and is hereby declared to have granted a fee simple estate with full power and authority in and to the grantee in such deed to sell, convey and grant and encumber both the legal and beneficial interest in the real estate conveyed, unless a contrary intention shall appear in the deed or conveyance ...
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Bunnell Med. Clinic, P. A. v. Eduardo Barrera, M.D., 419 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…s, Landis v. Mears, 329 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), and the existence of issues of fact and conflicting inferences to be drawn from the evidence precluded summary judgment. Burris v. Jacobson, 417 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Kirsch v. Mannen, 393 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). [*684] The summary judgment determining liability in favor of appellee is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. . Fla.R.App.P. 9.I…
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Goldbloom v. J. I. Kislak Mortg. Corp., 408 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…therefore not properly be resolved by summary judgment.1 See generally, Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966); Macina v. Magurno, 100 So. 2d 369 (Fla.1958); Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and cases cited; Kirsh v. Mannen, 393 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and cases cited. This result is required not only by the common sense of the [*750] situation but by a prior decision of this court which we consider indistinguishable from the present case. In Southeastern Home Mortgage Co. v. R…
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T-Jett Enters., Inc. v. Ernest & Stewart, Inc., 543 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…s to be paid since in the sales contract the words that the commission was due “at the closing” were crossed out, and the change was initialed by the buyer and seller in the presence and with the knowledge of the broker’s agent. See Kirsh v. Mannen, 393 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Gentile v. Abadessa, 267 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). The agent herself then signed the contract on the same page as the changes. Furthermore, there were unrebutted and uncontradicted sworn statements by the seller that the br…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (19 total)
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Leora Carroll and Martin Carroll v. Moxley, 241 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1970)
- MacIna v. Magurno, 100 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1958)
- Cornell Benson v. Atwood, 177 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- W. O. Owens and his wife v. MacKENZIE, 103 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- MacKENZIE v. AVIS Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 369 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Mead v. Mead, 193 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Terina Tamargo v. Tamargo, 348 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- B & J VAN Beber Equip. Rental, Inc. v. Pedersen, 348 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Bankers Ins. Serv. Corp. v. Se. Home Mortg. Co., 363 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)