MARSHA OFFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Marsha Offord appeals the denial of her motion to withdraw a guilty plea in a cocaine trafficking case. The court reversed, finding that the parties did not have a meeting of the minds regarding essential terms of the plea bargain, particularly regarding what constituted "substantial assistance" to the state.
The court reversed and held that Offord could not have known and understood all essential terms of the plea bargain at the time she entered her guilty plea because substantial assistance was a subject of continuing negotiations between the parties, preventing a meeting of the minds necessary for an enforceable contract.
[1] A plea bargain is a contract requiring a meeting of the minds of the parties.
[2] A meeting of the minds is absent when essential terms of an agreement are subject to continuing negotiation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A plea bargain is a contract. A meeting of the minds of the parties is a prerequisite to the existence of an enforceable contract.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating plea agreements—they must be treated as contracts with a meeting of the minds on essential terms.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfford was charged with trafficking in 400 grams or more of cocaine. She initially pleaded not guilty but on July 8, 1988, changed her plea to guilty …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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GARRETT, Judge.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of her Motion to Set Aside Plea.
Appellant was charged with trafficking in 400 grams or more of cocaine. At her arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. On July 8, 1988 after negotiating with the state, appellant changed her plea to guilty. The negotiations required the appellant to provide substantial assistance pursuant to section 893.-135(3), Florida Statutes (1987), in return for a sentence cap of seven years with a mandatory minimum five years instead of the statutory mandatory minimum fifteen years. The state moved several times to postpone sentencing to allow appellant to provide the substantial assistance. On October 20, 1988, appellant was sentenced to fifteen years, a mandatory minimum fifteen years, and the mandatory fine of $250,000.
On October 21, 1988, a U.S. Customs agent spoke on behalf of the appellant. The trial judge expressed his willingness to vacate the sentence if the state would move to reduce the sentence. The state refused. On November 10, 1988, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
The record does not contain a copy of any written plea agreement.
The plea colloquy contains statements such as “[Y]ou have to satisfy the police, who would satisfy the State Attorney.... If you don’t help them in the way they think you should help, what will happen to you? ... And if you help them, what will happen?”
At a later hearing, appellant contended someone had been “busted” through her efforts.
At the motion to withdraw plea hearing, the prosecutor, explaining office policy in substantial assistance cases, stated, “the offer we make, is that the person must make a case we can prosecute.... she was not able to do it.”
A plea bargain is a contract. A meeting of the minds of the parties is a prerequisite to the existence of an enforceable contract. Where it appears the parties are continuing to negotiate as to essential terms of an agreement there can be no meeting of the minds. Central Properties, Inc. v. Robbinson, 450 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), quashed in part on other grounds, 468 So. 2d 986 (Fla.1985). Where it appears any party is mistaken, confused or misunderstands such essential terms there can be no meeting of the minds. See Scott v. State, 499 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
We reverse. We cannot conclude appellant knew and understood all of the essential terms of the plea bargain at the time she entered her guilty plea. What was to be substantial assistance appears to have been a subject of continuing negotiations. REVERSED AND REMANDED with directions to allow appellant to withdraw her guilty plea and for further proceedings.
DELL and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Timothee v. State, 721 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…avor of the defendant because “[t]he law inclines toward a trial on the merits.” Yesnes v. State, 440 So. 2d 628, 634 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). As we previously recognized, a plea agreement is a contract requiring a meeting of the minds. Offord v. State, 544 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). When it appears any party is mistaken, confused, or misunderstands essential terms of the agreement, there can be no meeting of the minds. Id. Under the facts of this case Timothee should have been allowed to withdraw his plea.…
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Lafave v. State, 149 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 2014)…State v. Frazier, 697 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements); Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (contract principles are to be applied to plea agreements); see also Offord v. State, 544 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (contract principles applied to substantial assistance agreements), but the legislature has left us no choice. We strongly urge the Florida legislature to study this issue and consider an appropriate amendment to section 924.07 i…
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State v. Jordan, 783 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…State v. Frazier, 697 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements); Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (contract principles are to be applied to plea agreements); see also Offord v. State, 544 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (contract principles applied to substantial assistance agreements), but the legislature has left us no choice. We strongly urge the Florida legislature to study this issue and consider an appropriate amendment to section 924.07 i…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Schwartz v. Zenia Schwartz, 450 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Robbinson v. Delk, 468 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1985)
- Scott v. State, 499 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)