MARY RUSSO, WILLIAM T. MAYO AND ORA BELL E. MEADOWS, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM ROSS, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF EDNA FINE, ET AL., APPELLEES
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This appeal concerns a summary judgment granted in favor of a personal representative in a will contest. The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact regarding testamentary capacity and undue influence precluded summary disposition and required trial.
Summary judgment must be denied when the record reflects genuine issues of material fact or raises even the slightest reasonable doubt regarding such issues. The moving party bears the burden of conclusively showing the absence of such issues. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding testamentary capacity and undue influence.
[1] A summary judgment must be denied if the record reflects the existence of genuine issues of material fact or raises even the slightest reasonable doubt regarding such iss…
[2] The moving party bears the burden of conclusively showing the absence of genuine issues of material fact to be entitled to summary judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a summary judgment must be denied if the record reflects the existence of genuine issues of material fact or raises even the slightest reasonable doubt regarding such issues”
Establishes the governing standard for summary judgment in Florida requiring denial when any genuine factual dispute exists.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn February 25, 1987, decedent Edna Fine executed a will leaving her entire estate to her aunt, Mildred Sears. Upon Fine's death, William Ross, the al…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order granting a defense motion for a summary judgment which was entered below in a probate matter involving a will contest. We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal as one taken from a final order. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla.R.P. & G.P. 5.100.
On February 25, 1987, the decedent, Edna Fine, executed a will leaving her entire estate to her aunt, Mildred Sears. Upon decedent’s demise, William Ross, alternate personal representative under the will, petitioned for admission of the will to probate; appellants, decedent’s remaining aunts and uncle, contested admission of the will on the grounds that decedent lacked testamentary capacity and had been unduly influenced by Mildred Sears. Both issues were decided in favor of appellee Ross on his motion for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, we reverse.
It is well settled (1) that a summary judgment must be denied if the record reflects the existence of genuine issues of material fact or raises even the slightest reasonable doubt regarding such issues, Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966); Monroe County v. New Port Largo, Inc., 441 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Braun v. Ryder Systems, Inc., 430 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and (2) that the moving party has the burden of conclusively showing the absence of such issues, Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla.1977); Florida East Coast Ry. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Braun v. Ryder Systems, Inc.
The record on appeal discloses that there are genuine issues of material fact on the lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence which have not been eliminated by the appellee Ross as the movant for summary judgment below. Although the appellants admitted in requests for admissions that they had no personal knowledge of the events which led up to the execution of the subject will, this admission does not, as urged, conclusively establish that appellants cannot prove their attack on the will; there may be witnesses appellants can call at trial which will prove their case. Significantly, the appellee Ross produced no evidence below negating the appellants’ claims in this case. The order under review is, therefore, reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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Williams v. The Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank OF Fla. & Gay C. Russo, 582 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…rly, the record in this case reflects that material issues of fact remain unresolved and in dispute requiring reversal of the summary judgment. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1985); Holl v, Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966); Russo v. Ross, 545 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Monroe County v. New Port Largo, Inc., 441 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). For example, the trier-of-fact in this case will have to determine what liability, if any, should be borne by Citizens and Southern of Florida and/or Russo…
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Hemker v. Beldene C. Abdul, 716 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…So. 2d 697, 701 (Fla.1971). Abdul, occupied a confidential relationship with Evanco, and her lack of knowledge regarding the- will does not establish conclusively that .Hemker could not prove her attack on the will. See Russo, Mayo, & Bell v. Ross, 545 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).-After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court again may conclude that Hemker’s petition should be denied. However, at this point there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. Reversed and remande…
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Est. OF Lou Bacon v. Adele Bacon, 573 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…neous because the plaintiff ■failed entirely, let alone conclusively, to establish her entitlement to judgment in the face of the affirmative defenses contained in the beneficiaries’ answer.1 Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966); Russo v. Ross, 545 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Hyde Shipping Corp. v. Concrete Asfaltico Nacional, 507 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Puritan Ins. Co. v. Frank, 436 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). For these [*1036] reasons,2 the summary judgments are reversed and the cause re…
Authorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Wills v. Sears, 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977)
- Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 438 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Ceballos v. State, 441 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Braun v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 430 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)