TIMMIE LEWIS PARKER, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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A trial judge may properly impose an habitual offender sentence by making the statutorily required findings in a reported judicial proceeding, and these findings need not be in writing.
[1] Habitual offender sentences may be imposed based on findings made orally at a reported sentencing hearing, without the need for written findings.
[2] The statutory requirements for imposing an habitual offender sentence do not mandate that the court's findings be in writing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceParker challenged his habitual offender sentence, arguing the trial court's findings were not in writing. The district court affirmed, finding written…
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OVERTON, Justice.
We have for review Parker v. State, 538 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), in which Parker challenges the validity of his habitual offender sentence because the trial court’s findings were not in writing. The district court affirmed the sentence and acknowledged conflict with Hoefert v. State, 509 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We approve the district court’s decision.
The pertinent facts reflect that the trial court imposed upon Parker an habitual offender sentence pursuant to section 775.-084, Florida Statutes (1987),1 and, in doing so, made specific findings at Parker’s sentencing hearing, which was reported by a court reporter. The district court of appeal affirmed the sentence,2 concluding that the trial court’s findings that Parker was an habitual offender were not required to be in writing so long as the express findings required by the statute were made at a reported hearing. Parker, 538 So. 2d at 978.
Parker argues that “almost every Florida scheme permitting extraordinary sentencing requires findings of fact and reasons justifying the sentence to be in writing.” In this regard, he relies on our decisions and the applicable statute or rule which require written findings to (1) justify the death sentence,3 (2) sentence a juvenile as an adult,4 and (3) impose a sentence which departs from the prescribed sentencing guidelines.5 Parker argues that the same rule should apply to habitual offender sentencing. We disagree. The applicable statute or rule in the three instances relied on by Parker specifically requires the underlying reasons for the sentence to be in writing. To the contrary, section 775.084 contains no such requirement.
We have addressed this identical issue in Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980), and stated:
Section 775.084(3)(d) [Florida Statutes (1977) ] requires that the trial court make findings of fact that show on their face that an extended term is necessary to protect the public from defendant’s further criminal conduct. These findings, however, need not be in writing but may be reported in a transcript of the sentencing hearing.
Id. at 226 (citation omitted; emphasis added). We hold that a trial judge may properly impose an habitual offender sentence by making the statutorily required findings in a reported judicial proceeding.
We reject as without merit the claim that there was no justification to find the habitual sentence necessary for the protection of the public. The circumstances clearly support the court’s finding.
Accordingly, we approve the district court’s decision in this cause and disapprove Hoefert v. State, 509 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), to the extent that it conflicts with this decision.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. .The applicable portion of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1987), states:
(a) The court shall obtain and consider a presentence investigation prior to the imposition of a sentence as an habitual felony offender or an habitual misdemeanant.
(3) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if it is necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the defendant to an extended term as provided in subsection (4) and if the defendant is an habitual felony offender or an habitual misdemeanant. The procedure shall be as follows:
(b) Written notice shall be served on the defendant and his attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence so as to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (a), all evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.
(d) Each of the findings required as the .basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable to the extent normally applicable to similar findings.
(e) For the purpose of identification of an habitual felony offender or an habitual misdemeanant, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.
. The sentence was within the guidelines range and there is no claim that it was a departure sentence.
. § 921.141(3), Fla.Stat. (1987); Cave v. State, 445 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1984).
. § 39.111(7)(d), Fla.Stat. (1987); State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984).
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(11); State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054 (Fla.1985), overruled on other grounds, Milter v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987).
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Citator
Cited By (36 total)
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Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)…and section 921.001(6), Florida Statutes (1991), reasons delineating a departure from a guidelines sentence. As we have noted previously, the writing requirements in these statutory schemes and in section 39.059(7) are similar. See Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727, 728-29 (Fla.1989). The similarity exists because of the need to ensure that statutory safeguards are strictly maintained when trial judges treat individuals substantially more severely than is customary. In interpreting section 921.141(3), this Co…
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Anderson v. State, 592 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…enders.” Barber at 1171. The trial court’s failure to make the findings required by section 775.-084(l)(a) is, however, reversible error, even in the absence of objection. Rolle v. State, 586 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), citing Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727 (Fla.1989) and Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1985). Anderson’s sentence must therefore be reversed. We note that, on remand for resentencing, the trial court may resen-tence Anderson as an habitual offender, if the requisite statutory finding…
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Hierro v. State, 608 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…), including the “no pardon” and “no post-conviction relief” findings. The findings need only be made on the record and need not be reduced to a written order, although the trial court may enter a written order if it so chooses. See Parker v. State, 546 So. 2d 727, 729 (Fla.1989); Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d at 226; Tibbetts v. State, 603 So. 2d [*916] 43, 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Moreno v. State, 550 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). We find no error in the trial court’s evi-dentiary rulings regarding the rest…
Previewing 3 of 36 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1987)
- State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1985)
- Fredford James Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1980)
- State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)
- Hoefert v. State, 509 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Alphonso Cave v. State, 445 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1984)
- THE Florida BAR v. Hazen, 445 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1984)
- Booker v. State, 538 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Harlan S. Chiron, P.A. v. Paul, 538 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)