LINDA MAY COLUCCI AND JANE GENTILE, APPELLANTS,
v.
ALAN E. GREENFIELD, APPELLEE
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Linda May Colucci and Jane Gentile voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit, which divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter judgment. The appellate court reversed the final judgment entered after the dismissal, holding that an intervenor's claim cannot be adjudicated once the main proceeding has been voluntarily dismissed.
The trial court was divested of jurisdiction by the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal, rendering any judgment entered thereafter void. Because intervention exists in subordination to the propriety of the main proceeding, the trial court was precluded from adjudicating the intervenor's claim after the main action was dismissed.
[1] A voluntary dismissal of a cause of action divests the trial court of jurisdiction.
[2] A trial court is precluded from adjudicating an intervenor's claim when the intervention is in subordination to the main proceeding.
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Establishes the core holding that voluntary dismissal divests the court of jurisdiction to enter subsequent judgments.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceColucci and Gentile filed a lawsuit against Alan E. Greenfield. During the course of proceedings, a third party sought to intervene in the action. Pla…
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BASKIN, Judge.
Finding that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction by plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of their cause of action, we reverse the Final Judgment entered subsequent to the voluntary dismissal.1 Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 1221 (Fla.1986); Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla.1978); Freeman v. Mintz, 523 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA), cause dismissed, 528 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.), review denied sub nom. Coldwell Banker-Klock Co. v. Freeman, 534 So. 2d 398 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 534 So. 2d 400 (Fla.1988); Marvella Assoc., Inc. v. Carney, 512 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Ambory v. Ambory, 442 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Gonzalez v. Mulreany, 375 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
In addition, we hold that because intervention is “in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding,” Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230, the trial court was precluded from adjudicating the inter-venor’s claim.2 Cf. Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Dade County, 178 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1965); Krouse v. Palmer, 131 Fla. 444, 179 So. 762 (Fla.1938).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., concurs.
. The law is well-settled that the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Bohlinger v. Higginbotham, 70 So. 2d 911 (Fla.1954); City of Miami v. Cosgrove, 516 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Jared v. Jackson, 483 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Stel-Den of America, Inc. v. Roof Structures, Inc., 438 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), review denied, 450 So. 2d 488 (Fla.1984); Swebilius v. Florida Constr. Indus. Licensing Bd., 365 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Pushkin v. Lombard, 279 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 284 So. 2d 396 (Fla.1973); Walton v. Walton, 181 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Hadley v. Hadley, 140 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); Mendez v. Ortega, 134 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); Pittman v. Roberts, 122 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); Florio v. State, 119 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); In re Coleman’s Estate, 103 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958); In re Weiss’ Estate, 102 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. discharged, 106 So. 2d 411 (Fla.1958); Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.140(h)(2).
. We note that the "intervenor’s” failure to obtain permission to intervene, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230, renders the intervention proceeding questionable.
HUBBART, Judge
(dissenting)
I would affirm the final judgment appealed from in all respects on the ground that the appellants’ main brief does not present any judicial issues for appellate review. It is a long, rambling brief under the single heading “statement”; it fails to “list[ ] the issues presented for review,” as required by Fla.R.App.P. 9.210(b)(1), and contains no “[ajrgument with regard to each issue,” as required by Fla.R.App.P. 9.210(b)(5), even when read liberally to account for the fact that the brief was filed by the appellants pro se. This being so, it is clear that the appellants have waived all points on appeal and the final judgment must be affirmed. Florida Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Dentistry, 500 So. 2d 324, 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), rev. denied, 509 So. 2d 1117 (Fla.1987); Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Portela, 364 So. 2d 840, 841 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Florida First Nat’l Bank v. Dent, 350 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
I recognize that the appellants in their reply brief filed by counsel raise certain points on appeal which the court agrees with in its opinion. It is well settled, however, that an appellate court cannot consider matters which are raised for the first time on appeal in an appellant’s reply brief; the court is confined solely to the points on appeal raised in the appellant’s main brief. Zerwal v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hill, 198 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); Pursell v. Sumter Elec. Coop., Inc., 169 So. 2d 515, 518 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
Nor do I think errors relied on by the court are so blatant that we should notice them on our own, even in the absence of a proper point on appeal. None of the authorities cited in the court’s opinion hold that a trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain an intervenor’s complaint when, as here, the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the main action. The point is therefore far from settled and we overreach our authority, I think, by noticing such an alleged error on our own.
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84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…to adjudicate 84 Lumber’s intervention claim when 84 Lumber failed to preserve this claim prior to dismissal of the litigation between Cooper and his insurance carrier. See Weiss v. Courshon, 618 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Colucci v. Greenfield, 547 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Our decision, however, does not preclude either party from having the issue of reimbursement adjudicated in a lawfully instituted proceeding. The trial court’s order, rendered without jurisdiction, is not entitled to the preclus…
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Env't Confederation OF Sw. Fla., Inc. v. IMC Phosphates, Inc., 857 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…litigation continues between the parties. For example, a voluntary dismissal by the party asserting a claim will generally foreclose the rights of an intervenor who wished to address that claim. See Humana, 500 So. 2d at 187; Colucci v. Greenfield, 547 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Alice P., et al., 367 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Any right the Confederation and Manasota-88 might have to participate as intervenors would be lost altogether if the parties decide to se…
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Alec Ross v. Wells Fargo Bank, 114 So. 3d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…sing the re-foreclosure for lack of prosecution. . Wells Fargo argues that Ross’s jurisdictional argument was not properly preserved below and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This argument is without merit. See Colucci v. Greenfield, 547 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding that the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time); accord Jared v. Jackson, 483 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). .Our decision is without prejudice to Wells Fargo filing a separate foreclosure a…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (33 total)
- Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978)
- Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1986)
- Florio v. State of Fla. ex rel. A. L. Epperson, 119 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Pushkin v. Lombard, 279 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Freeman v. Al Mintz, 523 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Bohlinger v. Higginbotham, 70 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1954)
- Krouse v. Julta M. Palmer, 131 Fla. 444 (Fla. 1938)
- In re Est. of Matthew A. Coleman, 103 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Pittman v. Roberts, 122 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Stel-Den OF Am., Inc. v. Roof Structures, Inc., 438 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)