ALEC ROSS, APPELLANT,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, APPELLEE
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Ross appeals a trial court order reinstating Wells Fargo's post-judgment re-foreclosure action after it had been dismissed for lack of prosecution. The court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to permit the addition of Ross as a defendant in a supplemental complaint filed after the final foreclosure judgment.
No. A trial court loses jurisdiction upon rendition of a final judgment and expiration of the time to alter, modify, or vacate it, except to the extent jurisdiction is specifically reserved in the final judgment or provided by statute or rule of procedure. The final judgment here did not reserve jurisdiction to add omitted parties post-judgment, so the court lacked jurisdiction to permit the supplemental complaint.
[1] A trial court generally loses subject matter jurisdiction upon the rendition of a final judgment and the expiration of the time for altering, modifying, or vacating that…
[2] A trial court retains jurisdiction after a final judgment only to the extent specifically reserved in the final judgment or provided by statute or rule of procedure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction upon the rendition of a final judgment and expiration of the time allotted for altering, modifying or vacating the judgment.”
Establishes the foundational principle that courts lose jurisdiction after final judgment except as reserved
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWells Fargo obtained a final judgment of foreclosure against Tarazi on July 8, 2008. In November 2008, Wells Fargo filed a motion to add a supplementa…
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Alec Ross (“Ross”) appeals a non-final order which reinstated Wells Fargo Bank’s (“Wells Fargo”) post-judgment re-foreclosure proceedings against Ross, after that re-foreclosure action had been dismissed for lack of prosecution. We reverse because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to permit the post-judgment re-foreclosure proceeding.
On March 21, 2008, Wells Fargo filed a Mortgage Foreclosure Complaint against Zion Tarazi, (“Tarazi”). On July 8, 2008, Wells Fargo obtained a final judgment of foreclosure against Tarazi. On November 24, 2008, Wells Fargo filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint to assert a cause of action for re-foreclosure against Tarazi, and to add Ross as a defendant. The trial court granted Wells Fargo’s motion on December 3, 2008. Thereafter, the trial court entered, and later vacated, an order dismissing the re-foreclosure for lack of prosecution. Ross ap*257peals the trial court’s order vacating the dismissal order and reinstating the re-foreclosure action, contending that the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to permit the post-judgment re-foreclosure action to proceed.1
Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction upon the rendition of a final judgment and expiration of the time allotted for altering, modifying or vacating the judgment. Patin v. Popino, 459 So.2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The court retains jurisdiction to the extent such is specifically reserved in the final judgment or to the extent provided by statute or rule of procedure. Ross v. Damas, 31 So.3d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Harrell v. Harrell, 515 So.2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). In the instant case, the trial court entered a final judgment of foreclosure against Tarazi on July 8, 2008. That final judgment contained only a general reservation of jurisdiction: “The Court retains jurisdiction of this action to enter further Orders that are proper including, without limitation, writs of possession and deficiency judgments.” The final judgment did not retain jurisdiction to allow for a supplemental complaint to add an omitted party post-judgment. In permitting such a supplemental post-judgment proceeding, the trial court acted in the absence of jurisdiction.2 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Sidman, 103 So.3d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Damas, 31 So.3d at 203; Patin, 459 So.2d at 436. Therefore, the December 3, 2008 order granting Wells Fargo’s motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint to add Ross as a party, the order dismissing the re-foreclosure for lack of prosecution, and the subsequent order vacating that dismissal, are each a nullity.
We reverse and remand with directions to vacate these three orders, to reinstate the final judgment entered on July 8, 2008, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Callahan, 155 So. 3d 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…nd the time for filing post-trial motions has expired, a trial court may not entertain post-judgment motions absent a rule to the contrary, “unless it specifically retained jurisdiction to do so in its final judgment”). In Ross v. Wells Fargo Bank, 114 So. 3d 256, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), the trial court reserved jurisdiction in a clause identical to paragraph 12 of the final judgment in the instant case.3 Subsequent to final judgment, Wells Fargo filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint to r…
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Renovaship, Inc. v. Barclay Quatremain, 208 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…ismissal order of March 12, 2015. ANALYSIS As a general rule, “a trial court loses jurisdiction upon the rendition of a final judgment and expiration of the time allotted for altering, modifying or vacating the judgment.” Ross v. Wells Fargo Bank, 114 So. 3d 256, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).6 [*284] The trial court retains jurisdiction to the extent such is specifically reserved in the final judgment or as otherwise provided by statute or rule. Id. In the instant case, the order dismissing the action for lack of…
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Cent. Park A Metrowest Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Amtrust REO I, LLC, 169 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…extent such is specifically reserved in the final judgment or to the extent provided by statute or rule of procedure. Ross v. Damas, 31 So. 3d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Harrell v.Harrell, 515 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Ross v. Wells Fargo Bank, 114 So. 3d 256, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Central Mortgage Company v. Callahan, 155 So. 3d 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), supports the conclusion that the trial court lacked the authority to issue a post-judgment order in this case. In Callahan, Central Mortgage Company f…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Patin v. Popino, 459 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Cyrilla Ann Harrell v. Harrell, 515 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- O. Alan Jared, M.D., Bethesda Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Jackson, 483 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Colucci v. Greenfield, 547 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Emmett Abdoney v. Janetta York with rights to manage, 903 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Alec Ross v. Damas, 31 So. 3d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
- Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Orline M. Sidman, 103 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
- Johnson v. State, 31 So. 3d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
- FNS4, LLC v. Sec. Bank, N.A., 88 So. 3d 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)