JEFFREY W. CRANE, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1989-08-01
No. 89-113
Before JORGENSON, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.
547 So. 2d 266 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Jeffrey Crane appeals the revocation of his concealed weapon license based on his prior felony convictions with withheld adjudication. The court affirms the revocation, holding that a concealed weapon license is a privilege rather than a vested right and that retroactive application of the statute revoking such licenses for felony convictions is constitutional and mandated by statute.


Holding

The court affirmed that retroactive application of the statute is constitutional because a concealed weapon license is a privilege, not a vested right, and the legislature's unequivocal language mandated retroactive application. The public interest in regulating concealed weapons substantially outweighs any burden on Crane, particularly since he was a private investigator before obtaining the license.


Headnotes

[1] A license to carry a concealed weapon or firearm is a privilege, not a vested right, and thus its retroactive revocation is not unconstitutional.

[2] A statute requiring the revocation of a concealed weapon license for a felony disposition within the past three years applies regardless of whether adjudication of guilt…

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Key Quotes

“a license to carry a concealed weapon or firearm is a privilege and not a vested right”

Establishes the fundamental principle that concealed weapon licenses are privileges subject to revocation rather than protected vested rights

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Facts & Procedural History

Crane pleaded nolo contendere to two felony charges in 1987 with adjudication of guilt withheld. In 1988, the Florida Department of State, Division of…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of appel-lee Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing, revoking appellant Jeffrey Crane’s license for carrying a concealed weapon or firearm. We affirm.

The Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing (Department), revoked Crane’s license to carry a concealed weapon or firearm pursuant to the authority of section 790.06(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988). The order was based on Crane’s having had a withholding of adjudication of guilt on two felony charges.

Section 790.06(2)(k), Florida Statutes, requires the Department to revoke the concealed weapon license of any person who has had a felony disposition within the past three years, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld.

Crane contends that when he pled nolo contendere to the felonies in 1987, section 790.06(2)(k), Florida Statutes, was not in effect. Therefore, he could not have known that his plea would affect his right to carry a concealed weapon and ultimately affect his ability to earn a living as a private investigator. He further argues that retroactive application of section 790.-06(2)(k), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional. The Department asserts that retroactive application of the statute is neither unconstitutional nor unjust. The Department’s position is that a license to carry a concealed weapon is merely a privilege, and not a vested right.

We find that retroactive application of section 790.06(2)(k), Florida Statutes, is not unconstitutional because a license to carry a concealed weapon or firearm is a privilege and not a vested right. See Mayo v. Market Fruit Co. of Sanford, 40 So. 2d 555 (Fla.1949). Further, retroactive application of section 790.06(2)(k), Florida Statutes, is mandated by the unequivocal language of the state legislature, which in amending chapter 790 directed the Department to:

review its files of persons licensed prior to the effective date of this act to determine whether the license of any licensee is subject to revocation in accordance with the provisions of this act. The department shall revoke the license of any licensee who no longer remains eligible under s. 790.06(2), Florida Statutes, by reason of having been found incompetent, mentally ill, or guilty of a felony, as a result of plea or trial, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt has been withheld or imposition of sentence suspended.

Ch. 88-183, § 1, Laws of Fla. Although a license has been traditionally seen as being in the nature of a privilege to do that which would otherwise be unlawful, Holloway v. Schott, 64 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla.1953), licensing laws are subject to due process guaranties. Kline v. State Beverage Department, 77 So. 2d 872, 874 (Fla.1955). Assuming arguendo that it could be said Crane had acquired any vested rights with respect to his existing license, the applicable test for the validity of the retroactive legislation is found in State Department of Transportation v. Knowles, 402 So. 2d 1155, 1158 (Fla.1981).1 Here, the public interest in strict regulation of carrying concealed weapons is very great in comparison with the withdrawal of that privilege, for a three-year period, for anyone who has had a felony disposition. While Crane asserts that the statute impedes his ability to pursue his occupation of private investigator, it is clear on this record that Crane was a private investigator long before he obtained the license to carry a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the final order appealed from is affirmed.

. See generally Benton, Retroactivity in Licensing Cases, 59 Fla.Bar.J. 81 (June 1985); 2 N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 41.01-.03 (4th ed. 1986).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Norman v. State, 159 So. 3d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    …analysis are discussed more fully below. . We recognize that some cases pre-dating Heller I and McDonald have held that the carrying of firearms outside the' home for self-defense purposes is a privilege. Crane v. Dep’t of State, Div. of Licensing, 547 So. 2d 266, 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“[A] license to carry a concealed weapon or firearm is a privilege and not a vested right.”). However, recent cases decided since Heller I and McDonald, including Peruta, have established that the carrying of firearms outsid…
  • Middlebrooks v. Dep't of State, 565 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
    …not accurate to say that retroactive operation is permitted in all cases except those impairing vested rights. The Mayo language was also cited in a case that is factually similar to the case at bar, Crane v. Department of State, Div. of Licensing, 547 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Appellant Crane was a private investigator who was licensed to carry a concealed firearm. In 1988, Section 790.-06(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), was enacted, requiring the Department of State to deny an application for a c…
  • Hernandez v. State, 629 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
    …] Hernandez’s constitutional claim is bottomed on an assertion that the issuance of a license creates a vested right, or that the license itself is a property right. We rejected the same contention in Crane v. Department of State, Div. of Licensing, 547 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), which is controlling. In Crane we noted, relying on Mayo v. Market Fruit Co. of Sanford, 40 So. 2d 555 (Fla.1949), that a firearms license was a privilege which created no vested rights. We held that section 790.06(2)(k), which s…

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