DANIEL GRANT, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1989-07-05
No. 87-2732
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and LEVY, JJ.
547 So. 2d 952 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Daniel Grant, Jr. was convicted of second-degree murder, strong-arm robbery, and illegal firearm possession for killing a gas station attendant during a robbery attempt. The trial judge imposed a 25-year sentence (with 3 years suspended) as an upward departure from the 17-22 year guideline range, but the appellate court reversed, finding the stated reasons for departure legally insufficient.


Holding

The court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing within the guideline range, holding that the trial judge's three stated reasons for upward departure—an escalating pattern of criminal activity, temporal proximity of offenses, and victim vulnerability—were invalid under the facts presented.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant's prior misdemeanor convictions over a five-year period, consisting of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest without violence, hindrance of a bus driver, posse…

[2] The age of a victim, standing alone, is not a sufficient reason for an upward departure from sentencing guidelines.

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Key Quotes

“Our review of the record reflects that neither the defendant's prior criminal history nor the temporal proximity of the offenses committed demonstrates the defendant's involvement in a persistent or escalating pattern of criminal activity sufficient to justify departure.”

Establishes that prior misdemeanor convictions alone, absent an escalating pattern, do not justify upward departure from sentencing guidelines.

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Facts & Procedural History

In November 1986, Grant attempted to steal a gun from a sleeping 57-year-old gas station attendant to sell for crack cocaine money. When the attendant…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In November of 1986, Daniel Grant, Jr., the defendant, attempted to steal a gun in order to sell it and buy “crack” cocaine. The gun was in the back pocket of a sleeping 57 year old gas station attendant, who awoke when the defendant tried to steal his gun, whereupon the defendant knocked him to the ground, beat him, and succeeded in pulling the gun from the attendant’s pants. The defendant then stood over the attendant, and shot him once in the head at close range, killing him. The defendant was found guilty of second degree murder, strong arm robbery, and illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Although the sentencing guidelines called for a sentence of between 17-22 years,1 the trial judge sentenced the defendant to 25 years incarceration, suspending three years during which the defendant would be placed on probation.

The trial court based the upward departure upon the escalating pattern and the temporal proximity of the offenses committed, and also upon the vulnerability of the victim and the manner in which the murder was committed.

We find the listed reasons for departure invalid under the facts of this case and reverse.

Our review of the record reflects that neither the defendant’s prior criminal history nor the temporal proximity of the offenses committed demonstrates the defendant’s involvement in a persistent or escalating pattern of criminal activity sufficient to justify departure. In 1981, the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence. In 1982 he was convicted for resisting arrest without violence and hindrance of a MTA bus driver. In 1983, he was convicted of possession of marijuana and in January of 1986 he was convicted of criminal mischief.

In December of 1986, he was convicted of disorderly conduct and a bench warrant was issued. These five convictions over a period of five years were all for misdemeanors and do not support either a finding of an escalating pattern of criminal activity or a persistent pattern of criminal activity based upon the timing of the offenses.

Finally, the fact that the victim was 57 years old and had been sleeping prior to the attack does not establish the victim’s vulnerability as a proper reason for departure. See Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1308 (Fla.1986) (fact that victim was stabbed while sleeping held insufficient reason for departure); Johnson v. State, 517 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (fact that murder victim was 57 years old and drunk at time of murder held invalid reason for departure); Harmon v. State, 506 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (fact that one robbery victim was 52 years old held invalid reason for departure).

Accordingly, we vacate the sentence, and reverse and remand for resentencing within the 17-22 years guideline range.

Reversed and remanded.

. The guideline sentence was elevated from 12-17 years to 17-22 years based on the fact that the defendant was subject to an outstanding bench warrant. Under Rule 3.988(a)(IV), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 points are added to a defendant's scoresheet if the defendant's legal status at the time of the offense involves a “legal constraint." Rule 3.701(d)(6), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, defines legal status at the time of an offense as including “fugitives who have ... failed to appear for a criminal judicial proceeding.” Here the defendant was subject to an outstanding bench warrant which causes him to come within this rule, thus justifying the addition of the 21 points which elevated his guideline sentence range. See Gemme v. State, 508 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (defendant subject to New York warrant fell within the definition of legal status causing added scoresheet points).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Graham v. State, 557 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
    …rt gave for departing from the guidelines was that the defendant stabbed the victim while she was sleeping and therefore more vulnerable. This factor alone is not a clear and convincing reason to depart. 492 So. 2d at 1309. See also Grant v. State, 547 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Brown v. State, 511 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). 4. The victim M.K. was vulnerable because the defendant stood in a position of trust as baby-sitter to the victim, which position the defendant abused in committing the instant…
  • Grant v. State, 779 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
    …contends that legal constraint points should not have been included on his scoresheet. We disagree and affirm the trial court order. This court has already held that the assessment of legal constraint points was proper in this case. Grant v. State, 547 So. 2d 952, 952 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Affirmed.* * After defendant-appellant Grant filed his notice of appeal, he filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss his Rule 3.800 motion with [*670] out prejudice, and the trial court granted the motion. B…

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