JUNIOUS EDWARD MITCHELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mitchell was convicted of armed robbery and three counts of sexual battery after the state used peremptory challenges to exclude black prospective jurors. The court reversed, finding the state improperly exercised peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner by excluding a black juror based on pretextual reasons that equally applied to accepted non-black jurors.
The court held that the state violated equal protection by using peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors based on pretextual, race-neutral reasons that equally applied to accepted non-black jurors. The exclusion of a single prospective juror for a racially impermissible reason constitutes a violation of equal protection, and Mitchell is entitled to a new trial.
[1] The exclusion of even a single prospective juror for a racially impermissible reason may violate equal protection.
[2] When evaluating the legitimacy of a race-neutral justification for a peremptory challenge, reasons equally applicable to a juror who was not challenged weigh against the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the exclusion of even a single prospective black juror for a racially impermissible reason may be a violation of equal protection”
Establishes that excluding a single juror of a particular race on improper grounds violates equal protection, even if another juror of that race was seated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring jury selection, the state used peremptory challenges to exclude two black prospective jurors. The state justified excluding one black female be…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of judgments of conviction and sentences for armed robbery and three counts of sexual battery. We find that the state was improperly allowed to utilize a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner. This error requires that the judgments of conviction be reversed.
After the state utilized peremptory challenges, to exclude two black prospective jurors, appellant’s counsel requested that the court inquire as to the state’s reasons for such exclusion.
The state responded, indicating that one of the challenges was utilized as to a black female because she was divorced and had never served on a jury. Appellant’s counsel noted that other jurors were accepted who had not previously served on a jury. The state suggested that “her status as a divorcee indicates a relative instability and the other jurors are not similarly situated.” Appellant’s counsel further noted that the prospective juror had been employed for “quite some time” and had lived in the area for ten years, and that “it’s the same qualifications” as certain jurors who were accepted. The court determined that the state's challenges were exercised for valid reasons, and the case then proceeded to a trial resulting in appellant’s conviction.
Appellant made a sufficient objection and initial showing in accordance with State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1984), to contest the state’s use of peremptory challenges. Although one black was seated on the jury, and another excluded for a valid reason, the exclusion of even a single prospective black juror for a racially impermissible reason may be a violation of equal protection. See State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.1988); Floyd v. State, 511 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
In conducting a Neil inquiry and concluding that the state had expressed valid reasons for its peremptory challenges, the court apparently determined that the state had offered a racially neutral explanation. When determining the reasonableness of an explanation the court should properly decline to substitute its judgment for that of counsel. See Slap-py, supra. Likewise, the appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the lower court in assessing credibility, absent an abuse of discretion. See McCloud v. State, 536 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
But the proffered reasons should not be merely accepted at face value; they must be evaluated as a disputed issue of fact. See Slappy, supra. And once a likelihood of racial motivation has been demonstrated, the state must tender an explanation which is not only reasonable but also shows the absence of subterfuge or pretext. Id. The state’s asserted justification that a challenged juror was divorced and had never served on a jury was equally applicable to a juror and an alternate who were not black and were accepted without challenge. This circumstance is “strong evidence” that the state’s explanation was a subterfuge to avoid admitting a discriminatory motive. See Floyd, supra. And Slappy indicates that an explanation based on reasons equally applicable to a juror who is not challenged weighs against the legitimacy of a race-neutral justification and-tends to suggest an impermissible pretext. Because a substantial likelihood of racial discrimination was initially shown, and the state’s explanation did not distinguish the excluded individual from jurors who were accepted without challenge, the state has not rebutted the inference that it utilized a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner.
The lower court should not have allowed the exclusion of a potential juror on this basis, and appellant is therefore entitled to a new trial.
The judgments of conviction are reversed and the sentences vacated, and the cause is remanded.
ERVIN and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
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Files v. State, 586 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…ermining the existence of reasonableness is not to substitute its judgment for that of the prosecutor, but merely to decide if the state’s assertions are such that some reasonable persons would agree. 522 So. 2d at 22-23. See abo Mitchell v. State, 548 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); McCloud v. State, 536 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Spillis Candela & Partners, Inc. v. The Association of School Consultants, Inc., 586 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Bohannon v. State, 557 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 3d DCA), review d…1 / 2
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Green v. State, 572 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…a showing of which requires that the above described initial burden of proof be carried and then be not satisfactorily rebutted by the state. See also, e.g., Williams v. State, 567 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Dinkins. But see Mitchell v. State, 548 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (while reciting that defendant had shown a substantial likelihood of racial discrimination in the state’s peremptory challenges of two black prospective jurors thereby placing upon state burden of showing racially neutral re…
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Marin Stroia v. State, 119 So. 3d 1274 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…-American jurors was not genuine, where challenge “was equally applicable to non-black jurors who were not challenged”); Brown v. State, 733 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Richardson v. State, 575 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Mitchell v. State, 548 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In this case, we find the trial court’s finding of genuineness as to the state’s proffered reason for its strike of juror 22 to be clearly erroneous. Juror 2 had a brother who had been arrested for drugs, and her father had bee…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984)
- State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Perez, 511 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Alphonso Floyd v. State, 511 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Harrel F. Braddy v. Honorable Lawrence L. Korda, 536 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- McCLOUD v. State, 536 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)