MICHAEL C. TRAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Travis was convicted of selling counterfeit controlled substances and challenged both his sentences and the revocation of his driver's license. The court reversed the sentences as exceeding the statutory maximum and vacated the driver's license revocation for being an improper condition of probation, requiring the court to direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to suspend his license instead.
The sentences were imposed in excess of the statutory maximum and required resentencing. While suspending Travis's driver's license was an appropriate penalty given that a motor vehicle was used in the felonies, the trial court improperly invoked that power directly rather than directing the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to impose the suspension as provided by statute. The court could impose as a probation condition a requirement not to drive during the probationary term.
[1] A sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for a felony conviction requires resentencing.
[2] A trial court may direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to suspend a driver's license upon conviction of a felony involving a motor vehicle, if the c…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. Accordingly, resentencing is required.”
Establishes that sentences exceeding statutory maximums are void and require resentencing, citing precedent from Calhoun and Williams cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTravis pleaded guilty to two counts of sale or delivery of a substance falsely represented to be a controlled substance. The crimes occurred when he m…
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FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
Michael C. Travis seeks relief from an order revoking his driver’s license and the sentences imposed upon him following his convictions for trafficking in cocaine and the sale or delivery of a substance falsely represented to be a controlled substance.
In Case No. 88-03174, Travis was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of sale/delivery of a substance in lieu of a controlled substance, in violation of section 817.563, Florida Statutes (1987), a third degree felony punishable as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1987).
The trial court sentenced Travis to four years incarceration to be followed by five years probation, a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. In Case No. 88-03175 Travis pleaded guilty to the same charge, a third degree felony, and was sentenced to twelve months incarceration to be followed by six years probation — again, a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, resentencing is required. See Calhoun v. State, 522 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Williams v. State, 485 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
As a condition of probation the trial judge revoked Travis’ driver’s license for six years. Travis contends that this sanction is not a reasonable condition of probation; he makes his living as a long-distance truck driver.
We disagree. The crimes for which he was convicted occurred when Travis met undercover detectives at an interstate highway rest area and he produced controlled substances from the vehicle he was driving.
Under section 322.-27(2), Florida Statutes (1987), the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles must suspend an operator’s driver’s license for a felony in which a motor vehicle is used “upon direction of the court, when the court feels that the seriousness of the offense and the circumstances surrounding the conviction warrant the suspension of the licensee’s driving privilege.” Although the suspension of Travis’ driver’s license was an appropriate penalty, the trial court invaded the province of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, the agency authorized to impose the actual suspension. See Moreland v. State, 442 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Hence, upon remand, the court should delete the suspension order and substitute a direction to the Department that it suspend Travis’ license as provided in section 322.27, Florida Statutes.
We note also that the court may impose upon Travis’ probation a condition that he not drive a motor vehicle during the probationary term.
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
HALL and PARKER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Crawford v. State, 651 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…llant’s driver’s license for two years. However, section 322.055 does not provide the trial court with the authority to suspend or revoke the license itself, which is what it did, thereby invading the province of the department. See Travis v. State, 549 So. 2d 737, 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), called into doubt on other grounds, Spera v. State, 556 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Accordingly, we reverse that part of the trial judge’s order being appealed and remand with direction for the trial court to order the de…
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Spera v. State, 556 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…acate that portion of the appellant’s sentence suspending his driver’s license and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Otherwise, affirmed. FRANK, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur. . In Travis v. State, 549 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), it was stated that the trial court could recommend the revocation of a driver’s license upon commission of a felony in which a motor vehicle is used pursuant to section 322.27(2), Florida Statutes (1987), "upon direction of the c…
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Bright v. State, 553 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…involves an offense for which the trial court is empowered to revoke or suspend a driver’s license. Thus, as is also conceded by the State, these cases are controlled by Mandile v. State, 547 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). See also Travis v. State, 549 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Accordingly, we affirm Bright’s convictions and sentences but we vacate those portions of the sentences suspending his driver’s license. LEHAN, A.C.J., and FRANK and PARKER, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Calhoun v. State, 522 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Loucious Earl Williams v. State, 485 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Moreland v. State, 442 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Dell E. Barfield and Louis W. Barfield v. Bradshaw, 442 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)