PATRICK CRAWFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Crawford appeals from the trial court's oral direction suspending his driver's license for two years following his conviction for drug possession and probation violations. The court held that while the trial court had authority to direct the Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke the license, it lacked authority to directly suspend or revoke it itself, requiring remand for proper procedure.
The trial court had authority under section 322.055(1), Florida Statutes, to direct the Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke appellant's driver's license for two years, but lacked authority to directly suspend or revoke the license itself. The court's direct suspension invaded the province of the administrative department.
[1] A court may direct the department to revoke a driver's license upon a conviction involving a controlled substance.
[2] A trial court lacks the authority to directly suspend or revoke a driver's license; its role is to direct the relevant department to do so.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“upon the conviction of a person 18 years of age or older for possession or sale of, trafficking in, or conspiracy to possess, sell, or traffic in a controlled substance, the court shall direct the department to revoke the driver's license or driving privilege of the person.”
Establishes the statutory basis requiring courts to direct the department (not directly revoke) licenses for drug convictions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCrawford was placed on probation in 1993 for cocaine possession. In 1994, he was found guilty of violating probation conditions by committing armed ro…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was placed on probation in 1993 for possession of cocaine. In 1994, appellant was found guilty of violating conditions of his probation by committing armed robbery and unlawfully using a disguise in that robbery. The trial court revoked appellant’s probation and adjudicated him guilty of possession of cocaine. Appellant was sentenced to thirty months incarceration.
In addition, the trial court orally directed that appellant’s driver’s license be suspended for two years. This appeal is solely from that direction.
Section 322.055(1), Florida Statutes (1993), provides a basis for the revocation of a driver’s license based upon a conviction involving a controlled substance.
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 322.28, upon the conviction of a person 18 years of age or older for possession or sale of, trafficking in, or conspiracy to possess, sell, or traffic in a controlled substance, the court shall direct the department to revoke the driver’s license or driving privilege of the person. The period of such revocation shall be 2 years or until the person is evaluated for and, if deemed necessary by the evaluating agency, completes a drug treatment and rehabilitation program approved or regulated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. However, the court may, in its sound discretion, direct the department to issue a license for driving privileges restricted to business or employment purposes only, as defined by s. 322.271, if the person is otherwise qualified for such a license.
Accordingly, the trial court had the authority to direct the department to revoke appellant’s driver’s license for two years. However, section 322.055 does not provide the trial court with the authority to suspend or revoke the license itself, which is what it did, thereby invading the province of the department. See Travis v. State, 549 So. 2d 737, 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), called into doubt on other grounds, Spera v. State, 556 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Accordingly, we reverse that part of the trial judge’s order being appealed and remand with direction for the trial court to order the department to revoke appellant’s license for two years pursuant to section 322.055. See, e.g., Spera, 556 So. 2d at 487; Travis, 549 So. 2d at 738; Mandile v. State, 547 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
HERSEY, GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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State v. Grapski, 696 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…evoking the license, the judge merely follows the mandate of the statute as an administrative representative of the department, without any discretion to exercise. Smith, 93 So. 2d at 107; accord Vogt, 489 So. 2d at 1170; see also Crawford v. State, 651 So. 2d 731, 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Likewise, when a requirement for reinstatement, such as enrollment in a DUI course, is made mandatory by statute, reinstatement is an administrative function over which the trial court has no discretion. Cf Smith, 93 So. 2d…
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Brunson v. State, 31 So. 3d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…CA 1995) (holding, per section 322.055, Florida Statutes, a trial court only has the authority to direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to suspend a defendant’s license, but may not revoke the license itself); Crawford v. State, 651 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding the same). For the foregoing reasons, we reverse appellant’s conviction and sentence and remand for further proceedings. THOMAS, J., concurs; WEBSTER, J., concurs with opinion. * Due to the heightened use of videotapi…
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Davis v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 660 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…f 25 June 1976.” Id. at 1224. If, as has been held, a circuit court with conceded “authority to direct the department to revoke [a] driver’s license, ... [nevertheless lacks] the authority to suspend or revoke the license itself,” Crawford v. State, 651 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), surely no “DUI Evaluator” has such authority, sans rule or statute. Although we do not decide the question, we feel obliged to point out that current Florida Administrative Code Rule 15A-10.031(1) might dictate a different resu…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mandile v. State, 547 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Travis v. State, 549 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Nowling v. State, 556 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Spera v. State, 556 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)