ANTHONY JULIUS RICKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Police officers conducted a warrantless search of a defendant's mouth by forcing it open after observing him make a cupping gesture to his mouth in a drug-infested hotel, recovering cocaine. The court reversed the conviction, holding that while the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, they lacked authority under stop-and-frisk law to forcibly search his mouth without probable cause to believe he was armed with a dangerous weapon.
The officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, but they were not authorized to search him by forcing open his mouth. Upon a valid stop, officers could only frisk a defendant if they had probable cause to believe he was armed with a dangerous weapon, and they were not automatically authorized to search the defendant for other items.
[1] A founded or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifies a stop, but does not automatically authorize a search beyond the scope permitted by stop and frisk law.
[2] Police officers may frisk a lawfully stopped individual only if they have probable cause to believe the individual is armed with a dangerous weapon.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon effecting a valid stop, the officers could have frisked the defendant if they had probable cause to believe he was armed with a dangerous weapon... However, they were not automatically authorized to search the defendant.”
Establishes the distinction between authority to stop versus authority to search, and the limitation on frisks to situations involving probable cause to believe the defendant is armed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo uniformed police officers visited a hotel known for illegal drug activity. While walking down a hallway, they observed the defendant walking towar…
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COWART, Judge.
Two uniformed police officers visited a hotel reputed for illegal drug activity. While walking down a hallway, the officers observed the defendant walking toward them. The defendant, upon seeing the officers, placed his hand in a cupping manner to his mouth, turned and proceeded quickly away from the officers. The officers did not see what, if anything, had been in the defendant’s hand. One of the officers testified that in his experience, it is common practice for an individual under such circumstances to conceal drugs in his or her mouth. - The officers gave chase and grabbed the defendant. One officer held the defendant’s arms while the other applied pressure to the defendant’s throat, forcing the defendant’s mouth open. The defendant spat out a small plastic baggie containing cocaine.
The defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress, with the trial court ruling that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
The officers had a founded or reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the circumstances presented. The question is whether the officers were authorized under stop and frisk law to search the defendant by forcing open his mouth. They were not.
Upon effecting a valid stop, the officers could have frisked the defendant if they had probable cause to believe he was armed with a dangerous weapon. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). However, they were not automatically authorized to search the defendant. Thomas v. State, 533 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). This case is analogous to those invalidating a seizure where the officer upon stopping the defendant reached inside the defendant’s pocket to seize an item which the officer did not believe was a weapon. See, e.g., Warren v. State, 547 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Jordan v. State, 544 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The State’s reliance on Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) is unavailing because there the officer had seen, among other items, a cocaine smoking pipe and had probable cause to believe a crime was being committed.
The defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine is
REVERSED.
DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.
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Keller v. State, 586 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…89 (Fla.1983), this court relied on Faison and reversed a conviction for false imprisonment because the victim’s confinement during an attempted sexual battery was incidental to the crime.8 The same standard was employed in Jenkins v. [*1262] State, 549 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), in which a kidnapping conviction was reversed because the confinement and movement of the victim was incidental to the sexual batteries. And similarly in Kirtsey v. State, 511 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), a kidnapping convict…
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Cummo v. State, 581 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…e knew Cummo had something in his mouth and based on his experience, he suspected it might be cocaine. He further testified that the object in Cummo’s mouth could have been a lifesaver or a mint. We find as the Fifth District did in Ricks v. State, 549 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), that “[t]his case is analogous to those invalidating a seizure where the officer upon stopping the defendant reached inside the defendant’s pocket to seize an item which the officer did not believe was a weapon.” (Citations omit…
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State v. Caicedo, 622 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…fficer observed the defendant place the just-acquired object immediately into his mouth, and testified that in his experience, the mouth is commonly used to carry rock cocaine. See Steele v. State, 561 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Ricks v. State, 549 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). An observation as to a known mode of transportation of drugs is a factor properly considered in a probable cause determination. See P.L.R. v. State, 455 So. 2d 363 (Fla.1984) (…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (U.S. 1983)
- Jordan v. State, 544 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Thomas v. State, 533 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Ethingor Wilzo Warren v. State, 547 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)