KAY ARCANGELI, APPELLANT,
v.
ALBERTSON'S, INC., APPELLEE
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An order merely granting a motion for summary judgment is not a final, appealable order.
[1] An order merely granting a motion for summary judgment is not a final, appealable judgment.
[2] An appellate court may temporarily relinquish jurisdiction to a trial court to allow the entry of a final appealable order.
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COBB, Judge.
The dispositive issue in regard to this appeal is jurisdiction. The trial court entered an order merely granting the defendant Albertson’s motion for summary judgment. The order is not an appealable final judgment. Lawler v. Harris, 418 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); and McCready v. Villas Apartments, 379 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).1
In Lawler, confronted with the problem of an appealed order’s lack of finality, we adopted the solution suggested by the Third District in Gries Investment Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980): a temporary relinquishment of an inchoate jurisdiction in order for the parties to obtain a final appealable order, without an outright dismissal of the pending appeal. It is now apparent that our Lawler remedy has not induced attorneys to avoid the appellate pitfalls of orders merely granting motions for dismissal and for summary judgment.
We now agree with our sister courts in the Fourth and First Districts with respect to this problem. See Russell v. Russell, 507 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); and Johnson v. First City Bank of Gainesville, 491 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). It is time to end the Lawler experiment, which has failed, and adopt a stricter policy of dismissal, so as to motivate the appellate bar to furnish us with appealable orders. As a matter of judicial economy, we can no longer babysit “inchoate” appeals by relinquishing jurisdiction to the trial courts, so that they may do what should have been done in the first instance.
We hereby dismiss the instant appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We have considered this order En Banc for the purpose of receding from Lawler v. Harris, which we now do.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
DANIEL, C.J., and DAUKSCH, SHARP, COWART and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . Language added to an order granting a plaintiffs motion for summary judgment can give the order the necessary declaration of finality. Catchings v. Florida-McCracken Concrete Pipe Co., 101 Fla. 792, 135 So. 561 (1931).
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Citator
Cited By (25 total)
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State v. Saufley, 574 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…then the first order does not constitute a “final order” appealable as such under Rule 9.030(b)(1)(A) and attempted appeals of such non-final orders are subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as held in [*1211] Arcangeli v. Albertson’s Inc., 550 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Arcangeli merely holds that an order to be appealable as a final order under Rule 9.030(b)(1)(A) must end the judicial labor in the cause and that an order merely granting a motion to dismiss, as in Lawler v. Harris, 418 So. 2d…1 / 2
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Yost v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 570 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…, 557 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Chapman v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, 549 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Johnson v. First City Bank of Gainesville, 491 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Arcangeli v. Albertson’s, Inc., 550 So. 2d 557, 558 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); White Palms of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Fox, 525 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 4th [*354] DCA 1988); Russell v. Russell, 507 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Accordingly, we reverse the order which awarded final judgment to American Nat…
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Dixon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 609 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…y, 584 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (an order which merely grants a motion for summary judgment is not a final order). Accord Nolan’s Towing and Recovery v. Marino Trucking, Inc., 581 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Arcangeli v. Albertson’s, Inc., 550 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (en banc); Amelco Investment Corp. v. Bryant Electric Co., 487 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Pompano Paint Co. v. Pompano Beach Bank & Trust Co., 208 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). Because the “Order Granting Summary Judgment…
Previewing 3 of 25 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Johnson v. First City Bank OF Gainesville & J. Emory Cross, 491 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Russell v. Russell, 507 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Emory Catchings v. Florida-McCracken Concrete Pipe Co., 101 Fla. 792 (Fla. 1931)
- Danford v. City OF Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Robert E. Lawler, M.D. v. Harris, 418 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- McCREADY v. The Villas Apts., 379 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)