JAMES MCCREADY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE VILLAS APARTMENTS, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
James McCready appeals from an order which simply reads “The Motion of THE VILLAS APARTMENTS and INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, for Summary Judgment is granted.”
The appealability of that order has not been raised. We raise it on our own.
An order simply granting a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not an order that can be appealed. Pompano Paint Co. v. Pompano Beach Bank and Trust Co., 208 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Bailey v. Allstate Insurance Company, 218 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1969); Renard v. Kirkeby Hotels, Inc., 99 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1958); Haddad, Partial ‘Final’ Judgments, 53 Fla.B.J. 204 (Oct.1979). Thus we must dismiss this appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED, sua sponte.
CROSS, J., and McDONALD, PARKER LEE, Associate Judge, concur. DAUKSCH, C. J., concurs specially with opinion.
DAUKSCH, Chief Justice,
concurring specially:
While I quite agree with the dismissal of this appeal, I suggest a change in the appellate rules to relax such a formalistic requirement to save the embarrassment and expense, not to mention the judicial labor, incurred in cases such as these. Why can’t we say the granting of a motion for summary judgment is just as appealable as the inevitable judgment itself if the order essentially meets the finality requirements? The case law, of course, is quite clear and a rule change is required, if desired.
Since we are acting sua sponte in this matter, I cannot help wonder aloud how one can sue “The Villas Apartments.” Is that the curious name of a natural person? I suspect not. It certainly is not a corporation because the word or one of the abbreviated indications is not there. Thus, the only way the appellee could be deemed a form of legal entity is if someone, either a corporation or a natural person, has filed under the Fictitious Name Statute to use the name “The Villas Apartments”. In such event, appellant should sue the one who registers the name, not the name.
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Arcangeli v. Albertson's, Inc., 550 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…ndant Albertson’s motion for summary judgment. The order is not an appealable final judgment. Lawler v. Harris, 418 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); and McCready v. Villas Apartments, 379 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).1 In Lawler, confronted with the problem of an appealed order’s lack of finality, we adopted the solution suggested by the Third District in Gries Investment Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980): a temporary relinq…
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Blanche Harris Kingsland v. Nat'l Advertising Co., 384 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…inal order. We should note first that the order appealed from is not a partial final judgment, but only an order granting defendant’s motion for partial final judgment. As such, it is not an appealable final judgment. McCready v. Villas Apartments, 379 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). But even if we treat it as a partial final judgment, it is not appealable under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida and the other district courts which have considered the problem. Piecemeal appeals are not permitted w…
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Newmeyer v. Se. Mortg. Co., 546 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…ck v. Allstate Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Bailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Renard v. Kirkeby Hotels, 99 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); Fla.R.Civ.P. Form 1.994; see also McCready v. Villas Apartments, 379 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).…
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- Renard v. Kirkeby Hotels, Inc., 99 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Pompano Paint Co. v. Pompano Beach Bank & Tr. Co., 208 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- Bailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)