G. L. PRINCE, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
J. RAY ARNOLD LUMBER CORPORATION OF OLUSTEE, A CORPORATION, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld a trial court's decision to abate an action brought against a domestic corporation in Duval County based on the corporation's plea of privilege, holding that venue was improper where the corporation maintained its principal office in Lake County and a branch office in Baker County (where the cause of action accrued), not in Duval County.
The plea of privilege was valid and venue was improper. Even if not technically and formally correct, the plea was substantial and sufficient under Florida law to establish that suits against the corporation must be brought in the county where it maintains an office for transacting customary business or where the cause of action accrued, neither of which was Duval County.
“Suits against domestic corporations shall be commenced only in the county (or justice's district) where such corporation shall have or usually keep an office for the transaction of its customary business, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is”
Establishes the statutory venue requirement for suits against domestic corporations under Section 4222 of the Compiled General Laws (1927)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceG. L. Prince brought an action in Duval County against J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corporation for damages from personal injuries alleged to have occurred in…
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In an action brought in Duval County to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have occurred in Baker County, the defendant domestic corporation filed the following plea of privilege:
“And now comes the defendant in the above entitled cause and for a plea o’f privilege says that it is a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida, and in its certificate of incorporation its principal place of business is fixed at Groveland, in Lake County, Florida; that it keeps an office for the transaetioh of its customary business at Olustee, in Baber County, Florida, and that the cause of action in this suit accrued in Baker County, Florida, and not in Duval County, Florida; that it does not keep and never has kept an office for the transaction of its customary business in Duval County, Florida, WHEREFORE said defendant claims the privilege to be sued *366in Lake Cotmty, Florida, where it keeps its principal office or in Baker County, Florida, where it keeps an office for the transaction of its customary business, and prays judgment of the court as to whether or not it should be required to plead further in this cause.”
The plea was sworn to by the president of the defendant company.
A motion to strike the plea was denied and the plaintiff required to file his replication by a given day. Thereafter the Court rendered the following judgment:
“The above entitled cause having been heard on motion of the Plaintiff to strike Defendant’s, plea of privilege filed in the above entitled cause, and after argument df counsel the Court having denied said motion, and Plaintiff having declined to join issue on said plea of privilege or to plead further herein, it is thereupon
CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the declaration in the above entitled cause be quashed and the foregoing action abate and that the Defendant recover of and from the Plaintiff its reasonable costs.”
The plaintiff took writ of error.
Section 4222, Compiled General Laws, 1927, provides:
“Suits against domestic corporations shall be commenced only in the county (or justice’s district) where such corporation shall have or usually keep an office for the transaction of its customary business, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is; and in the case of companies incorporated in other States or Countries, and doing business in this State, suits shall be commenced in a county or justice’s district wherein such company may have an agent or other representative, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is situated.” (Ch. 1639, Acts of 1669, par. 24, as amended by Ch. 5221, Acts of 1903).
Even if the plea be not 'technically and formally correct it is in substance and effect sufficient as a plea of *367privilege, under the applicable statutes and Rules, of practice in force in this State. See Ritch vs. Adams, 102 Fla. 983, 136 Sou. Rep. 719.
Affirmed.
Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.
Buford, O.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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The Grand Lodge v. Daisy Good all Stroud, 107 Fla. 152 (Fla. 1932)…. 153, 47 So. 397. The stricken plea contained no allegation negativing the fact that the defendant kept an office in Volusia County, so it was wholly and distinctly different in substance from the plea upheld in Prince vs. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co., 105 Fla. 365, 141 Sou. Rep. 172. The default judgment was entered by the Circuit Judge himself at the time he struck the plea of privilege as frivolous, and it does not appear that prior to, or at [*155] that time, the defendant had made any request to he permi…
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The Homestead Fire Ins. Co. v. Andian Corp., 121 Fla. 356 (Fla. 1935)…the plea in question sufficiently complies with that rule. It was not [*359] necessary to include the summons in the record, nor was a formal prayer to the plea essential. Ritch v. Adams, 102 Fla. 983, 136 So. 719; Prince v. J. Ray Arnold Lbr. Co., 105 Fla. 365, 141 So. 172. Other objections to the plea in abatement have been examined and found to be insufficient. The fact that the plea in abatement was entered after the time for defendant to exercise his thirty day option is not material in this case. It…
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Poland v. Cooper, 143 Fla. 729 (Fla. 1940)…d the sufficiency of pleas in abatement in: Universal Credit Co. v. Beckwith, 126 Fla. 865, 172 So. 358; The Homestead Fire Ins. Co. v. Andian, 121 Fla. 356, 164 So. 187; Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146; Prince v. J. Ray Arnold Lbr. Co., 105 Fla. 365; 141 So. 172; Whitaker v. Wright, 100 Fla. 282, 129 So. 889; Ritch v. Adams, 102 Fla. 983, 136 So. 719; Payne v. Ivey, 83 Fla. 436, 93 So. 143; Williams v. Peninsular Gro. Co., 73 Fla. 937, 75 So. 517; McLeod v. Citizens Bank of Live Oak, 61 Fla. 35…
Authorities Cited
- Ritch v. Park H. Adams, 102 Fla. 983 (Fla. 1931)