THE GRAND LODGE, KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS OF NORTH AMERICA, SOUTH AMERICA, EUROPE, ASIA, AFRICA AND AUSTRALIA, JURISDICTION OF FLORIDA, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
DAISY GOOD ALL STROUD, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND AND NEXT FRIEND, JAMES STROUD, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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The Florida Supreme Court denied a motion to quash a writ of error, finding no reversible error in the lower court's proceedings after reviewing the record. The court affirmed the judgment based on established legal principles.
The motion to quash the writ of error was denied. The court found no reversible error in the lower court's proceedings and affirmed the judgment.
“Courts of error have power to quash proceedings in all cases in which error does not lie, or where they are taken against good faith or merely for delay.”
This quote defines the statutory basis for the motion to quash the writ of error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias filed a writ of error challenging a judgment against them. The opposing party, Daisy Goodall Stroud, filed a motio…
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This is a motion to quash a writ of error under Section 4639 C. G. L., 2920 R. G. S., which provides that Courts of error have power to quash proceedings in all cases in which error does not lie, or where they are taken against good faith or merely for delay.
To determine the motion the Court has been compelled to make an examination of the voluminous transcript of *154the record brought here on this appeal, and from such examination the Court is satisfied that no reversible error was committed by the Court below.
Therefore the motion to quash or dismiss the proceedings in error will be denied and the judgment affirmed on the principles stated by this Court in Roberts Bros. vs. Langford, 99 Fla. 1268, 128 Sou. Rep. 810.
Affirmed.
Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.
Buford, C.J., and Brown, J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
On Petition for a Rehearing.
On Motion to Quash writ of error as frivolous, motion denied and judgment affirmed October 24, 1932. On petition for rehearing as to the judgment of affirmance, petition denied.
The Court did not overlook any of the propositions mentioned in the petition for rehearing, when the judgment Oct. 24, 1932, was affirmed.
The plea of privilege interposed was so insufficient in form and substance as to be subject to either demurrer or motion to strike. Bass vs. Geiger, 73 Fla. 312, 73 So. Rep. 936. And after it was ordered stricken, default was properly entered in the absence of any request to be permitted to plead further. Brash vs. Ehrman, 56 Fla. 153, 47 So. 397. The stricken plea contained no allegation negativing the fact that the defendant kept an office in Volusia County, so it was wholly and distinctly different in substance from the plea upheld in Prince vs. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co., 105 Fla. 365, 141 Sou. Rep. 172.
The default judgment was entered by the Circuit Judge himself at the time he struck the plea of privilege as frivolous, and it does not appear that prior to, or at *155that time, the defendant had made any request to he permitted to plead further in the event the motion to strike was granted. So there was no error in entering the default, and consequently no error in allowing the cause to proceed ex parte - in all its phases after the default was entered.
The fact that the defendant had a right to appear and be heard as to damages, even after default judgment, did not impose any duty on the plaintiff to serve notices on defendant as to such further proceedings, in the absence of some request on plaintiff to be served with notices of taking depositions, or some order of the court applied for and obtained requiring such notices to be served. To proceed ex parte means to proceed without the necessity of serving notice and such was the order of procedure directed by the Judge in his order granting the default judgment, which order was known to defendant which could have applied to the court for permission to be permitted to defend thereafter as to damages and be served with notices relating to that inquiry.
Rehearing denied.
Buford C.J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, Brown and Davis, J.J., concur.
On Petition for a Rehearing.
On Motion to Quash writ of error as frivolous, motion denied and judgment affirmed October 24, 1932. On petition for rehearing as to the judgment of affirmance, petition denied.
Per Curiam.
The Court did not overlook any of the propositions mentioned in the petition for rehearing, when the judgment Oct. 24, 1932, was affirmed.
The plea of privilege interposed was so insufficient in form and substance as to be subject to either demurrer or motion to strike. Bass vs. Geiger, 73 Fla. 312, 73 So. Rep. 936. And after it was ordered stricken, default was properly entered in the absence of any request to be permitted to plead further. Brash vs. Ehrman, 56 Fla. 153, 47 So. 397. The stricken plea contained no allegation negativing the fact that the defendant kept an office in Volusia County, so it was wholly and distinctly different in substance from the plea upheld in Prince vs. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co., 105 Fla. 365, 141 Sou. Rep. 172.
The default judgment was entered by the Circuit Judge himself at the time he struck the plea of privilege as frivolous, and it does not appear that prior to, or at that time, the defendant had made any request to he permitted to plead further in the event the motion to strike was granted. So there was no error in entering the default, and consequently no error in allowing the cause to proceed ex parte - in all its phases after the default was entered.
The fact that the defendant had a right to appear and be heard as to damages, even after default judgment, did not impose any duty on the plaintiff to serve notices on defendant as to such further proceedings, in the absence of some request on plaintiff to be served with notices of taking depositions, or some order of the court applied for and obtained requiring such notices to be served. To proceed ex parte means to proceed without the necessity of serving notice and such was the order of procedure directed by the Judge in his order granting the default judgment, which order was known to defendant which could have applied to the court for permission to be permitted to defend thereafter as to damages and be served with notices relating to that inquiry.
Rehearing denied.
Buford C.J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, Brown and Davis, J.J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Moore v. Boyd, 62 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1952)…agree to this rule and have no quarrel with it, but it will be noted that the case upon which appellee relies, Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias of North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia, Jurisdiction of Florida, v. Stroud, 107 Fla. 152, 144 So. 324, 325, merely indicates that no affirmative notice need be given of the intent to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. The notice which is to be given to the defendant is the call of the docket at the next term of Court, at which he is…
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Meier v. Johnston, 110 Fla. 374 (Fla. 1933)…. J. Upon motion to dismiss the appeal herein as frivolous, the Court is of the opinion that the motion to dismiss should be denied, but that the interlocutory order appealed from should be affirmed on the authority of Grand Lodge, etc., v. Stroud, 107 Fla. 152, 144 Sou. Rep. 324, wherein this Court held that where the Supreme Court, in determining motions to quash proceedings in error as frivolous, examines transcript and finds no reversible error, the judgment or decree appealed from will be affirmed, al…
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Smith v. Smith, 118 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1960)…rity to take such further proceedings in the cause as may be appropriate in order to arrive at another decree which will accord with the mandate of this Court. Davis v. Battle, 140 Fla. 778, 192 So. 607; Simpson v. Warren, 106 Fla. 688, 143 So. 602, 144 So. 324; Bredin v. Bredin, Fla.1958, 103 So. 2d 879. Appellant points to the provisions of Rule 3.13, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which fixes the time for taking testimony in chancery causes. We are referred particularly to that portion of the cited…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Roberts Bros. v. Bertie Langford, 99 Fla. 1268 (Fla. 1930)
- Doyle E. Carlton v. Raulerson, 100 Fla. 10 (Fla. 1930)
- Prince v. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corp. of Olustee, 105 Fla. 365 (Fla. 1932)
- Brash v. Ehrman, 56 Fla. 153 (Fla. 1908)
- Bass v. Mrs. M. A. Geiger, 73 Fla. 312 (Fla. 1917)