JOAN THOMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM J. THOMPSON, APPELLEE
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In this marital dissolution case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's award of $75,000 in lump sum alimony to the former wife but reversed on the issue of attorney's fees, finding that the trial court erred in requiring the wife to pay her own fees when a significant post-division asset disparity existed.
The court affirmed the $75,000 lump sum alimony award and rejection of the rehabilitative alimony claim, but reversed the attorney's fees determination. The trial court erred in requiring the wife to pay her own fees given the disparity in post-division assets, and the court must determine a reasonable fee on remand using the standard from Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe.
[1] A trial court's award of lump sum alimony will be affirmed if there is no evidentiary basis for the former wife's contention of a special equity in marital assets.
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying rehabilitative alimony when a substantial lump sum alimony award is made.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Our review of the record discloses there was no evidentiary basis for the wife's contention of a special equity in many of the assets claimed, and we can find no error in the trial court's award of $75,000 lump sum alimony.”
Establishes that the appellate court found sufficient factual support for the trial court's lump sum alimony award and rejected the wife's special equity claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJoan and William Thompson were married for approximately four years. Joan owned a Maryland home valued between $62,000 and $106,000 with a $37,000 mor…
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POLEN, Judge.
The parties were married approximately four years before they sought dissolution of their marriage. Appellant, the former wife, owned a home in Maryland at the time of the marriage, which is valued between $62,000 and $106,000, with a $37,000 mortgage. At the time of the dissolution, she had transferred this house to her son, although there was some conflict as to whether or not this was done at the former husband’s urging.
Appellee had substantial holdings coming into the marriage, which included a successful restaurant business in Ocean City, Maryland. By the appellant’s account, the husband’s holdings, together with joint assets, amounted to well in excess of $2,000,-000. Appellant was claiming a special equity in property such that her share would have been in the amount of $180,000.
The trial court awarded the former wife $75,000 in lump sum alimony which appellant assigns as error and alleges that this constituted a failure to equitably distribute the assets acquired during the marriage. Our review of the record discloses there was no evidentiary basis for the wife’s contention of a special equity in many of the assets claimed, and we can find no error in the trial court’s award of $75,000 lump sum alimony.
Appellant’s second point addresses the failure of the trial court to award her rehabilitative alimony. She relies primarily on Alexander v. Alexander, 479 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). In Alexander, we reversed and remanded in part for an. award of rehabilitative alimony, where the trial court’s award to the wife of a six-year marriage was described as “a melange of used personal property” and where her income was only $6,500 per year. We characterized that meager award as the wife’s being “cut adrift with virtually nothing.” We find Alexander clearly distinguishable from the present case, where the wife is to receive $75,000 as lump sum alimony, we find no abuse of discretion, and therefore affirm on this point as well.
However, appellant’s third point requires reversal. Having taken into consideration the aforementioned award of lump sum alimony, the trial court proceeded to order that each party should pay his or her own costs and attorney’s fees. Given the great disparity in post-division assets, in this case the court erred for two distinct reasons. First, the trial court should have required appellee to pay all of the wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.. Temple v. Temple, 519 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Linn v. Linn, 464 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Perlman v. Perlman, 450 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Secondly, in order to properly award such attorney’s fees, the court must make a determination as to what a reasonable fee would be for the former wife’s attorney, applying the dictates, inter alia, of Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985). The record does not disclose that the trial court ever made such a determination.
The final judgment is affirmed except as to appellant’s entitlement to and the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs, which we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HERSEY, C.J., and GARRETT, J., concur.
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Reich v. Bette Ann Reich, 652 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…dealing with individuals with vastly different financial situations. See Margulies v. Margulies, 645 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) and cases cited therein; see also Giovanelli v. Giovanelli, 654 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Thompson v. Thompson, 550 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). The husband owns his business, earns approximately $100,000 a year and has a substantial net worth consisting of a variety of assets, including a rental apartment, stocks and bonds. The wife is a cosmetologist who did not work d…
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Donsky-Levine v. Levine, 658 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…he above defects in findings invalidated the trial court’s award to the wife of sixty-five percent of her attorney’s fees. One-hundred percent should be granted if there is great disparity in post-division assets or income. See Thompson v. Thompson, 550 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Absent an evaluation of assets, a trial court cannot determine disparity. Moreover, in this ease, the trial court made no finding as to why a full award was not made as required by Wilkins v. Wilkins, 546 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th DCA…
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Driscoll v. Driscoll, 763 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…ity in post-division assets or income. See Donsky-Levine v. Levine, 658 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). One hundred percent should be granted if there is great disparity in post-division assets or income. Id. at 1025. See also Thompson v. Thompson, 550 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Although the trial court did not err in its determination of income of the parties, it failed to evaluate the husband’s two businesses found to be non-marital assets. This makes the trial court’s award of fifteen percent of th…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Linn v. Linn, 464 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Marianna Temple v. John Temple, 519 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Lore Alexander v. Alexander, 479 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Perlman v. Perlman, 450 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)