THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSE RAUL PUIG, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's suppression order after officers discovered a concealed firearm and cocaine during a traffic stop. The appellate court reversed, holding that whether a partially visible firearm is "concealed" is a factual question for the jury, and that the officer had probable cause to arrest based on observing the weapon.
The court held that whether a firearm is "concealed" is a question of fact for the jury, not a matter of law. The fact that a firearm is visible to a law enforcement officer does not preclude it from being concealed within the meaning of the statute. The officer had probable cause to arrest based on observing the weapon under the driver's seat.
[1] A firearm partially visible to a law enforcement officer may still be considered concealed under the relevant statute.
[2] The visibility of a firearm to a law enforcement officer does not automatically preclude it from being concealed.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The fact that a firearm is in the open view of a law enforcement officer does not preclude it from being a concealed firearm within the meaning of the applicable statute.”
Establishes the core holding that visibility to an officer does not determine whether a firearm is legally concealed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficers stopped Puig for a minor traffic violation. While checking the vehicle identification number with a flashlight, an officer observed the barre…
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GERSTEN, Judge.
This is an appeal by the State from the trial court’s order granting suppression of contraband. We reverse. Appellee, Jose Raul Puig, was stopped for a minor traffic violation by two police officers. After obtaining appellee’s driver’s license and the car’s registration, one of the officers went to appellee’s car to compare the vehicle identification number on the dashboard to the number on the registration. While flashing his light into the car to look at the vehicle identification number, the officer saw the barrel of a firearm protruding below the driver’s seat. The officer retrieved the firearm and arrested appellee for carrying a concealed firearm.
Searching the appellee’s car, the officer discovered a bag on the passenger’s seat. The officer’s search of that bag produced a kilo of cocaine. A search of the appellee’s pockets revealed a small vial of cocaine. The appellee was charged with trafficking in cocaine and possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense.
Appellee filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence, claiming that the gun was not concealed from the ordinary sight of others because it was clearly visible to the officer. Therefore the officer lacked any probable cause to arrest and conduct the subsequent search. The trial court granted the defense motion to suppress, which supplied the subject matter of this appeal.
The State contends, and we agree, that the issue of whether the partially visible firearm was “concealed” is an issue of fact for the jury. Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349 (Fla.1981); McGraw v. State, 404 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also Chapas v. State, 404 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The fact that a firearm is in the open view of a law enforcement officer does not preclude it from being a concealed firearm within the meaning of the applicable statute. State v. Strachan, 549 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
The existence of the weapon under the driver’s seat was sufficient evidence to give rise to the belief that an offense had been committed. See State v. Outten, 206 So. 2d 392 (Fla.1968). We therefore find that there was probable cause to arrest and to conduct a search incident to that arrest.
Reversed and remanded.
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Dorelus v. State, 747 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1999)…rts’ decisions to affirm the trial courts’ findings that the weapons were not concealed as a matter of law. However, other cases are in apparent conflict on this issue. Compare Goodman v. State, 689 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and State v. Puig, 551 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), with Cope v. State, 523 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), and Mitchell v. State, 494 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). . This statement comes from the sworn motion to dismiss quoting the arresting officer’s probable cause affidavit…
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State v. Pollock, 600 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…e weapon was on the floorboard protruding from the end of the seat, or was in the seat itself, but under either reading on this record the motion should have been denied. See id.; O.H. v. State, 577 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); State v. Puig, 551 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), review denied, 563 So. 2d 633 (Fla.1990); State v. Strachan, 549 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Myers v. State, 546 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The order under review is reversed and the cause remanded for further p…
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L.G. v. State, 693 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…certainly warranted the conclusion that when L.G. was seated in the driver’s seat with the doors closed, the firearm would not have been visible by ordinary observation to a person standing beside the vehicle. See id. at 355; see also State v. Puig, 551 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Myers v. State, 546 So. 2d 754, 754-55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). L.G. argues that the decision in Villegas v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D690, — So. 2d -(Fla. 2d DCA March 12,1997), supports his argument that concealment is judged…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Elton E. Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1981)
- Williams v. Barron Roofing Co., 206 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1968)
- State v. Outten, 206 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1968)
- Vince Alan Chapas v. State, 404 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- McGRAW v. State, 404 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Hydra Villas at Samari Lakes Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hydra Villas AT Samari Lakes Co., Inc., 549 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- State v. Strachan, 549 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)