ZUBERLON LENARD WILLIAMS
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacating a prior sentence. The petitioner argued his sentence was improperly based on a prior felony conviction for which he did not serve state prison time, a situation later clarified by the Florida Supreme Court.
The court held that commission of a PRR-qualifying offense within three years of release from jail, rather than prison, does not satisfy the requirements of the PRR statute. Therefore, the petitioner's sentence was improperly based on his prior conviction.
[1] A prison releasee reoffender sentence under section 775.082(9)(a)1 requires that the qualifying offense be committed within three years of release from state prison, not…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“commission of a PRR-qualifying offense within three years of release from jail, rather than prison, does not satisfy the requirements of section 775.082(9)(a)1.”
This quote from the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Lewars establishes the legal standard for PRR sentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe petitioner was found guilty of burglary and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). His PRR sentence was based on a prior felony convicti…
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PER CURIAM.
In 2015, a jury found Petitioner guilty of burglary of a dwelling. The trial court thereafter sentenced him to 15 years in prison as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). On appeal, Petitioner objected to his PRR sentence, arguing that he committed the burglary within 3 years after release from county jail on a plea to a felony which had a sentence of 511 days with credit for 511 days served. He never went to state prison on the prior felony. He asserted that, although the sentence was consistent with this Court’s controlling decision in State v. Wright, 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), Wright was wrongly decided. This Court per curiam affirmed without written opinion. Counsel moved for a written opinion and certification of conflict with Lewars v. State,
277 So. 3d 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), but this Court denied the request.
Subsequently, in State v. Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2018), the Florida Supreme Court disapproved this Court’s decision in Wright and approved the Second District’s holding in Lewars. The supreme court specifically held that “commission of a PRR-qualifying offense within three years of release from jail, rather than prison, does not satisfy the requirements of section 775.082(9)(a)1.” Id. at 802.
Because Petitioner asked for certification of conflict with Lewars, it would be manifestly unjust under the circumstances to deny Petitioner the same relief as was afforded the defendant in Lewars. See Elsperman v. State, 201 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). We grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacate the sentence imposed for the burglary of a dwelling offense, and remand for resentencing in accordance with Lewars. ROWE, WINOKUR, and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________
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Cited By
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Raik v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 344 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)…oes read, in violation of the separation of powers.” Nassau County v. Willis, 41 So. 3d 270, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Courts should not resort to the absurdity doctrine merely because of disagreements with the result of legislation. Lewars v. State, 277 So. 3d 143, 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). But, “a literal interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). We believe it would be unre…
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Hutchinson v. State, 363 So. 3d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023)…eme court addressed the 2012 version of the statute in Lewars, the language at issue is identical. See Lewars, 259 So. 3d at 795. transferred from the county jail to a Florida Department of Corrections or private vendor facility. Lewars v. State, 277 So. 3d 143, 144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). Mr. Lewars committed a burglary within two months of his release, and the trial court sentenced him as a prison releasee reoffender for that offense. Id. at 144–45. This court reversed, holding "that Lewars does not quali…
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Dakota Sterling Owens v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)…read, in violation of the separation of powers.” Nassau County v. Willis, 41 So. 3d 270, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Courts should not resort to the absurdity doctrine merely because of disagreements with the result of legislation. Lewars v. State, 277 So. 3d 143, 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). But, “a literal interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). We believe it would be un…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Dazarian Cordell Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2018)
- State v. Wright, 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
- Elsperman v. State, 201 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)